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Abstract 
 
Doubts remain over the true success of USOs in the UK, particularly those created outside the 
elite research universities. This thesis examines the financial performance of USOs generated 
from universities with a range of research intensities from a single region, the West Midlands, 
and considers whether observations can be rationalised using the frameworks of signalling and 
agency theories. 
While some results are in line with the expectations of the frameworks, others are not and 
demonstrate the complexity in attempting to explain the data, and the need to consider wider 
data sets and more explanatory factors. 
Universities with a strong research pedigree generated the most USOs in line with the 
theoretical frameworks, with the Russell Group universities dominant in the region. The data 
relating to survival of USOs is more difficult to rationalise and leads to a tentative conclusion 
that this is not a useful performance metric. External funding appears to be in line with prior 
studies e.g. Shane (2004) and the theoretical frameworks in that the total funding obtained by a 
university is positively correlated to its research strength, although the Russell Group member 
Warwick shows an exceptionally high level of funding obtained. Finally, the data on exits 
demonstrates the inability of all universities across the region to generate financially successful 
exits. In fact, the only financially successful exit was by a USO that had no external funding, 
demonstrating a lack of commercialisable technology created across the region. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and importance of USOs in the UK 
University spin-off companies (USOs) have become a significant feature of the UK’s further 
education sector landscape since the late 1990s. UK universities have been encouraged by 
successive governments to develop and expand a ‘third mission’ (Chatterton and Goddard, 
2003; Visintin and Pisano, 2014) of, amongst other things, economic development through 
technology transfer (Etzkowitz, 2002). Such activities were expected to sit alongside their 
traditional missions of teaching and research, and USOs have increased in number to become 
possibly the most visible manifestation of this strategy. 
Within the wider purview of this ‘third mission’, stakeholders including governments, policy 
makers and universities have identified early-stage and potentially disruptive technologies 
created at universities as having the potential to be developed to reach a stage where they can 
be commercialised and generate income for their owners (Lambert, 2003; Soetanto and 
Geenhuizen, 2015). Historically, such intellectual property had been owned indirectly by the UK 
government via the government-owned British Technology Group as public money had been 
used in the technology’s development. However, during the 1980s, and in line with the 
pioneering Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 in the US, legislation was enacted which allowed UK 
universities for the first time to retain the intellectual property rights arising from research that 
was publicly funded (Richards, 2009). It should be noted that not all UK universities enacted 
their rights to ownership until much later, with the academic behind the development of such 
rights often owning them. 
The downward pressure on funding availability from public revenues to enable the undertaking 
of early-stage research at universities meant that potential financial returns to the parent 
institution through USOs and other forms of technology commercialisation became an 
increasingly attractive prospect (Siegel and Wright, 2015). Such hopes were given credence by 
the apparent financial success of USOs from the US (Geuna and Rossi, 2011). The UK 
government released significant public funds, particularly in the form of University Challenge 
Funds (UCFs) from 1999, to help universities set up USOs and overcome the well-known funding 
gap that all new companies trying to commercialise an innovative technology face while still in 
the development phase. 
Given the financial incentives available, it is perhaps unsurprising that the number of USOs in 
existence increased significantly from about the year 2000 as many UK universities fully 
embraced the government’s vision. Numbers of USOs formed each year increased from fewer 
than 10 in 1994 to over 100 by 2001 (Mueller, 2010). New and refurbished infrastructure such 
as technology transfer offices (TTOs) and incubatory facilities became a common sight on 
university campuses, together with significant investment in the staff working within these 
operations (Shane, 2004). Some of the USOs created were also able to attract funding from the 
private investment sector, which gave further hopes that, bearing in mind the due diligence 
such organisations perform before investing, genuinely disruptive and commercialisable 
technologies were being found and developed. These patterns were also observed in overseas 
countries, which followed the lead of the US (Wennberg et al., 2010). 
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However, once the initial burst of USO creation activity slowed, some commentators e.g. 
Lambert (2003) started to discuss the need for a number of thorough reviews of the actual 
financial performance to date of such USOs. While the numbers of USOs created were 
increasing significantly, such a metric said nothing about the underlying success of the 
companies created. Studies were performed using non-financial metrics, which are certainly of 
importance, but the study of financial performance at a company level would be crucial in 
providing comfort to all stakeholders that the policy of USO creation was meeting one of its 
aims of creating wealth. Critics of the USO programme focused on the apparent measurement 
by certain commentators of the success of the UK’s USO programme by considering the 
quantity of USOs generated rather than their quality (Fini et al., 2017), and ignoring more 
challenging performance measures such as the amount of third party finance attracted by the 
companies (Lambert, 2003; Guthrie, 2004). The lack of a UK USO to reach the size of their 
largest US counterparts, and indeed the more general apparently inferior performance of UK 
universities in generating revenues, employment and financial value from their USO 
programmes, when compared with the US, has also been noted (RSC, 2005). The financial 
performance of USOs was also unfavourably compared to that of corporate spin offs (CSOs) in a 
number of studies (Zahra et al., 2007; Wennberg et al., 2011).  
As time passed, however, despite the desire for a significant body of work, the number of 
studies of detailed financial performance of USOs increased only at a very slow rate (Wennberg 
et al., 2010), as well as studies over the long-term viability of USOs (Meoli et al., 2013). This can 
be attributed to a number of factors which will be discussed at much greater length, but 
difficulty in obtaining reliable and complete financial data was, and remains, a key issue. 
Inevitably, a number of commentators started to question whether USOs were delivering any 
tangible financial benefits, and indeed whether they were even covering the costs of servicing 
the infrastructure set up to support USO creation. A picture is painted of a large number of very 
small USOs in the UK which were not justifying the investments and hype surrounding them, as 
well as in other countries (Fini et al., 2017; Iaccobuci et al., 2011). Harrison and Leitch (2010) 
described the phenomenon of USOs as a ‘voodoo institution’ where hard evidence for backing 
up claims of success is lacking. Other researchers noted the fact that most USOs tend to remain 
very small (Hesse and Sternberg, 2017). From a government and public policy perspective, 
studies into the financial performance of USOs are thus of great importance, given the fact that 
large sums of public money have been invested in these programmes of USO creation (Wright et 
al., 2008). 
In a similar vein, Rasmussen et al. (2012) note that, given the prominence of USOs in 
government policies to promote economic growth, empirical evidence on their impact is 
limited, with some of the apparent success stories of companies created by universities being 
based on very broad definitions. In addition, a small share of universities are responsible for a 
high proportion of USOs created, and the literature to date often uses empirical data from the 
most successful cases. Most studies consider only anecdotal evidence or case studies of a single 
university or region, and it is not clear if conclusions can be transferred to other contexts. It can 
be seen from above that a number of financial performance studies have been undertaken to 
date, but the conclusions that may be drawn are limited. 
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1.2 Motivation and contribution to the literature 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to add to the understanding of the topic of the financial 
performance of USOs. It should be noted that there are other, non-financial ways to measure 
performance, but these are not considered in depth given the nature of the data to be 
collected. The overall success, or otherwise, of USOs in the UK is a topic that still requires 
further study, almost twenty years after the increase in numbers, and given the passing of time 
the data available will allow a useful assessment to be made. 
In terms of a conceptual contribution to the literature, this thesis evaluates the theoretical 
frameworks used to date in the studies of financial performance of USOs and identifies the most 
suitable both for this work and to allow easy comparability with future studies as signalling and 
agency theories. While other frameworks such as the Resource-Based View (RBV) have been 
popular in studies of USOs to date, these are less appropriate to this work given the restricted 
nature of the financial data collected. It adds to the literature by providing an analysis of the 
performance metrics used to date in other works and a justification of those used that produce 
the best means to discover whether the overall programme of USOs in the UK has been a 
success, as well as considering how these metrics are linked and builds a performance model 
that can be used in further work. It also seeks to link performance data obtained back to the 
chosen theoretical frameworks to see if findings are consistent with the hpredictions of the 
frameworks, while recognising that financial performance is dependent upon a wide range of 
factors meaning that any conclusions are likely to be tentative in nature.  
The thesis further seeks to make a significant contribution by helping to partially fill the 
evidence gap mentioned above in the academic literature on the financial performance of UK 
USOs. However, the motivation to further research this topic is slightly broader and attempts to 
address a number of potential methodological deficiencies in the existing literature. Those 
existing studies that do seek to explore this field often appear to use samples of USOs that, 
while relatively easy to obtain, are likely to miss out a number of interesting cases and may 
present a distortion of the true picture, inaccurately estimating the financial success of USOs 
(Shane and Stuart, 2002). As a result, the findings of previous works are often incomplete and 
thus difficult for policy makers and investors to form judgments over the effectiveness of USOs 
in commercialising technology. 
As noted above and discussed in greater depth in Chapter 3, many existing studies obtain their 
USO populations and financial performance data either from university TTOs, or directly from 
USOs themselves. Neither of these sources is necessarily likely to provide an objective source of 
data in isolation, particularly in regard to USOs that failed from a financial performance 
perspective and which may have simply been forgotten, resulting in potential survivor bias in 
their populations (Shane and Stuart, 2002). It is therefore difficult for existing studies to 
adequately explain unusual results. For example, a number of prior studies have discovered that 
USOs appear to survive for longer than other start-up companies e.g. Shane (2004), yet due to 
uncertainties over the accuracy and completeness of their population of USOs from an 
institution, their explanations for this phenomenon remain disputed e.g. Zhang (2009), although 
it should be noted that some USOs will need to spend a long time to develop their particular 
technology (Pettersen and Tobiassen, 2012). Companies that survive without demonstrating a 
positive financial performance have been identified in other parts of the literature e.g. ‘living 
dead’ companies (Ruhnka et al., 1992), but this issue has not been explored in any detail in the 
USO literature. Existing studies of USOs usually attempt to bypass such issues by not making any 
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attempt to research and present absolute performance data, but instead use regression 
techniques to assess the impact of various variables upon a chosen performance measurement 
e.g. Mueller (2010). While such studies are of value, they are of limited use to policymakers in 
particular, who wish to focus on absolute results of the USO programmes undertaken to provide 
justification or otherwise for the absolute value of financial investment made into them. This 
thesis aims to provide policymakers with a clear picture as to whether the USO creation 
programme within the West Midlands was successful from a financial perspective. 
As a result, this thesis’s potentially most significant contribution towards the academic 
literature is by studying financial performance of USOs using a different methodology from 
many previous studies while testing out the validity of the two main theoretical frameworks 
chosen. It places a very significant emphasis upon creating a very accurate dataset of USOs 
using strict definitional criteria, and a significant proportion of the time spent on this work was 
in planning and completing this task. It seeks to overcome the issue of survivor bias to which 
many previous studies are prone by considering a range of objective sources independent of the 
university technology transfer organisations, combining the findings and then by meticulously 
reviewing records from earlier years to obtain the required information. Financial performance 
data is largely extracted from review of the published accounts of each USO rather than relying 
upon less accurate sources, given that accounting data in the public domain, although 
sometimes limited in scope, is likely to be more accurate than other forms of data used to date 
given legal public reporting requirements. Once this accurate data set has been obtained it will 
be possible to analyse trends across the universities chosen at a granular company level, and 
over a significant period of time. Importantly, the techniques used will be easily replicable for 
other areas of the UK for future studies given the nature of the research paradigm in which this 
research is performed. 
In addition to contributing to the literature with high quality data, this thesis also adds a 
different dimension with the choice of region in which the USOs and universities are studied, 
namely the West Midlands area of the UK, commonly considered to be a post-industrial region. 
The heritage of the West Midlands area is largely represented by that of different forms of 
heavy industry such as pottery in the Stoke region, metalwork and manufacturing in the 
Birmingham region, and automotive and supporting industries, which attract significant 
amounts of research from academia and industry in the Coventry and Warwickshire areas 
(Amison and Bailey, 2014). USOs in these sectors might therefore be expected to be observed in 
significant numbers in the region. Such industries are still very much present in these traditional 
areas, but now employ far fewer people in absolute terms than in previous years and are likely 
to be carried on in smaller industrial units and employing more highly skilled workers. The 
region itself also shows a wide range of universities from research-intensive Russell Group1 
members (a grouping of the UK’s most prestigious research universities) such as Warwick and 
Birmingham to much newer universities with less research pedigree. 
It should be noted that the study of USOs from a single geographic region rather than nationally 
or from a single university (Fini et al., 2017) is, in itself, unusual in the literature. This 
observation is surprising as the wide range of types of universities within the sample gives rise 
 
1 The Russell Group of universities, formed in 1994, represents 24 leading UK universities with its aim ‘to 
help ensure the universities have the optimum conditions in which to flourish and continue to make 
social, economic and cultural impacts through their world-leading research and teaching’. 
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to a number of interesting comparisons between data collected within the same region, and 
explanations based upon the profile of the parent institutions, before even considering 
comparisons with universities in the rest of the UK and overseas, which could be replicated in 
other studies. The difficulty in obtaining objective data, discussed in greater depth below, is 
likely to be the root cause of this omission to date.  
Universities from such post-industrial areas have not been considered in the UK USO literature 
in great detail to date, which has often focussed on institutions such as Oxford (Lawton Smith 
and Ho, 2006), Cambridge (Garnsey and Heffernan, 2005) and London Universities (Holi et al., 
2007; Lawton Smith et al., 2014), which constitute the elite UK universities with particularly 
strong and well-funded science and engineering departments, from which the majority of USOs 
traditionally originate. This study will therefore provide a perspective on a different tier of UK 
universities and determine whether the USO phenomenon has provided any significant financial 
benefits to them, as doubts remain as to how far the findings from such elite universities are 
replicated (Wright et al., 2008). It will serve to complement a study of the redbrick Queen’s 
University, Belfast by Harrison and Leitch (2010) and provide further insight as to whether the 
performance of USOs justifies the resources invested in them. It further compares and contrasts 
findings from other works in the literature with its own data, which is surprisingly a topic that 
has rarely been performed to date e.g. Mueller (2010), possibly due to the wide range of 
performance data collected which appears to be largely driven by the source of data at hand to 
the researchers. As a result the financial data may be able to contribute to some extent to the 
wider area of national and regional support for USOs and how policy makers can seek to achieve 
this, or even if such support is actually the most effective use of resources in attempting to 
commercialise university-developed technology. 
As noted above, the West Midlands region has a wide range of universities, and therefore 
unsurprisingly a wide range of attitudes towards the creation and support of USOs generated to 
exploit and commercialise their technology. These range from establishing substantial 
technology transfer offices with dedicated staff, often with private sector experience, who 
actively seek out university technology with commercial potential, as in the case of Warwick, to 
more low key operations, as seen amongst some of the newer universities where USOs are 
supported in a non-financial way. A number of newer universities in the region generated no 
USOs at all. The table below provides some examples of this range of support. 
 
Active support Less active support 
Technology transfer office established No technology transfer office established 
Employees with private sector experience 
recruited to assist USOs 
University staff assist USOs 
University recommends external directors to 
USOs 
University does not recommend directors 
University has close relationships with 
external investors 
Few or no relationships with investors 
Unversity provides low-cost incubator space 
to USOs 
USOs must seek external premises 
University creates a strong, positive culture 
of entrepreneurship amongst staff and 
students 
Entrepreneurial culture not developed 
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University secures external professional 
advisers to offer free or discounted services 
to USOs 
Few or no relationships with professional 
advisers 
University hosts networking events with 
investors and entrepreneurs 
Few or no external events or interactions 
University offers practical entrepreneurship 
modules or courses 
Few or no relevant modelules or courses 
University selectivelyinvests in equity of 
USOs 
No investments made 
Table 1.1 Range of university support for USOs (author-generated) 
 
1.2.1 Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis of this work is the USO i.e. the limited company ‘spun off’ from the 
university to attempt to commercialise technology. This is a clear consequence of the desire to 
collect detailed historic accounting data from company records. A limited company is a discrete 
legal entity and forms a suitable unit of analysis for study. However, there are significant 
relationships between a USO, the university (including any associated technology transfer 
operations) from which the USO is derived, and the region in which it is located. All these 
elements are of interest to explore where possible as noted in the preceding paragraphs. For 
instance, it is well known that universities have very different policies and create a very wide 
range of USOs, ranging from zero to significant numbers (Shane, 2004; Rasmussen et al., 2012), 
and there are also significant regional variations (Minshall and Wicksteed, 2010). 
As a result, it is acknowledged that it may be difficult at times to separate USOs from their 
parent university, and potentially the wider region, when discussing the results. It may be 
necessary to group together USOs under parent universities or region, especially when 
comapring results with the small number of existing studies in the literature, and it should be 
borne in mind that a number of USOs under examination will no longer exist. However, the real 
value and novelty of this work lies in the methodology of collection of data from different 
sources to prior work as noted above; it is not simply the study of USOs from a new region. It is 
hoped that the accuracy of the new approach will allow comments to be made on existing 
studies, offering possible solutions to queries raised to date. 
 
1.3 Research questions 
Based on the above motivations behind this thesis to contribute towards the academic 
literature on USOs, the broad overarching research question which this work seeks to answer is: 
‘Have USOs generated by West Midlands universities been successful in terms of financial 
performance?’ 
In order to answer this question, it is critical to identify the most effective performance metrics 
with which to evaluate the USOs, and the following associated methodological question is 
further researched in Chapter 3: 
‘What are the most effective financial performance metrics for studying the performance of 
USOs?’ 
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Several supplementary research questions relating to the interaction and links between key 
performance metrics identified are further developed in Chapter 3 in order to build a model 
that can be replicated in future studies. 
 
1.4 Thesis structure 
Following this introductory chapter, the thesis is broken down into a number of further chapters 
to explore the chosen theme. 
As noted above, the current academic literature relating to USOs is relatively small compared to 
other fields, as would be expected when dealing with a new area of study, but growing fairly 
rapidly. Chapters 2 and 3 of this work undertake a detailed review of the existing academic 
literature relevant to USOs. Chapter 2 focusses on the growing literature examining the wider 
topic of universities and entrepreneurship, including key topics such as government policies 
worldwide to encourage the development of this area, before focussing on the part of this 
literature that considers USOs. Important issues are introduced such as a review of previous 
attempts to define a USO, consideration of the heterogeneity of USOs and attempts to classify 
them into different typologies. Chapter 3 reviews the key performance metrics, as well as 
theoretical models used to date in the literature to study USOs, before selecting those metrics 
that are most suitable for the current work and the theoretical frameworks within which to 
collect and analyse the financial performance data obtained. 
Chapter 4 investigates the research paradigm within which the research is carried out, and also 
explains the research methodologies and design to be used in the present work, justifying the 
choices made.  
Chapter 5 presents a case study of the University of Birmingham, focussing on the financial 
performance of its USOs using the metrics and methodologies selected in the previous chapters 
to test their validity for use in the whole thesis. The University of Birmingham falls within the 
overall population of universities from the West Midlands, and a case study on a single 
university was run to test whether the proposed methodology for the whole work was realistic 
and that sufficient data could be collected and analysed. This chapter formed the basis of a 
published journal paper (Jelfs, 2016). 
Chapter 6 expands upon the single university case study of the previous chapter, using the same 
metrics and methodologies that had previously proved successful, to include all the universities 
throughout the West Midlands region. The data for all the universities is collated to allow more 
detailed subsequent analysis to be performed. 
Chapter 7 compares and contrasts the data collected between the universities within the West 
Midlands region and draws out trends across the region. It analyses results and trends within 
the theoretical frameworks chosen in Chapter 3 and attempts to provide explanations for trends 
observed that are of particular interest. 
Chapter 8 follows on by comparing and contrasting the West Midlands universities’ data with 
data collected in other academic studies, which cover USOs derived from both other UK and 
overseas universities. The number of comparable studies in the academic literature is currently 
very low, but some interesting comparisons are able to be drawn, as well as validation of data 
collected in these other studies. 
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Chapter 9 provides discussion points for key USO stakeholders arising from the thesis, 
conclusions arising and suggestions for further work to be performed within the field to build on 
the findings of this work. It also provides answers to the research questions raised in Chapter 4 
based on the financial data collected, and concludes on the validity of the theoretical 
frameworks of signalling and agency theories. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the topic of USOs. A literature review highlights key 
issues related to USOs that have been studied to date, and their relevance to the subjects of 
investigation of this thesis.  
The chapter starts with a brief review of key concepts and definitions from the academic 
literature about the interaction between universities and entrepreneurship, of which USOs are a 
part. It then considers government policies introduced to encourage universities into 
undertaking entrepreneurial activities, including financial support for USOs. The remainder of 
the chapter then focusses on USOs at a company level, and considers key issues from the 
literature such as definitions of USOs, the heterogeneity of their properties and typologies 
proposed to date, which will be important concepts to consider within the research design of 
the current study. Finally, regional and institutional aspects are also briefly considered given the 
importance of the West Midlands region in this thesis. 
 
2.2. Universities and entrepreneurship 
USOs form an important part of a much wider range of interactions between universities and 
entrepreneurship. This section considers very briefly some of the background from the 
literature concerning this relationship, before the chapter moves on to consider USOs in more 
detail. 
Since the founding of mediaeval universities, their two key activities have usually been teaching 
and research. Martin and Etzkowitz (2000) note that the roles attributed to universities have 
evolved according to two main perspectives on the two primary traditional functions: 
• The ‘classical university’ generates and transmits knowledge through research 
conducted for its own sake, and teaching aiming to develop the full potential of 
students 
• The ‘technical university’ focusses on training students with knowledge and skills that 
are useful for society, and on creating knowledge of direct societal benefit 
On a narrow level relevant to the current study, the ‘third mission’ of universities can be 
described as a mission of economic development through technology transfer (Etzkowitz, 1998). 
Chatterton and Goddard (2003) consider the mission to be a more wide-ranging concept with a 
number of proposed definitions encompassing the interaction of universities with society, 
covering economic, social, cultural and knowledge transfer engagement. This civic role is a 
particularly important concept for some of the UK’s ‘redbrick’ universities such as Birmingham. 
The definition of technology transfer is broad, and Harrison and Leitch (2010) note that there 
has long been a link between university expansion and economic growth, but this was 
previously based on development of human capital rather than exploitation of academic 
research. 
An ‘entrepreneurial university’ (Etzkowitz, 1983) is an institution that shows entrepreneurial 
behaviours, although this is much wider than simply considering technology commercialisation. 
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A recent report by the OECD (OECD, 2012) found little consensus in the literature over how to 
define such an entity. Gibb (2013) described it as a university ‘designed to empower staff and 
students to demonstrate enterprise, innovation and creativity in research, teaching and pursuit 
and use of knowledge across boundaries’. An older definition from Clark (1998) describes such a 
university as one that ‘seeks to innovate in how it goes to business, to work out a substantial 
shift in organizational character, to become stand-up universities that are significant actors in 
their own terms’. 
Governments worldwide have made concerted policy efforts to increase university 
entrepreneurship, and particularly in the development and commercialisation of their 
intellectual property. Most commentators appear to acknowledge that this step change in 
activity was initially observed in the US; Grimaldi et al. (2011) consider that the change 
commenced in the late 1970s following growing concerns over the apparent deterioration of 
the national competitive advantage in manufacturing, and particularly from increased 
competition from Japan. Rothermael et al. (2007) state that a shift occurred in the US university 
system to create entrepreneurial universities, driven by the following key contributory factors: 
• Rise in venture capital availability 
• New legislation, particularly the Bayh-Dole Act mentioned in more detail below, which 
provided incentives for universities to obtain patent protection for discoveries achieved 
with federal funding 
• Rise in the numbers in the pool and thus the mobility of scientists and engineers 
• Important technological breakthroughs in a range of areas, particularly computing, 
biotechnology and nanotechnology 
From a UK perspective, Minshall and Wicksteed (2005) consider that commercialisation 
activities in UK universities suffered from a poor image internally for a long while, particularly 
when compared to the US. The process of change has often been considered to have 
accelerated in 1985 with the Conservative government’s ending of the state-owned British 
Technology Group’s monopoly over the ownership of intellectual property rights generated by 
academics, a policy which gave universities the right to exploit their own inventions, whether 
publicly-funded or otherwise. 
However, the entrepreneurial university concept has also attracted critical analyses over its 
effectiveness. Holbrook and Hulbert (2007) identify a fundamental change in how a university is 
viewed as a social institution from one of education and research to a consumerist ‘knowledge 
factory’, collaborating closely and increasingly funded by industry and developing a range of 
client-specific programmes. Further criticisms of the model include some opinions that the 
entrepreneurial university is a failed idea (Armbruster, 2008), as it raises unreasonable 
expectations with expected returns failing to materialise, and threatens to compromise the 
creation of science itself. Tuunainen (2005) considers that the entrepreneurial university pays 
insufficient attention to ‘the problems and contradictions universities encounter as they cater 
for the new economic functions’, while Vestergaard (2007) notes that efforts to commercialise 
university research are often impeded by role conflicts and tensions between university 
management and researchers. Bozeman (2000) argues that the ‘cooperative technology policy 
paradigm’, which sees technology transfer as a key mechanism for impacting markets, industry 
competitiveness and economic development, has only a modest potential for creating new jobs 
or businesses. 
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2.3 Government policies on supporting USOs 
Grimaldi et al. (2011) note that there is widespread global agreement on the value of promoting 
commercialisation of knowledge generated by universities, and a variety of government policies 
to encourage this behaviour are seen in a number of countries both on a national and regional 
level, although some recent studies have challenged the need for public support of USOs e.g. 
Sternberg (2014). Rasmussen (2006) considers that many countries have undertaken university 
reforms with a view to increase the commercialisation of the results of public research, which 
have been achieved through changes in academic systems and instruments for research 
funding, as well as setting up structures to support such activities. The approaches taken have 
been varied, and an overview of policies in this field in two key geographic areas: the US and the 
UK, is given below. 
As with the encouragement of university entrepreneurship mentioned above, both national and 
regional governments have introduced policies explicitly to target the creation and support of 
USOs (Sternberg, 2014; Fini et al., 2016). Geenhuizen and Soetanto (2009) state that a major 
reason for policy attention on USOs in Europe lies in the ‘European paradox’, which is the 
apparently contradictory situation of a high level of publicly financed knowledge production at 
universities and research institutes, but a limited wealth creation achieved through using the 
knowledge (Wright et al., 2008). This concept has been developed further e.g. the Swedish 
‘academic paradox’ (Edquist, 2002) as more detailed studies have been carried out on a country 
level. Policies to create USOs at national, regional and university level have been introduced 
over the last few years. At universities, institutional arrangements such as TTOs and internal 
seed funds have been set up, but commentators have noted that few institutions have, 
however, gained a positive revenue from commercialisation activity (Geuna and Nesta, 2006), a 
situation that this study seeks to explore. 
Support for USOs by policy makers has developed with time and this is reflected in a growing 
literature. As noted in the previous chapter, the primary aim of this work is to collect financial 
performance data, but this may be able to contribute to the wider debate over the most 
effective way to support USO development, within the wider context of general national and 
regional economic development. Guerrero et al. (2016) note that many nations, regions and 
states have attempted to stimultate innovation by companies in order to increase economic 
growth, and in general these policies, at whatever level, aim to support technology-based 
entrepreneurship (Mustar and Wright, 2010; Grimaldi et al., 2011). Governments support 
universities as part of this aim (Cohen et al., 2002) and Guerrero et al. (2016) consider that the 
emerging role of an entrepreneurial university focusses on both innovation and entreneurship 
to contribute to increasing innovation, competitiveness and economic growth (Audretsch, 
2014). 
Siegel and Wright (2015) discuss the development of policies to support academic 
entrepreneursip and speculate as to future outcomes within this field given the significant 
changes seen in recent years. They note that evidence for the success of universities and their 
TTOs in promoting academic entrepreneurship is limited, and question the applicability of the 
models of elite universities to most other universities, leading to suggestions over whether 
many universities should take part at all, or at least focus their efforts narrowly to where they 
can be most effective. 
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In terms of future developments, Siegel and Wright (2015) consider that some universities will 
continue to undertaken academic entrepreneurship, driven by perceived national government 
policy desires, for three reasons, namely: i) competitive pressures form other universities driven 
by publication of relevant metrics, ii) to generate money from private donors, and iii) the 
growth of funding from government agencies. This last point is discussed in more depth below, 
focussing on the UK, with equivalent US programmes such as the Small Business Innovation 
Relief and Technology Transfer. In addition, Siegel and Wright (2015) consider that policy 
makers to date have focussed narrowly on formal intellectual property transfer via licences and 
USOs, and that significant opportunities exist for informal knowledge creation and exploitation 
via new forms of entrepreneurial venture. Further evidence of an evolution in 
traditionalacademic entrepreneurship scholarly analysis is given by Martin (2012) who considers 
that linking academic research with economic needs has a very long history, certainly predating 
the recent focus on USOs. Research such as that of Lockett et al. (2014) concludes that, in 
general, many TTOs are inefficient and do not generate positive net income (Abrams et al., 
2009), which backs up findings such as Grimaldi et al. (2011) that the benefit from government 
policies such as the Bayh-Dole Act were not as great as anticipated, but Siegel and Wright (2015) 
consider the emerging perspective in academic entrepreneurship to be around the wider social 
and economic benefit to the university ecosystem, rather than solely considering direct financial 
returns. 
In summary, the academic literature in the field of academic entrepreneurship and USOs is 
evolving around the area of the support provided by policy makers to encourage national and 
regional economic development. Earlier practices of essentially direct funding of USOs has been 
moderated given the lack of financial returns to date to provide broader support and calls for 
policies such as support for accelerator programmes (Clarysse et al., 2015). 
 
2.3.1 US policies 
As mentioned above, the US is generally acknowledged to be the worldwide leader in the field 
of university entrepreneurship, both in terms of the early date of commencement and the scale 
of the subsequent activity achieved. One widely observed manifestation of government policies 
in this field is the passing of appropriate legislation to encourage universities to develop 
entrepreneurial activities (Grimaldi et al., 2011). The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 in the US allowed 
universities to protect and exploit intellectual property (IP) rights developed from public 
funding, which they were previously not allowed to do. Mowery et al. (2001) note that the Act 
facilitated university patenting and licensing by replacing agreements negotiated between 
individual universities and federal agencies with a uniform policy, supporting the negotiation of 
exclusive licenses between universities and industrial firms for the results of federally funded 
research, and endorsing of the argument that failure to establish patent protection over the 
results of federally funded university research would limit the commercial exploitation of these 
results. This important piece of legislation is often cited as the ‘first in class’ worldwide in 
government support for university entrepreneurship. A number of European governments 
subsequently followed suit by passing similar legislation, with the UK leading the way, although 
exceptions remain such as Sweden which retains the ‘professors’ privilege’ (Geuna and Rossi, 
2011), where the academic is the legal owner of their inventions. 
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In terms of the success of the legislation, Wennberg et al. (2011) note that there is evidence 
that the Bayh-Dole Act, which was intended to facilitate the process by which the knowledge 
created at universities would spill over to the benefit of the public (Mowery et al., 2004), has 
fulfilled some of these intentions. Patenting activity of universities and revenues from the 
licensing of intellectual property both increased in the US following the passing of the legislation 
(Merrill and Mazza, 2010; Siegel and Wright, 2015), and subsequent reforms such as the 
founding of TTOs were seen at many universities, with the US leading the way and other 
countries following suit around the world. Siegel et al. (2007) note that in the US, the number of 
patents granted to US universities rose from fewer than 300 in 1980 to 3,278 in 2005, while 
licensing of new technologies increased almost fourfold from 1991 and annual licensing revenue 
rose from $160m in 1991 to $1.4bn in 2005, which reflect an international phenomenon and 
may in part be attributable specifically to the legislative changes. It should also be noted that 
there has been some debate over the contribution of the Bayh-Dole Act to society (Verspagen, 
2006), and Fini et al. (2010) consider that a wide range of innovation occurs outside the remit of 
its specific policies,  but Thursby and Thursby (2011) found little evidence of a destruction of 
open culture of science or less basic research work being performed. 
 
2.3.2 UK policies 
In the UK, following the introduction of the 1985 legislation mentioned above, Mustar and 
Wright (2010) identify that since the end of the 1990s, the main emphasis of government 
policies for universities has been the establishment of an entrepreneurial culture in which 
scientific capabilities are exploited through USOs (and other start-up and spin-off companies), 
as well as other means. They highlight five main financial initiatives introduced by the UK 
government to achieve this end, all of which have now expired and not specifically been 
replaced: 
 
Scheme Objective Outcomes/Finance 
Higher education reach out 
to business and the 
community (HEROBC - 1998) 
Funding to support activities 
to improve linkages between 
universities and their 
communities. Intended to 
initiate a third stream of 
funding. To reward and 
encourage HEI’s interaction 
with business. 
£20 million per year allocated 
to provide funding for the 
establishment of activities 
such as corporate liaison 
offices 
The first round of HEROBC 
funding ran from January 
2000 to July 2003. There 
were 87 awards ranging from 
£25k to £1.1m including five 
collaborative projects. 
The second round ran from 
August 2000 to July 2004. 
There were 50 awards 
ranging from £100k to £1.1m 
including 10 collaborative 
projects. 
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University challenge (UCF) – 
first round (1999), second 
round (2001) 
To close the funding gap 
between basic research and 
private sector investment by 
overcoming difficulties faced 
in trying to fund proof of 
concept and prototype 
development work, to 
demonstrate sufficient 
success so private investment 
will follow. Seed investments 
to help commercialisation of 
university IPR. 
637 institutions (28 
universities and 9 Research 
Council institutes) have 
access to £65m (£45m from 
government and charity 
sources and £20m from 
universities). Max investment 
of £250k. Generated tangible 
increase in spin outs and 
licensing. 
In second round, five funds 
established in which 27 
institutions are involved. 
Each consortium received 
£3m of government funding 
to establish the fund, or in 
some cases to add to funds in 
the first round. 
Science enterprise challenge 
(SEC) – first round (1999), 
second round (2001) 
To encourage the emergence 
of a culture that is open to 
entrepreneurship, which is 
required for successful 
knowledge transfer from the 
science base. Teaching of 
entrepreneurship to support 
the commercialisation of 
science and technology. To 
produce graduates and 
postgraduates better able to 
engage in enterprise. 
Establish a network of UK 
universities specialising in the 
teaching and practice of 
commercialisation and 
entrepreneurialism in the 
field of science and 
technology. 
12 centres of excellence were 
established with £29m of 
government funding. 
Following external 
contributions, the centres 
have access to around £57m 
funding. 
In second round, 7 consortia 
(involving more than 30 
institutions) were successful 
and £15m of government 
investments was made. The 
majority of awards provided 
additional funding to centres 
established by the first 
round. 
Higher education innovation 
fund (HEIF - 2001) 
Third stream funding for 
universities (additional to 
teaching and research) 
building on HEROBC fund. 
Single, long term 
commitment to a stream of 
funding to support 
universities’ potential to act 
as drivers of growth in the 
knowledge economy (focus 
on capacity building and 
development). 
Government allocated £140m 
over three years from 2001-
2. 
£80m to English HEIs over 
2000-4. Second round 2004-
6, third round 2006-8, fourth 
round 2008-11, other 
allocations up to March 2018 
when HEIF closed 
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Public sector research 
exploitation fund (PSREF – 
2001) 
To enable bodies carrying out 
research on the public sector 
to support commercialisation 
and access seed capital 
funding. 
Focus on capacity building 
and development. Focus on 
knowledge transfer through 
licensing and spin outs. 
£10m awarded in 2001-2, 
£4m in establishing a seed 
fund and the remaining £6m 
to enable 14 consortia, 
comprising PSREs and more 
than 30 NHS Trusts to 
develop capacity in 
knowledge transfer. 
Table 2.1 Main UK government initiatives to encourage university entrepreneurship – Mustar 
and Wright (2010) 
 
The relevance of these initiatives for this study is that other studies in the literature have 
observed a significant increase in the number of UK USOs from about the year 2000, which has 
been ascribed in part to the availability of UCF money (Soetanto and Geenhuizen, 2015). SQW 
(2005) show that up to July 2003, 413 projects benefited from a UCF investment, translating 
into 59 USOs, and concluded that ‘there is little doubt that UCF met a gap in the UK for early 
stage funding of technology-based ideas’. As a result, UCF funding will be an important variable 
in assessing financial performance, as well as discovering whether similar trends are observed in 
the West Midlands region. 
 
2.4 Definition of USOs 
One of the key features and difficulties faced by academic USO research is that there is no 
consistent definition in the academic literature of a USO (Criaco et al., 2014). This situation is 
potentially problematic for many reasons, not least the difficulty in comparing results obtained 
by different studies, and even results within the same study. As an illustration, the Higher 
Education Funding Council for England’s (HEFCE) annual report (the HE-BCI or Higher Education 
Business and Community Interaction survey - http://www.hefce.ac.uk/ke/hebci), which 
examines the exchange of knowledge between universities and the wider world, and informs 
the strategic direction of ‘knowledge exchange’ activity that funding bodies and higher 
education institutions in the UK undertake, identifies four categories of USO, namely: 
i) Spin offs with some Higher Education Institution (HEI) ownership 
ii) Formal spin offs, not HEI-owned 
iii) Staff start ups 
iv) Graduate start ups 
Attempts have been made in the literature to date to collate the various definitions used for 
USOs, and these are expanded upon below. On first principles, Djokovic and Souitaris (2008) 
consider that the definition of a USO should specify three key elements: 
• the ‘outcome’ of the spinout process 
• the essential ‘parties’ involved in it 
• the ‘core elements’ that are transferred (spun-out) during that process 
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Expanding slightly upon these concepts, the first element is the creation of a new company, 
which appears to be a consensus opinion (Djokovic and Souitaris, 2008) within the literature. 
The second element principally encompasses the university where the knowledge was 
developed prior to transfer (Carayannis et al., 1998), although it can include external parties 
such as USO managers. Shane (2004) considers that companies formed by current or former 
university employees based on technology developed in a location other than the university are 
not USOs, although other studies use a more broad definition. The university often provides 
assistance to the USO such as patenting activities, and often has an equity stake in it. However, 
the USO is not usually wholly-owned or managed by the university. Roberts and Malone (1996) 
identified four involved parties in the formation of a USO: 
• the parent organisation from which the technology is extracted 
• the technology originator i.e. the person who brings the technology from a basic 
research stage to a point at which technology transfer can begin 
• the entrepreneur who attempts to create a new venture centred on the technology 
• the venture investor that provides funding for the new company 
In addition, the entrepreneur is also a key player who developed the technology. They may 
continue to work for the university or leave to work in the USO, although some authors consider 
USOs to be only companies formed by former employees of the university (Carayannis et al., 
1998). Externally-hired entrepreneurs may also provide an important role in managing the USO, 
following the observation of Shane (2002) that the inventor of the technology is not usually the 
best leader of the USO due to their lack of commercial experience. 
The third element covers transfer of rights such as intellectual property, which may be tangible 
such as patents or intangible such as knowhow, although some studies exclude tacit knowledge-
based companies from definition as a USO (Wright et al., 2007). Core elements transferred can 
also include people, and Djokovic and Souitaris (2008) note that the transfer of people can be 
defined narrowly as technology being accompanied by people from the parent organisation 
(Smilor et al., 1990), while Radosevich (1995) distinguished between inventor-entrepreneurs 
and surrogate entrepreneurs who did not invent the technology but acquired the rights to 
commercialise it from the university. Nicolaou and Birley (2003) broadened the above definition 
accepting as a necessary condition for a USO the transfer of technology, but not necessarily 
people from the parent organisation. 
Tietz (2013) provides a comprehensive overview of definitions of USOs from the academic 
literature, observing that the areas of difference amongst these definitions principally concern 
the individuals who are involved as entrepreneurs, their relationship to the parent institution 
and the knowledge or technology on which the business is based. As a result of these factors, 
the range of different definitions used is striking, and are summarised in Table 2.2 below: 
 
Authors Year Definition 
McQueen and 
Wallmark 
1982 ‘…in order to be classified as a USO three criteria have to be met: 
(1) the company founder or founders have to come from a 
university (faculty staff or student); (2) the activity of the company 
has to be based on technical ideas generated in the university 
environment; and (3) the transfer from the university to the 
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company has to be direct and not via an intermediate employment 
somewhere’ 
Smilor, Gibson 
and Dietrich 
1990 ‘a company that is founded (1) by a faculty member, staff member, 
or student who left the university to start a company or who 
started the company while still affiliated with the university; 
and/or (2) around a technology or technology-based idea 
developed within the university’ 
Weatherston 1995 ‘…an academic spin-off can be described as a business venture 
which is initiated, or become commercially active, with the 
academic entrepreneur playing a key in role in any or all of the 
planning, initial establishment, or subsequent management 
phases’ 
Dahlstrand 1997 ‘an entrepreneurial spin-off arises where an entrepreneur leaves a 
company to start a firm of his own. To be a spin-off, this must also 
include the transfer of some rights e.g. assets or knowledge, from 
the existing legal body to the new firm or body’ 
Carayannis, 
Elias et al. 
1998 ‘…a new company formed by individuals who were former 
employees of a parent organisation (the university), around a core 
technology that originated at a parent organisation and that was 
transferred to the new company’ 
Bellini, 
Capaldo et al. 
1999 ‘…academic spin-offs are companies founded by university 
teachers, researchers, or students and graduates in order to 
commercially exploit the results of the research in which they 
might have been involved at the university…the commercial 
exploitation of scientific and technological knowledge is realised by 
university scientists (teachers or researchers), students and 
graduates’ 
Rappert, 
Webster and 
Charles 
1999 ‘University spin-offs are firms whose products or services develop 
out of technology-based ideas or scientific/technical know-how 
generated in a university setting by a member of faculty, staff or 
student who founded (or co-founded with others) the firm’ 
Clarysse, 
Heirman and 
Degroof 
2000 ‘…research-based spin-offs are defined as new companies set up 
by a host institute (university, technical school, public/private R&D 
department) to transfer and commercialise inventions resulting 
from the R&D efforts of the departments’ 
Klofsten and 
Jones-Evans 
2000 ‘…formation of new firm or organisation to exploit the results of 
the university research’ 
Steffensen, 
Rogers and 
Speakman 
2000 ‘a spin-off is a new company that is formed (1) by individuals who 
were former employees of a parent organisation, and (2) a core 
technology that is transferred from the parent organisation’ 
Nicolaou and 
Birley 
2003 ‘spinouts involve (1) the transfer of a core technology from an 
academic institution into a new company and (2) the founding 
member(s) may include the inventor academic(s) who may or may 
not be currently affiliated with the academic institution’ 
Clarysse and 
Moray 
2004 ‘a common two-dimensional definition of a research-based spin-off 
is a new company that is formed (1) by a faculty member, staff 
member or student who left university to found the company or 
started the company while still affiliated with the university; 
and/or (2) a core technology (or idea) that is transferred from the 
parent organisation’ 
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Hindle and 
Yencken 
2004 ‘direct research spin-offs are companies which have been created 
in order to commercialise IP arising out of a research institution 
where IP is licensed, involving a patent or copyright, from the 
research institution to the new firm to form the founding IP of the 
firm and staff may be seconded or transferred full or part-time 
from the research institution to the new firm’ 
 
‘start-ups or indirect spin-off companies are companies set up by 
former or present university staff and/or former students drawing 
on their experience acquired during their time at the university, 
but which have no formal IP licensing or similar relationships to the 
university’ 
Shane 2004 ‘…a new company founded to exploit a piece of intellectual 
property created in an academic institution’ 
De Coster and 
Butler 
2005 ‘university spin-off companies are high-technology ventures that 
originate from research work in a university, resulting in the 
generation of intellectual property and, usually, subsequent 
involvement of key researchers’ 
Leitch and 
Harrison 
2005 ‘spin-outs are defined as new companies formed around a core 
technology discovered in a lab. The parent organisation sells, 
licenses or somehow transfers the technology to the spin-out, 
which is often founded by researchers from the parent company or 
campus’ 
Table 2.2 Definitions of USOs in the literature – Tietz (2013) 
 
It is noticeable from Table 2.2 that USOs are not a recent phenomenon, as issues of definition 
were being debated many years before their numbers started to increase significantly. It would 
appear that over time, definitions have become more specific depending upon the nature of the 
data obtained, as researchers have started to realise that USOs are heterogeneous in terms of 
their properties. 
In acknowledgement of the difficulty of this issue, one of the key tasks of the current study is to 
use a strict definition of a USO which can be verified using external data. This gives greater 
confidence that USOs will be fairly compared like for like within this study, and under a positivist 
paradigm the definition should enable the data collected to be repeated for other universities, 
allowing comparisons to be made both with other UK universities as well as foreign ones. The 
current work will therefore define a USO as a company that met the first HEFCE category for the 
identification of a USO i.e. ‘spin offs with some HEI ownership’. Hence, only companies in which 
a university held at any time an equity stake are considered. This limitation in scope was 
considered reasonable for a number of reasons. Firstly, it implies significant university 
involvement in the creation of the USO via a transfer of intellectual property generated in the 
university, and a subsequent interest in its financial performance and the commercialisation of 
the technology. Secondly, the possession of an equity stake also allows the identification of 
potential USOs from a number of third party, independent sources which can be cross-checked 
to provide greater accuracy in compiling the database. Finally, such an approach has already 
been both proposed and used before (Minshall and Wicksteed, 2005). 
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As already noted, previous studies e.g. Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008), Mueller (2010) have 
often relied heavily on questionnaires sent to USOs or technology transfer offices to obtain 
financial and non-financial data. This study relies solely on a number of third party, independent 
sources of data to increase the reliability and scope of the information collected, an approach 
not seen to any significant extent in the literature to date. 
 
 
 
2.5 Heterogeneity and Typologies of USOs 
One of the main reasons for the difficulty in being able to compare and contrast findings from 
any study of a population of USOs is the observed heterogeneity amongst the properties of each 
company. This heterogeneity of USOs may arise through their existing for different reasons, 
arising from different origins or conducting different activities (Birley, 2002). This is of great 
importance for the current work, as it implies on first principles that the financial performance 
of the USOs under investigation will vary significantly across a university or region. As a result, a 
number of different typologies have been explored in the literature to attempt to classify USOs. 
Druilhe and Garnsey (2004) note that studies of technology transfer may tend to depict USOs as 
a homogenous category, with a linear conception of the process of USO creation where a 
technology-based idea is generated from research, protected by patents and transferred to a 
company newly established to commercialise the idea. They question these assumptions and 
consider that such an approach may restrict understanding of science-based entrepreneurship 
and impede appropriate support by policy makers. Wright et al. (2006) note that certain studies 
recognise the complexity of problems involved in the development of USOs, which may be 
associated with the heterogeneity of USOs in terms of their resource endowments, business 
models and institutional contexts. 
In an important study, Druilhe and Garnsey (2004) identified four categories of USO (although 
they subsequently significantly increased the number of categories in the same paper), which 
they proposed based upon the activities that they carry out: 
1. Consulting USOs  
2. Development USOs to complete immature technology development  
3. Product companies  
4. Software companies  
However, USOs will often not fit neatly into one of these categories e.g. a USO could be a 
software company that also develops immature technology. Druilhe and Garnsey (2004) note 
that these typologies are useful, but consider that the dynamic processes leading to firm 
emergence and growth may be overlooked when classifications focus on static categories. They 
propose a typology linked to the entrepreneurial process of firm formation by drawing on the 
RBV (Resource-Based View) of the firm.  
A number of other attempts have been made to reflect this observed heterogeneity amongst 
USOs and develop typologies to assist in classification and analysis. One of the key studies in the 
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literature is that of Mustar et al. (2008), who identified at the firm level three very different 
types of company, which they labelled: 
• Venture capital (VC)-backed 
• Prospector 
• Lifestyle 
‘VC-backed’ USOs are probably the most visible and attractive form from a policy perspective. 
Their business model is oriented towards convincing stakeholders, particularly investors, about 
their technology, and while the model may be attractive through its potential growth, there are 
a number of risks to universities and policy makers. Few research groups have the potential to 
start such a company which requires a balanced portfolio of technology and which may include 
buying in or licensing IP. The research group requires recognition in the scientific community 
and must play a significant role in the market for ideas. It also requires human and financial 
resources and must be able to attract significant VC funding at start-up to be credible and 
attract researchers at the university. Mustar et al. (2008) state that most USOs will not be VC-
backed and, in fact, have limited potential because their technology base is not sufficiently new 
or credible to play a significant role in the market for new ideas. In this study, it is likely that 
USOs with successful financial performance will often be found in this category. 
‘Prospector’ companies may attract external finance from public or private equity funds linked 
to the university. Companies begin with a business model based on consulting or contract 
research and attempt to find a product to commercialise. Pre-seed funding may not be the best 
way to finance these companies. 
‘Lifestyle’ companies have a business model based on market acceptance, starting small and 
following the ‘pecking order’ of financing (Wright et al., 2006). They may become high growth at 
a later stage, but even if not their added value may be significant. They are often overlooked by 
TTOs as they do not involve the formal transfer of technology, but Mustar et al. (2008) consider 
them to form the heart of the entrepreneurial university, and they are less demanding in terms 
of resources required. 
An analysis of the three categories is presented in the following table, which gives a helpful 
comparison of a range of factors, some of which may be observed in the current study: 
 
 
 Factor VC-backed Prospector Lifestyle 
1. Institutional 
link 
Formal 
involvement 
Equity relation based 
on a complex IP 
system 
Equity relations 
based on one 
patent or none 
License, contract, 
informal 
relations 
 Prestige of 
research group 
Worldwide 
recognition over a 
broad domain 
Worldwide 
recognition in a 
focused 
subdomain or 
local recognition 
Various 
2. Business 
model 
Investor v. 
market 
acceptance 
Investor acceptance Both Market 
acceptance 
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 Mode of value 
capture 
Clear IP maximising 
strategy or value 
chain acquisition. 
Strategy to prepare 
trade sale/IPO 
Optimise time to 
break even and 
future trade sale 
value, no clear 
exit yet 
Optimise profit 
3. Technology 
resources 
Degree of 
innovativeness 
Disruptive 
technology or market 
New product 
based on non-
disruptive 
technology 
New 
product/service 
addresses an 
unmet market 
need 
 Stage of 
product/service 
development 
Early, sometimes not 
even defined 
Early, alpha 
prototype 
Almost market-
ready 
product/service 
 Broadness of 
the technology 
concept 
Can be broad Narrow Not relevant 
4. Financial 
resources 
VC involvement Able to attract 1-5 
M€ in first 18 months 
after founding 
Lower amount of 
business angels, 
baby VC or public 
fund investment 
Usually no 
external equity, 
some business 
angel 
involvement 
possible 
 Financing mix High level of external 
equity, some debt 
financing, intensive 
use of subsidies 
Mix of external 
capital, soft loans 
and subsidies 
Internal funding, 
debt and some 
soft loans 
5. Human 
resources 
Balanced team Surrogate 
entrepreneur or 
hired guns 
Technical 
scientists act as 
entrepreneurs 
Technical 
scientists 
 Sectoral 
experience 
Management 
experience, research 
excellence 
Little experience Plenty of sector 
experience 
6. Social 
resources 
Partnership at 
start-up 
Formal partnerships 
with stakeholders 
(VC, technology 
providers etc.) 
None Formal 
availability of 
lead user 
Table 2.3 USO typology analysis – Mustar et al. (2008) 
 
In summary, typologies are useful to assist on the classification of USOs, to allow easier 
assessment of USO properties, but have some obvious weaknesses, not least that there are 
many different versions. On a similar note, Rasmussen (2006) notes two further weaknesses, in 
that many USOs can belong to several types at the same time, and the typologies do not 
account for development over time.  
 
2.6 Regional and institutional aspects 
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This section briefly considers the regional and institutional context of university 
entrepreneurship, and in particular USOs. This is of particular significance to the current study, 
as it considers USOs within a single region, the post-industrial West Midlands. 
 
2.6.1 Regional aspects 
The regional dimension to USOs is an area that has not been explored in any significant depth to 
date. No studies are known of a single region within the UK, and performance studies in the 
literature to date tend to focus on a single university e.g. ETH Zurich (Oskarsson and Schläpfer, 
2008) or a single country e.g. Mueller (2010). As such, this study is an important addition to the 
literature. 
Regional aspects of university entrepreneurship have been considered in more depth. Harrison 
and Leitch (2010) note the important position of universities in regions in the entrepreneurial 
system model developed by Spilling (1996) as an enhancer of human capital and a source of 
knowledge capital which can stimulate entrepreneurial development through licensing, 
consulting, education and training, joint ventures and USOs. Klofsten and Jones-Evans (2000) 
state that universities are ‘important engines of technological development and growth’ and 
can act as ‘catalysts for the enhancement of employment opportunities for local industry’, 
particularly in high-knowledge and knowledge-based sectors, which encapsulates the positive 
view of the entrepreneurial university which may have driven many government policies. 
Breznitz (2011) notes that, at a regional level, interactions between universities and other 
institutions will influence both the entrepreneurial nature of the university and its USOs. 
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff’s (1997) ‘triple helix’ model of interaction between universities, 
government and business is one such model. 
In a similar vein, some researchers e.g. DiGregorio and Shane (2003) claim that geographic 
location of universities influences USO activity because some economic, legal and cultural 
environments are more supportive of USOs than others. The networking capability of a USO has 
been shown to impact upon its performance Walter et al. (2006) USO activity does vary 
significantly across countries due to different attitudes e.g. Wright et al. (2002) found that the 
UK was significantly more productive than the US and Canada at USO creation in terms of 
numbers of USOs created per dollar of research funding, but significantly less successful in 
licensing to non-USOs. Again, this is an area that can be explored in comparing USOs from the 
West Midlands to other parts of the UK and overseas. 
Shane (2004) states that four factors influence the level of USO activity in a location: access to 
capital to develop proof of concept and prototypes to attract private sector investors; property 
rights that reside with the university rather than the entrepreneur to minimise creating an anti-
entrepreneurial culture, creates expertise at the university in company formation, spreads risk 
across a pool of USOs associated with the university and a range of technologies; less rigid 
labour markets to allow inventors ability to generate resources they need, take leave to start 
companies and increased mobility between universities and industry allowing flow of 
commercial knowledge to universities and areas where USOs are common already given the 
existence of managers, customers and suppliers. The financial performance of USOs will also be 
impacted (Sternberg, 2014). 
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It is also noticeable that certain regions in the UK e.g. the ‘Golden Triangle’ of Oxford, 
Cambridge and London universities appear to have achieved financial success from technology 
commercialisation, some of which may be attributed to the attraction of the region in which to 
start a business, including the existing infrastructure (Holi et al., 2007; Lawton Smith et al., 
2014). Results from the current study will therefore be of interest to compare against such 
regions, as the West Midlands does not have such a strong reputation for successful hi-tech or 
start-up industries. 
Harrison and Leitch (2010) note that USOs have achieved primary focus within the background 
of regional economic development by universities as they tend to locate close to their parent 
university and hence job and wealth creation remains local. They contrast this with technology 
transfer from a university to a large corporation where the benefit often transfers out of the 
local region due to a lack of absorptive capacity in the regional economic infrastructure 
(Steffensen et al., 2000). The creation and growth of USOs can provide employment for 
university graduates and contribute to university revenues. Etzkowitz et al. (2000) find that the 
focus on USOs has been pronounced in the UK in response to a reduction in financial support for 
universities from central government with a shift from a grant to an exchange economy in 
higher education. Contract research and licensing have thus been important sources of revenue 
as the USO route requires more uncertain returns on investment over a longer period (Downes 
and Eadie, 1998). However, Harrison and Leitch (2010) note that, in the UK (Higher Education 
Funding Council 2007), income from the sale of shares in USOs accounted for less than one third 
of all income from the exploitation of protected IP, and was insignificant compared to other 
sources of income including contract research, consultancy and continuing professional 
development courses, accounting nationally for under 1% of total revenues, a trend that 
continued with just over 1% recorded for 2014/15. 
 
2.6.2 Institutional aspects  
A separate branch of the USO literature focusses on the difference in numbers and quality of 
USOs generated between universities. While this is not directly connected to the financial 
performance of USOs, it will still be an interesting angle to explore given that a range of 
different types of universities will be considered within the West Midlands region, and a 
potential area of study is to see whether universities that generate larger numbers of USOs 
correspond to those with the most successful USOs. A brief overview of the existing literature in 
this area is given below, with a focus on the individual university and the wider economic region 
in which it sits. 
 
Shane (2004) notes that the number of USOs generated by a university does not necessarily 
correlate with the amount of technological inventions arising from the institution, an example 
from his study being that Harvard University produces almost no USOs despite a generating a 
large number of inventions, while Carnegie Mellon University produces a large number given its 
technological production. He identifies three key factors which appear to explain these 
variations: university policies, technology licensing office expertise and university goals and 
culture. Other studies have shown similar results e.g. Pressman (2002) noted that 36% of US 
academic institutions did not generate any USOs at all. Wright et al. (2002) found that 25% of 
UK universities generated no USOs while Charles and Conway (2001) showed that 24 UK 
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universities accounted for 75% of USOs in 2000. Tornatzky et al. (1997) showed that the number 
of USOs generated by a university is not a function of the amount of technology created by 
comparing the number of licenses disclosed to number of USOs for a number of US universities; 
no correlation was found. 
 
University policies that tend to increase USO formation (Rasmussen and Borch, 2010; Shane, 
2004) include allowing exclusive licensing to encourage entrepreneurs to bear the risk of 
development and financing, taking equity stakes in USOs to add legitimacy and reduce 
inventors’ need to find funding, offering leave to academics to found USOs, providing incubation 
facilities, allocating lower royalties to inventors to encourage USOs rather than licences and 
providing access to pre-seed capital. The characteristics of the university technology licensing 
office also tend to increase USO numbers with provision of more resources, licensing officers 
with more experience of company formation and provision of access to a network of investors, 
managers and advisers. Other factors leading to more USOs include providing an 
entrepreneurial university culture, provision of entrepreneurial role models, the prestige of the 
university which facilitates resource acquisition under conditions of uncertainty and information 
asymmetry and provision of more industry funding which is better able to identify commercial 
applications and provide inventors with the skills to work with the private sector. 
 
The relationship between a university and a USO is complex and will vary depending upon the 
nature of the USO, as discussed in the previous section, as well as the university itself. Di 
Gregorio and Shane (2003) consider that explaining variation in start-up activity is important for 
at least four reasons: 
• University inventions are an important source of knowledge spill-overs and 
understanding the spill-over mechanism is important to understand technology creation 
and economic growth 
• USOs tend to locate close to the university making them valuable entities for local 
economic development  
• Successful USOs can generate wealth through IPOs for the university 
• University entrepreneurs make different decisions from non-entrepreneurs, leading 
USO creation to generate important questions about university policies towards 
research, teaching and knowledge disclosure 
In an important study in this area, Mustar et al. (2008) identify three models by which public 
research organisations (PROs), which include universities, organise their spin-off activities: 
• Low selective model 
• Incubator model 
• Supportive model 
The low selective model fits closely with the model of an entrepreneurial university (Etzkowitz, 
2004) to stimulate as many entrepreneurial ventures as possible. Entrepreneurs do not need to 
be academic staff or use technology developed at the university, and are awarded small 
amounts of money and office space. Most spin-offs fit the lifestyle profile, as discussed in the 
typology section above. The incubator model has attracted much more attention from policy 
makers and is highly selective in which projects it chooses to support, focussing on VC-backed 
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ventures. TTOs set up at universities devote significant time, setting up the necessary IP 
structures, search for management teams and for VC funding. The supportive model requires a 
formal transfer of technology from university to USO, but is less selective than the incubator 
model in which USOs it supports. USOs best fit the prospector model with more ambition than a 
lifestyle company to grow, but not yet ready for VC funding. 
Mustar et al. (2008) note that a university may require all three models to support their USOs, 
but TTOs are typically structured just to follow one. In a slight variation on this classification, 
Leung and Mathews (2011) identify three different examples of university involvement in USOs: 
1. Minimalist approach – university offers administrative support to academic staff with 
proven technology that has been licensed. It takes a small equity stake in the USO in 
exchange for the transfer of IP rights 
2. Maximalist approach – university actively seeks out prospective new ventures and 
investors driving the innovation speed and taking a higher equity stake and a stronger 
role in future growth of the USO 
3. Confucian ‘Middle Way’ – university plays an active role in the launch of the USO 
seeking investors or a JV partner, but then adopts a passive role allowing the USO to 
develop its own strategy and aims to secure a relatively early exit and transfer IP to the 
USO 
The effectiveness of university participation in USOs has been debated with most scholars 
finding high involvement is beneficial for USOs while others find it can lead to dependency 
(Rothermael et al., 2007). They also note conflicting opinions over the nature of the founding 
team with some highlighting universities successful in creating USOs having favourable attitudes 
towards surrogate entrepreneurs (Franklin et al., 2001), while others claim that coaching 
inventors leads to better performance (Clarysse and Moray, 2004). The parent university can 
also influence the USO’s ability to obtain funding (Soetanto and Geenhuizen, 2015). 
As already noted, USOs are not the only form of commercialisation of university knowledge. 
Minshall and Wicksteed (2005) identify that some universities generate considerably more start-
ups (companies where the university has no claim on the IP) than USOs; the ratio will depend on 
relevant university policies, resource allocation and the overall culture in relation to enterprise. 
As a result, they propose two key conclusions: 
• The number of USOs should not be interpreted as a free-standing indicator of the 
relevance of the university’s research to the commercial world 
• It should not be used uncritically as an indicator of the level of entrepreneurial 
enthusiasm amongst staff and other researchers 
The significance of these findings for this study is that the number and type of USO may be 
influenced simply by the identity of the parent university. This will need to be taken into 
consideration when comparing results from universities within the region. It may also be 
possible to propose a model for the universities’ different attitudes towards technology transfer 
based on the financial performance of their USOs, although any such prediction should be made 
with caution. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
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The current academic literature on USOs is growing and wide-ranging, with many different 
aspects that will impact upon this study that seeks to examine the financial performance of 
USOs within a region of the UK. 
USOs represent an important part of the field of university entrepreneurship and some of the 
key concepts within this field have been defined. It can be seen that universities have, in recent 
years, been encouraged by policy makers, including national governments, to undertake 
entrepreneurship-related activities in addition to their traditional teaching and research. Such 
encouragement directly impacts this study as the number of USOs in existence increased rapidly 
from the year 2000. 
The literature on USOs highlights the difficulties in obtaining a standard definition of a USO over 
a period of many years, which will impact this study in that a clear definition must be chosen to 
allow effective analysis of results and comparisons with previous studies. In addition, the 
literature highlights the heterogeneity of USOs with a wide range of properties displayed, and 
attempts to categorise them into a sensible typology. On first principles, studies of the financial 
performance of a number of USOs would be expected to show a wide range of results, an issue 
that must be kept under consideration when analysing the results of this study. 
Finally, the regional and institutional impacts upon university entrepreneurship and USOs have 
been briefly considered. The current study is unusual in the literature in that it considers USOs 
from a single, post-industrial region away from the elite UK universities, and regional aspects 
may have an influence on the financial performance measures seen. In a similar vein, the 
institutional effect of the universities being studied may have a significant impact upon results 
obtained as a consequence of their attitude towards entrepreneurship in general and USOs in 
particular. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical frameworks and performance metrics  
This chapter firstly considers the issue of performance metrics, and in order to answer the 
overarching research question of Chapter 1, namely ‘have USOs generated by West Midlands 
universities been successful in terms of financial performance?’, it attempts to ascertain the 
most suitable performance metrics to analyse the financial performance of USOs at a company 
level. It then briefly reviews financial performance studies of USOs undertaken to date in the 
academic literature and examines the performance metrics used, identifying those that will be 
of value for the current work. Finally, it considers the relationships between such metrics, and 
attempts to build a performance model that can be used both now and in future work.  
In order to provide an overall theoretical framework within which to assess the chosen metrics, 
the chapter then identifies potential theoretical frameworks within which USO performance can 
be assessed by reviewing those in the existing literature, and evaluates them as to their 
effectiveness for use in this work, before selecting the most appropriate. 
 
3.1 Performance metrics - background and importance 
The next section of the chapter considers in some depth the most effective performance 
metrics to be used in this work to analyse and conclude on the financial performance of USOs. 
In the context of economic development through knowledge transfer in a science and 
innovation knowledge-based economy, which includes technology transfer from universities, it 
is widely acknowledged that there needs to be consensus about the metrics used to measure 
the performance of technology transfer from universities. Measurement of both quality and 
quantity of transfer (Library House, 2008) are necessary to enable effective analysis to be 
undertaken. USOs form an important part of this technology transfer process, and their financial 
performance at a company level needs to be considered alongside the wider performance of 
the parent university in this field to give a complete picture. This is necessary both from a policy 
perspective as well as enabling effective assessments to be made of existing studies. 
Various metrics in the area of measuring university technology transfer have been used to date. 
In the US, the AUTM (Association of University Technology Managers) measures annually the 
revenues obtained by universities from their intellectual property, although other studies have 
attempted to use a wider range of measures both financial and non-financial to give a fuller 
picture. In the UK, one of the most significant studies to date in this field is that of Library House 
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(2008), which was commissioned by UNICO (a technology transfer association) to build a 
coherent framework of metrics that could be used to both measure absolute performance and 
to benchmark performance between universities on an international basis, with USOs forming a 
part of this exercise. The commission exercise recognised the lack of an existing study on 
performance metrics and sought to address this gap, and other studies in the wider literature 
have noted the difficulty in obtaining a rigorous measure of performance e.g. Siegel and Wright 
(2015). 
 
3.1.1 Views of university stakeholders on performance metrics 
In the study undertaken by Library House (2008), within the wider context of measuring UK 
university technology transfer, potential financial performance metrics were initially generated 
through discussion with three key groups of university stakeholders: research funders, senior 
university management and the business community, reflecting the policy focus of the study. In 
the specific case of USOs, the following metrics were identified: 
 
Stakeholder Measures of quantity Measures of quality 
Research funders External investment raised 
Revenues generated 
Market value at flotation 
n/a 
Business community Number of USOs formed 
External investment raised 
Revenues generated 
Flotation/exit value 
Survival rate/viability 
Growth rate 
Customer feedback 
Senior university 
management 
Revenues generated 
External investment raised 
Survival rate/viability 
Table 3.1 Stakeholder views on performance metrics - Library House (2008)  
There is a significant degree of overlap between the metrics suggested despite the different 
backgrounds and perspectives of the stakeholders, which gives confidence that the metrics 
proposed are fit for purpose. Interestingly, it should be noted that the business community did 
not propose USOs at all as a mechanism of knowledge transfer for a university, although the 
reasons for this were not investigated further, but this finding may cast doubt at least on the 
perceived significance of USOs amongst policy makers and governments as a means for 
commercialising university knowledge.  
In order to aid international comparison, the survey also undertook a similar exercise in 
identifying performance metrics by contacting senior technology transfer personnel at a 
number of US universities, on the basis that the US is generally seen as the world leader in 
technology transfer from universities. In terms of USOs, the following metrics were proposed 
from a US perspective (the UK findings across all stakeholders from above are shown again to 
aid comparison): 
 
 Measures of quantity Measures of quality 
US universities Number of USOs formed Investor satisfaction 
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Survival rate 
Amount of external 
investment raised 
Quality of investors 
Number of USOs that are 
geographically close to the 
university 
Survival rate 
Amount of external 
investment raised 
UK universities Number of USOs formed 
External investment raised 
Revenues generated 
Flotation/exit value 
Survival rate 
Viability 
Growth rate 
Customer feedback 
Table 3.2 Measures suggested by TTO personnel - Library House (2008) 
In general, the proposed metrics from the two countries are very similar. One interesting 
quantity metric proposed by the US stakeholders only is the number of USOs geographically 
close to the university, which may be a consequence of the different ways in which USOs obtain 
significant parts of their funding: by national research councils in the UK i.e. not region-specific, 
but by local state governments in the US. The US stakeholders also proposed the metric of 
amount of external investment raised as both a measure of quantity and quality, given that 
external investors offer a form of ‘peer review’ in assessing and then investing in USOs, 
reflecting their quality, a theme echoed in parts of the UK literature (Lambert, 2003). 
 
3.1.2 Wider USO performance metrics - literature review  
Apart from the Library House report, there is a small but growing academic literature assessing 
the financial performance of USOs at a company level. Rasmussen et al. (2012) undertook an 
extensive literature review of the academic work in this area on entrepreneurial firms including 
USOs. One of their research questions was ‘what are the strengths and weaknesses of the 
different methodologies and indicators used to measure the impacts of SBEFs (science-based 
entrepreneurial firms)?’ They produced the following table which includes only those studies 
identified which utilised financial performance measures: 
Author(s) Which measures/indicators 
of impact or performance is 
used? 
Key indicators 
Chrisman et al., 1995 Impact measured as venture 
creation and employment 
growth 
Economic impact 
(technology transfer) 
Wallmark, 1997 Measure impact in terms of 
employment 
Employment 
Shane and Stuart, 2002 Analyses three dimensions of 
performance: the ability to 
attract venture capital, 
experience IPOs and failing, 
Also considers the time it 
takes to achieve each of these 
outcomes. 
Resource acquisition, 
financial, survival 
Nerkar and Shane, 2003 Performance measured as 
firm survival (acquired firms 
Firm survival 
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included). Authors test 
several factors that influence 
survival and success of a new 
start-up firm. 
Perez and Sanchez, 2003 Impact measured as number 
of employees. Explores 
technology transfer by 
looking at networking 
activities. 
Technology transfer 
Ensley and Hmieleski, 2005 Performance measured as net 
cash flow and revenue 
growth. University-based 
start-ups are found to be 
significantly lower performing 
in terms of net cash flow and 
revenue growth than 
independent new ventures 
Financial firm performance 
Garnsey and Heffernan, 2005 Impact measured as survival, 
employment and turnover. 
Discusses impact from 
clustering at regional level. 
Survival, employment, 
financial 
Leitch and Harrison, 2005 Discussing impact measures 
such as survival rate, 
turnover, employment and 
second order spin-offs 
Regional development 
Lindelof and Lofsten, 2005 Performance measured a 
sales growth and profitability. 
There is no evidence that 
USOs exhibit slower growth 
(sales) than CSOs – they are 
also equally profitable. 
Financial 
Moray and Clarysse, 2005 Performance measured as 
financial measures and 
employment growth. The 
research institution 
significantly impacts the 
starting configuration of its 
USOs. 
Financial, employment 
growth 
Lawton Smith and Ho, 2006 Impact measured as 
employment, turnover, 
market capitalisation and 
patenting and licensing 
activity. Discusses the 
contribution to the economy. 
Employment, financial, 
innovation, regional impact 
Walter et al., 2006 Performance measured as 
sales growth, sales per 
employee, profit attainment, 
perceived customer 
relationship quality, realised 
Financial 
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competitive advantages and 
long-term survival 
Buenstorf, 2007 Time period of presence in 
the laser industry is taken as a 
measure of firm performance 
Firm survival 
Clarysse et al., 2007 Start-up capital raised within 
18 months of start-up. 
Average capital increase 
(total capital divided by firm 
age) 
Obtaining external financing 
Toole and Czarnitzki, 2007 
and 2009 
Performance measured as 
completing SBIR program, 
patents granted and follow 
up private venture capital 
backing 
Start-up process, attract VC 
funding 
Valentin et al., 2007 Performance measured as 
financial performance, 
number of patents 
Financial, innovation 
Zahra et al., 2007 Performance measured as 
productivity, profitability 
(ROA) and revenue growth 
Financial 
Soetanto and Van 
Geenhuizen, 2009 and 2010 
Performance measured as 
annual average job growth 
Employment growth 
Zhang, 2009 Performance measured as 
firm survival 
Survival 
Bonardo et al., 2010 Performance measured as 
probability of being acquired 
after IPO 
Venture acquisition 
Colombo et al., 2010 Performance measured as 
growth in number of 
employees 
The contribution of university 
research to the growth of 
academic start-ups (number 
of employees) 
Employment growth 
Harrison and Leitch, 2010 Impact measured as 
employment and turnover. 
Impact on the 
entrepreneurial system is 
discussed. 
Employment, financial 
Vincett, 2010 Impact is measured as the 
present value of past and 
future sales. Discusses the 
contribution to Gross 
Domestic Product. 
Financial 
Munari and Toschi, 2011 Performance measured as 
firm’s ability to attract VC 
funding. Venture capitalists 
do not have a bias against 
Attract VC funding 
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investment in academic spin-
offs. 
Rasmussen et al., 2011 Performance defined as 
reaching the credibility 
threshold (adding new team 
members beyond the original 
inventor(s) and early stage 
investment from a private 
sector investor). 
Process of venture start-up 
Table 3.3 Performance metrics taken from Rasmussen et al. (2012) 
In reviewing the relevant literature, Rasmussen et al. (2012) note that studying firm 
performance during the early start-up process is challenging because it is difficult to identify 
samples of firms at an early stage of development, and USOs often have long development 
paths before they grow and become profitable, making it difficult to effectively use growth-
based performance measures. Measures such as gaining external equity investment and 
additional team members are thus useful in studying the early stages of a firm as it seeks to 
overcome the credibility threshold. As a consequence, Rasmussen et al. (2012) note that to 
investigate the long term effect of start-up conditions there is a need for longitudinal datasets 
over long periods of time. This observation applies equally to financial performance studies. 
They further note that creating datasets by using historical data is labour intensive and 
restricted to issues covered by historical documentation, which is the driving force behind the 
current work. One example of a long-term study in the literature is that of Buenstorf (2007) who 
examined the evolution of the German laser industry using historical data from various sources 
over forty years. Rasmussen et al. (2012) consider, however, that the recent increase in studies 
on USOs will allow more follow-up studies on existing datasets. It should also be noted that 
there are a number of common performance measures between the studies of Rasmussen et al. 
(2012) and Library House (2008), which gives a valuable insight for the current work as it seeks 
to identify the most effective performance metrics to answer the overarching research 
question. 
 
3.2 Difficulties in measuring financial performance of USOs 
There have been relatively few studies of the financial performance of USOs at a company level 
to date in the UK and elsewhere (Wennberg et al., 2011). At first glance this may be surprising 
as there are a large number of USOs which have been created over a significant length of time 
providing a potentially suitable dataset. In addition, many countries spend significant sums of 
money targeting university based entrepreneurship (Wright et al., 2008) and as a policy this 
only makes sense if this kind of entrepreneurship is an effective way of establishing companies 
with high growth potential. However, attempts to conduct studies meet a number of practical 
difficulties, which have led to the repeated observation that there is a lack of financial data 
relevant to USOs of a sufficiently high standard (Zhang, 2009). Rasmussen et al. (2012) note that 
most studies to date on impact of USOs use simple measures often selected on the basis of data 
availability. These findings will inform the choice of research methodology for the current work. 
Throughout the literature to date, a number of themes on the difficulty of obtaining USO 
financial performance data and conducting meaningful analysis therewith have emerged. Firstly, 
as noted previously, there is no consistent definition in the academic literature of a USO (Zahra 
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et al., 2007). For example, in considering the four different definitions of a USO under the HEFCE 
classification as noted in Chapter 2, clearly these are four very different types of entity and 
constructing a dataset for any one category would require very different methods from the 
others. Any attempt to compare financial performance across the categories, or even to be sure 
that all relevant companies have been captured, is therefore extremely challenging. Where a 
population of USOs is obtained, it is impossible without detailed analysis, or using strict 
definitional criteria, to be sure which kind of USOs are present, which makes any attempt to 
compare results to similar studies fraught with difficulty. 
Secondly, it is difficult to verify the total population of USOs associated with a university, which 
leads to the danger of survivor bias (Shane and Stuart, 2002). While universities and their 
associated TTOs maintain data, it may be incomplete, especially in respect of older USOs or 
USOs that have failed many years previously. There may also be vested interests to take less 
care in recording this latter category. While commercial databases do exist e.g. Spinouts UK 
which is maintained by Young Company Finance and used in this work, the data contained 
therein is only as good as its source, which often includes TTOs, and needs to be verified 
thoroughly. 
Those performance studies that have been carried out to date have also been prone to use 
measures that are not necessarily the most appropriate in assessing the financial performance 
of USOs, and may be based more on the availability of data. While measures such as sales and 
employee growth are relatively easy to establish, they may not be the most appropriate for 
young companies such as USOs as they can very easily give distorted results as the quantity 
being measured is starting from a nil or very low base position. Measures which seek to 
determine the value of USOs, for example the amounts of finance raised from third parties, are 
often much more useful but data is very hard to come by. This is due to the fact that such deals 
are often kept confidential in terms of numbers and that older deals suffer from a lack of data 
still available in the public domain. 
A further limitation on obtaining financial data for the UK USOs is the reduction in data 
availability for such companies on public record over recent years. For some years in the UK, 
small companies have been able to file abbreviated sets of accounts at Companies’ House, 
which do not require disclosure of a wide range of information, including both turnover and 
employee numbers. Given that this is the only publicly available source of company financial 
data for private companies, it is now almost impossible to collect such data from a third party 
source independent of the company itself which reduces the objectivity of any analysis. Given 
their size, almost all USOs will file abbreviated accounts to avoid the time and cost of making 
more detailed disclosures. Such issues have already been noted in performance studies (Lawton 
Smith and Ho, 2006), and the importance of obtaining data from sources outside a university 
environment has been noted (Wennberg et al., 2011). 
These collected difficulties were noted in the Library House (2008) survey above, which 
identified a number of problems in collating suitable metrics for reasons already discussed at 
some length. From a quantity measure perspective, the survey had difficulty in defining USOs, a 
perennial problem in this area as already discussed. In particular, the difference between a spin 
off and a start-up company and how to be sure that a university was counting in such a way as 
to meet the definitions and allow effective comparison between institutions caused problems. 
In addition, on the quality front, the lack of data in the public domain on metrics such as growth 
rates was noted. 
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3.3 Classification of USO financial performance measures 
A number of attempts have been made to analyse USO performance over the years as already 
noted (Rasmussen et al., 2012). These may conveniently be grouped by nature of performance 
measure investigated and the key measures are summarised as follows (Jelfs, 2016): 
 
3.3.1 Descriptive performance measures 
Measures of absolute performance used in studies of USOs to date include company turnover 
(Lawton Smith and Ho, 2006), the number of company employees (Harrison and Leitch, 2010), 
number of patents granted to the company (Lindholm Dahlstrand, 1997) and net cash flow 
(Ensley and Hmielski, 2005). Amongst these measures, employment or job creation is a popular 
performance measure, particularly of interest to policy makers in regional and national 
government and their associated development agencies and may be particularly relevant for 
studies considering the impact of USOs at regional level.  
While these measures give an indication as to the scale of activity of the USO, and are likely to 
be fairly easy for which to collect data, they only provide a snapshot of performance (Lawton 
Smith and Ho, 2006). They also do not address the issue of whether USOs are performing 
effectively in relation to other start-up companies (Zahra et al., 2007) or to the level of 
investment made in them. For example, the number of patents held by a company may not 
necessarily reflect its success and growth (Zahra et al., 2007). Grimaldi et al. (2011) note the 
‘need to move beyond count measures…in order to estimate the value and quality of that 
activity’. 
In addition, metrics such as Return on Capital Employed (ROCE), although a common financial 
performance measure for more established companies, are difficult to use for USOs. Most USOs 
are attempting to commercialise novel technology and are pre-revenue, relying on external 
investors to fund their development programmes. Their income statements would therefore 
show a deficit each year, which would give a negative ROCE and not allow for meaningful 
analysis or comparisons between USOs. In addition, the lack of publicly available data 
concerning income and expenditure of small companies in the UK, and the lack of public 
disclosure of balance sheet items as noted above in the discussion over Companies’ House 
reporting, means that obtaining data needed to calculate ratios such as ROCE are all but 
impossible to obtain from an objective source, which is a key requirement of this work. 
 
3.3.2 Growth-based performance measures 
Performance measurement studies based on the growth in a variety of variables have been 
widely used in the literature. Growth has been identified as the most appropriate measure of 
performance for new ventures, (which are often loss-making), which encompasses many USOs 
(Clarysse et al., 2011). The variables used follow closely from the previous section. 
Growth in turnover (Wennberg et al., 2011; Zahra et al., 2007; Clarysse et al., 2011) and in 
employee numbers (Wennberg et al., 2011; Lindholm Dahlstrand, 1997; Clarysse et al., 2007) 
are the two most popular measures of performance. Such measures have the advantage over 
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absolute performance measures of providing a more dynamic picture of the company over a 
period of time and allowing for more meaningful comparisons between USOs. Woo et al. (1992) 
note that sales growth has been used extensively as a measure of performance in strategic 
management research. Clarysse et al. (2011) note that sales growth is a preferred measure for 
new ventures as it is relatively accessible, applies to almost all companies and is relatively 
insensitive to capital intensity and degree of integration (Delmar et al., 2003). 
Chandler and Hanks (1993) note that employee growth is a good indicator of the speed at which 
a new venture can grow; in the case of USOs, assets and employment often grow before sales 
are generated as the underlying technology is developed. Delmar et al. (2003) consider 
employee growth a more direct indicator of performance than sales growth for certain 
companies, a view shared by other resource-based scholars (Clarysse et al., 2011). Davila et al. 
(2003) note that companies may reach an IPO with considerable value before any sales are 
generated. These views are in interesting contrast to Shepherd and Wiklund (2009) who found 
that sales growth was vastly the most popular measure in the growth literature. 
As with descriptive performance measures, there are still a number of limitations with these 
growth-based performance methods (Tietz, 2013), as well as some inconsistent results. Firstly, 
they say nothing about the true financial value of the company; a company may have developed 
very valuable technology but not yet achieved any sales. Employment data can be misleading or 
difficult to gather as many USOs will typically use self-employed consultants rather than 
employees in the early days to avoid expensive costs of employment such as employer’s 
National Insurance, and allow more flexibility to hire only when work is required.  In addition, 
data can be distorted given that the USO will typically be starting from nil or a very low base 
value on the growth measure. There is also a particular problem in the UK and other countries 
with the obtaining of growth data as discussed above. Finally, Shepherd and Wiklund (2009) 
note that there is a lack of correlation between different measures of growth, although the 
reasons for this are not entirely clear. As a result, it is usual to analyse at least two different 
measures. 
 
3.3.3 Survival measurements 
A third category of financial performance measurement of USOs concerns the length of time 
that the company survives or is actively undertaking some form of business activity. On first 
principles a company that does not survive is one that is unsuccessful. It is widely recognised 
that most companies, including USOs, that fail do so within their first few years following the 
commencement of activity. Studies which have included length of survival as a USO 
performance measurement include Wennberg et al. (2011), Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008), 
Zhang (2009) and Criaco et al. (2013). Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008) state that survival is the 
most popular financial performance measure in the USO literature. They note that this model is 
a longstanding one in the more general venture capital literature, and has been further refined 
in the literature dealing with venture capital investment performance to consider four possible 
options for portfolio investments: initial public offering of shares, trade sale, still in portfolio and 
failure. These categories are directly equivalent to those in the USO literature. 
It is relatively widely noted across studies from a range of countries and universities that USOs 
tend to survive for longer than other start-up companies (Shane, 2004; Tietz, 2013). Zhang 
(2009) provides three possible explanations for this particular phenomenon: academic 
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entrepreneurs have higher opportunity costs than non-academics (i.e. more to lose if the USO 
fails), a tacit technology advantage arising from the USO’s university origins given the high 
quality nature of research performed at the institution, or finally the benefits of incubatory 
services provided by the university. A number of these perceived advantages are open to 
debate. Other explanations for this phenomenon include USOs remaining small and highly 
innovative developing technology exploited by others (Dahlstrand, 1997b) or Nerkar and 
Shane’s (2003) view that firms exploiting more radical technologies and broad patent scopes 
(both criteria often met by product-oriented USOs) may survive longer. It should, however, be 
noted that a number of commentators identify less positive reasons for this phenomenon, an 
example being de Cleyn (2011) who notes that some USOs may be kept artificially alive by 
subsidies. 
Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008) find that, from their review of a number of survival studies, 
although they cover different timespans and economic conditions, the stated USO survival rates 
are in the region of 70-90% and consistently higher than the survival rates of non-USOs across a 
range of countries and universities. Other studies give results in line with this general theme. 
Lindholm Dahlstrand (1997b) found that 89% of 240 Chalmers University USOs between 1960 
and 1993 survive at the latter date with an annual failure rate of only 1.4%. Di Gregorio and 
Shane (2003) found 70% of 2,578 US USOs founded between 1980 and 1998 survived at the 
latter date. 
Survival of USOs is a popular financial performance measure either considered alone or in 
combination with others, and may be a more appropriate measure than metrics based ono 
profitability (Criaco et al., 2013). Rasmussen et al. (2012) consider survival to be a simple 
measure with data easily available, but note that surviving USOs may stall in growth terms and 
lead to limited impacts. The simple proposition that a surviving company implies a successful 
financial performance is therefore not necessarily true. They consider it a shallow measure that 
reveals little about the development pattern of surviving firms. In addition, they note that the 
measure may be biased if the destinies of the non-surviving firms is not known. Rasmussen et 
al. (2012) further note that the process of USO creation is complex and dynamic and studying it 
is challenging as a result. Most studies to date are derived from data relating to successful 
companies and hence suffer from survival biases. Few studies in the existing literature have 
access to data that can separate USOs that fail from those that are bought or merged. These are 
significant issues for the performance metric of survival which this study will seek to address. 
 
3.3.4 Valuation and external investment measurements 
The final group of financial performance metrics for USOs is concerned with looking at the value 
created by the company for its shareholders. The ultimate goal of any USO is to create financial 
value which can potentially be realised for its equity holders, in ways such as a public stock 
market flotation or other sale of shares. The large US companies that have achieved this in the 
past from university origins, e.g. Genentech (Wennberg et al., 2011) and Cisco (Zhang, 2009), 
have significantly contributed towards government interest in the policy of creating USOs 
throughout the world. 
Woo et al. (1992) consider that market-based measures reflecting the shareholder value of a 
company may be the best measure of the company’s performance. They note that share prices 
are the value of the earnings over the lifetime of the company discounted for risk to 
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shareholders and should, in theory, reflect both current and future performance. The difference 
between market and book value of a company has been seen as a measure of the ability of the 
company’s strategy to deliver required returns to investors, a measure of long term wealth 
creation (Peters and Waterman, 1982) and evaluating overall performance, benefits of specific 
competitive actions and different corporate restructuring alternatives (Fruhan, 1979). Clearly 
such measures are difficult to apply to USOs that are not listed on a public stock exchange and 
Bonardo et al. (2011) note that listed USOs may be different to ‘typical’ USOs. 
One way to obtain a measurement of a USO’s value is simply to look at the company’s market 
capitalisation e.g. Lawton Smith and Ho (2006). This is clearly very difficult to apply to 
companies that are not listed on a stock exchange and, given the volatility of stock markets, 
data collected may be quickly out of date. Valuations of privately-held companies may be 
carried out, often using data from comparable listed companies, but again this is a difficult and 
specialist area, and one in which experts frequently significantly disagree. 
Some interesting variations on this theme of company valuation were explored by Zhang (2009) 
who considered, among other performance measures, the amounts of investment a USO raises 
from third party venture capitalists and the percentage of companies who ever made an IPO of 
shares, an event described as ‘a crowning achievement for the parent university’ by Bonardo et 
al. (2011). The former measure had already been highlighted by Lambert (2003) who considered 
this a good measure of the quality of a USO given the stringent due diligence performed by 
private equity firms before making any investments. Lambert (2003) noted that USO creation in 
the UK had been largely driven by government-funded University Challenge Funds with only one 
third of new USOs in 2002 securing capital from private equity. Rasmussen et al. (2012) note 
that most USO performance studies rely on proxy measures rather than direct performance 
measures; as USOs often need significant financing to develop their product or service, 
obtaining external financing is considered a useful measure, given that external financiers will 
independently assess the USO’s potential for success and establish a value to guide their 
investment. 
The major study to date on the subject of valuation returns generated by USOs is that by 
Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008). They undertook a performance study of USOs from ETH Zurich 
employing a number of venture capital valuation methods to calculate returns on equity, a 
technique that has been explored before in the venture capital literature although not 
specifically in the context of USOs. The general premise is that venture capital investments have 
historically shown high average returns and high risk, with wide variations in return observed. 
However, it should be noted that metrics such as internal rate of return are very difficult to 
measure for small, early-stage unlisted companies, typically involving estimations and use of 
comparables. In addition, basing valuation on financing and imputing valuations is fraught with 
difficulty, especially given the rate of failure amongst start-up companies (Nadeau, 2011). 
Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008) actually put forward the thesis that academic enterprises 
perform better than other start-up companies. De Coster and Butler (2005) show that USOs 
typically have a better protected competitive position and better satisfy market demand. Other 
factors mentioned in the literature include access to a more extensive support system and the 
value of a university brand. 
As noted above in the Library House (2008) work, obtaining venture capital investment is seen 
as a positive performance metric and has been explored in a number of studies e.g. Soetanto 
and Geenhuizen (2015). Shane and Stuart (2002) show that the percentage of successful exits 
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through an IPO of shares is strongly correlated with the amount of VC funding obtained. Wright 
et al. (2006) state that VCs are reluctant to fund USOs at seed/start-up stage due principally to 
their concerns over the lack of experience in the management team, but that USOs are 
significantly more likely, despite this, to obtain venture backing than the average small business. 
USOs do, however, tend to get funding at a later stage resulting in a ‘funding gap’. However, 
access to venture financing is a key determinant of growth and value generation for new 
technology-based USOs and those that fail to attract VC funding in early years are unlikely to do 
so in future. 
 
3.3.5 Metrics chosen for this study 
It can be seen from the above that two performance metrics in particular stand out as providing 
good evidence for the successful financial performance or otherwise of a USO at a company 
level, and are at least possible to evaluate given the current public availability of data in the UK. 
These are (i) survival and (ii) the attraction of external investment. Both metrics are identified as 
important in the Library House (2008) study, as well as the wider evaluation of the literature by 
Rasmussen et al. (2012), providing comfort with this finding, although not all recent studies 
have used them e.g. Sternberg (2014). These two metrics will form the core of this study in 
terms of performance data collection and analysis. The ability or otherwise of USOs to reach an 
IPO or an exit for investors will also form a complementary metric, representing a specific 
scenario in obtaining external investment, as again the data is available and the metric is a good 
one for the evaluation of successful financial performance for a USO. 
Returns on equity or internal rates of return, though commonly used in the venture capital 
valuation literature, as well as in practice by investors and fund managers (Nadeau, 2011), will 
not be used here, given the restricted nature but extremely accurate nature of the data to be 
collected. Measures such as ROCE are not appropriate given the nature of the unit of analysis 
i.e. the USO, many of which show accounting losses given their pre-revenue status as they seek 
to commercialise technology. 
This ‘triumvirate’ of USO financial performance metrics can be represented below as a model in 
diagrammatic form: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 ‘Triumvirate’ of performance metrics (author diagram) 
 
External 
Investment 
Survival 
IPO/exit 
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As can be seen, the attraction of external investment by a USO, while a key financial 
performance metric in its own right, may also on first principles have an impact upon the 
survival or completion of an IPO or exit by reflecting the strength of the company and its 
attractiveness to investors. Subsequent sections of this chapter briefly review the literature on 
the relationship between attracting finance and subsequent financial performance. On first 
principles, a new company with more resources might be expected to survive for longer 
(Aspelund et al., 2005) 
 
 
 
3.4 Literature review of USO financial performance studies - introduction 
Following the selection of the performance metrics to be used in this work, this section 
introduces studies in the existing USO literature that also use these metrics, and against which 
results from the West Midlands can be compared. 
 
3.4.1 Summary of existing studies 
The key study in the literature to date of particular comparability with the current work is that 
of Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008). This study looked at the financial performance of USOs 
generated by the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zurich), an institution which 
focusses on teaching and research into science and technology. Their population consisted of 
130 USOs formed during the ten year period from 1998 to 2007. While their study also 
considers other performance measures such as USO employee numbers and an attempt to 
measure the return on equity arising on each USO through a calculation of equity value 
generated (a measure that requires a number of significant assumptions to be made and is likely 
to have produced dramatically lower results in the worldwide ‘credit crunch’ that immediately 
followed this period), metrics for which the current work cannot obtain independent data, 
survival and third party investment were two other metrics considered. 
Oskarsson and Schläpfer’s (2008) study is an empirical one reflecting the commercial finance 
background and viewpoint of the authors. As such, it does not consider the results in the light of 
any single theoretical framework, although its literature reviews are comprehensive in nature. 
This is a common theme amongst those academic works in the USO performance field, and is 
likely also to apply to the current study, given the broad policy-based nature of the overarching 
research question. It should also be noted that, in common with many other examples from the 
literature, their data collection relied significantly upon questionnaires sent to USOs that were 
still surviving, a research technique which this study will not replicate for the purposes of 
accuracy. In addition, their study compares and contrasts their findings with results of other 
works, which leads to some comfort with the current work that no further studies have 
occurred that have been omitted. 
A brief summary of some of the other more significant studies against which the results from 
the current work may be compared and contrasted is given below, as well as an indication of 
whether survival, investment or IPO data is considered. 
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Shane (2004) is an early study of USOs by a researcher in the field from the US who collates data 
from a number of other studies covering different countries such as the Netherlands and 
Sweden. The study also contains data from a large sample size of USOs from the US. Survival 
results from all these studies were collated by Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008) and will be 
compared against the results from this work. The Shane (2004) study is an important example of 
early work in the field which led to the widespread observation in the literature that USOs 
survive for significantly longer than other start-up companies. However, concerns about the 
accuracy and completeness of the data sets of USOs being compiled and used were one of the 
key motivations behind the undertaking of this work. 
Clayman and Holbrook (2006) collected survival data from USOs generated by Canadian 
universities. A database of USOs was constructed from data provided by university-industry 
liaison offices (UILOs), and a USO was deemed to be inactive if it had no website and no 
reference could be found to it by a Google search. Again, there are significant concerns with the 
accuracy of the above methodology. The authors of this paper acknowledged that the UILO data 
was at risk of being out of date in respect of more recent USOs, and that the methodology used 
to determine activity is likely to be an understatement of survival in respect of USOs that have 
been absorbed by another company. 
Leung and Mathews (2011) considered the survival of USOs from Hong Kong universities 
although the exact source of the population is not entirely clear, but TTOs from the relevant 
universities are likely to have been a significant source. The authors acknowledged that data 
could not be obtained from a number of USOs that were no longer in existence which places 
limits upon conclusions drawn from the findings. 
Wennberg et al. (2011) considered a large population of USOs from Sweden. The USOs were 
identified in an unusual way, firstly by identifying all privately-incorporated companies in 
Sweden over a period of time in knowledge-intensive sectors. This data was then cross-checked 
with a database called LISA which is maintained by Statistics Sweden and contains annual data 
about all Swedish inhabitants including detailed information about education and employment, 
and where an individual transferred into entrepreneurship directly from employment in a 
university the company which they joined was designated a USO. This method clearly relies on 
an unusually detailed database the like of which is not available in the majority of other 
countries (including the UK), but does have the significant advantage of not simply relying on 
data supplied by a TTO. This paper is significant as it is one of the first to consider the 
methodology by which an accurate population of USOs can be drawn up from objective sources, 
and considers more than one source of data. It provides survival data for comparison with the 
current work. 
Zhang (2009) used the VentureOne commercial database which provides data on venture 
capital investments into all companies in the US, but screened for USOs by only considering 
companies where one of the founders per the database had previously worked in a university. 
The author noted that this methodology ignores all USOs that do not attract VC funding as well 
as USOs where the founders’ details were not recorded in the database. This makes 
comparability with other studies difficult, including the present work, but survival, investment 
and IPO data are provided. 
Holi et al. (2007) considered a large population of UK USOs over a five year timescale and 
collected details of external investment, so on first principles this would be a very useful 
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comparison for the current work. Unfortunately, the detailed data could not be accessed as the 
publisher of the study, Library House, is no longer trading. Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008) and 
Mueller (2010), who had access to the databases, allow some comparisons to be drawn. 
Mueller (2010) in an unpublished PhD thesis considered USO financial performance from a 
Resource-Based View (RBV) theoretical perspective in line with other studies, a model 
mentioned briefly above, and also provided some details of external investment. The USO 
population was drawn solely from a single Library House database which again leads to queries 
over whether the population is complete and accurate. 
Munari and Toschi (2010) identified a population of USOs in the UK by starting from a 
population of all MNT (micro- and nano-technology) companies active in 2004 from data 
supplied by the MNT Network, and identifying USOs within the sample by methods that are not 
entirely clear. The Venture Expert database was then consulted to see which of these USOs 
obtained funding as of December 2007. Again, the methodology used leads to concerns over 
the completeness and accuracy of the USO population as there is no auditable trail behind the 
initial population of USOs and commercial database are often incomplete so comparison with 
the current work must be made with great care. Detail of external investment attracted by USOs 
was provided by this study. 
Minshall and Wicksteed (2005) provide some external investment data for a small number of UK 
USOs. This is one of the early studies in the field when concerns were starting to be raised about 
the reality of the financial performance of USOs. Three different classes of university were 
considered: universities with large research budgets (Oxford, Cambridge, Imperial and 
University College London), other large universities in major cities (Edinburgh, Newcastle and 
Southampton) and universities with much smaller research budgets, reflecting in part their lack 
of medical research activities, but each with a high proportion of research funds coming from 
UK industry (Cranfield, Loughborough, Strathclyde). This classification is interesting, although 
the sample is very small, and again the data was all obtained from the relevant university’s TTO. 
As can be seen, there are a wide range of methodologies used in the studies above for 
identifying populations of USOs, so care will need to be exercised when undertaking 
comparisons with data from the current work. Where significant discrepancies in results exist, 
the methodology used in the studies should be examined to see if any potential explanations 
can be obtained. 
 
3.4.2 Results from existing studies 
The tables below collate the results from the above studies for USO survival, third party 
financing and IPO/exit. Detailed analysis of these findings will be performed and discussed in a 
later chapter alongside the results from the current study. 
 
3.4.2.1 Survival 
The two tables below combine USO survival data from Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008) and 
other studies in the literature, performed by both by country and university. 
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Country Survival rate 
(%) 
Period Years Sample size Source 
USA 68 1980-2000 21 3376 Shane (2004) 
Canada 73 1995-2003 9 301 Clayman and 
Holbrook (2006) 
Hong Kong 
(timed rate 
after 5 years) 
79 1997-2004 8 56 Leung and Mathews 
(2006) 
Netherlands 83 1984-1992 9 92 Shane (2004) 
France 84 1984-1987 4 100 Mustar (1997) 
Sweden 87 1960-1993 34 30 Shane (2004) 
Northern 
Ireland 
94 1984-1995 12 17 Shane (2004) 
Sweden 
(timed rate 
after 2 years) 
73 1994-2002 9 528 Wennberg et al 
(2011) 
Sweden 
(timed rate 
after 5 years) 
53 1994-2002 9 528 Wennberg et al 
(2011) 
USA 94 1991-2001 11 655 Zhang (2009) 
Table 3.4: USO Survival data by country (Oskarsson and Schläpfer, 2008) 
 
University Survival rate 
(%) 
Period Years Sample size Source 
USA – MIT 80 1980-1996 17 134 Shane (2004) 
Oxford 90 1950-2004 55 64 Lawton Smith and 
Ho (2006) 
ETH Zurich 88 1998-2007 10 130 Oskarsson and 
Schläpfer (2008) 
Table 3.5: USO Survival data by University (Oskarsson and Schläpfer, 2008) 
 
3.4.2.2 External investment and IPO 
The tables below compare data collected from previous studies, some of which were collated by 
Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008), concerning the performance metrics of attraction of third party 
external funding by USOs and successful exits from USOs across a range of universities from 
different countries, although mostly from the UK. Table 3.7 simply shows the percentage of 
USOs that attracted external third party funding that were created at each academic institution. 
Table 3.8 shows the percentage of USOs that achieved a successful exit for its parent through a 
trade sale or IPO of its shares. In the same format as above, Table 3.9 shows the total amount of 
external funding secured by a university for all of its USOs, while Table 3.10 shows the amount 
of funding obtained by USOs that obtained any level of funding i.e. removing the distorting 
influence for a university of its USOs that did not achieve any external funding. 
Oskarsson and Schläpfer’s (2008) study on ETH Zurich was only able to obtain data on funding 
from 82 of its 130 USOs as a result of non-responses to their questionnaire, hence the smaller 
sample size in Table 3.9, although the authors did not consider that this fact distorted any of 
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their results or conclusions. Data in Table 3.10 for the other UK universities is not complete as 
the Holi et al. (2007) report can no longer be accessed, although enough relevant information 
was obtained from citations in Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008) to enable a reasonable level of 
comparison with other studies. 
 
University Total 
USOs 
Number with 
external funding 
% with external 
funding 
Source 
ETH Zurich 1998 - 2007 130 34 26 Oskarsson and 
Schläpfer 
(2008) 
     
10 UK universities 1998 
- 2002 
172 111 65 Minshall and 
Wicksteed 
(2005) 
Cambridge, Oxford, 
Imperial College, 
University College 
London  
99 71 72  
Edinburgh, Newcastle, 
Southampton 
36 25 69  
Cranfield, 
Loughborough, 
Strathclyde 
37 15 40  
     
20 UK universities 2001 
- 2006 
233 137 59 Holi et al. 
(2007) 
Cambridge 30 20 67  
Oxford 24 18 75  
Imperial College 29 19 66  
University College 
London 
9 6 67  
Edinburgh 26 15 58  
     
UK universities 1985 - 
2007 
123 42 34 Munari and 
Toschi (2010) 
     
UK universities 1990 - 
2007 
125 78 62 Mueller (2010) 
Table 3.6 Percentage of USOs attracting third party financing 
 
University Total 
USOs 
Trade 
sales 
% trade 
sales 
IPOs % 
IPOs 
Source 
ETH Zurich 1998 - 
2007 
130 8 6.2 1 0.8 Oskarsson and Schläpfer 
(2008) 
       
US universities 655    7.6 Zhang (2009) 
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20 UK universities 
2001 - 2006 
233 8 3.4 5 2.1 Holi et al. (2007) 
Cambridge 30 1 3.3 0 0  
Oxford 24 0 0 1 4.2  
Imperial College 29 1 3.4 1 3.4  
University College 
London 
9 2 22.2 0 0  
Edinburgh 26 0 0 0 0  
Table 3.7 Percentage of USOs obtaining a trade sale or IPO 
 
 
University Total 
USOs 
Total funding 
(£’000) 
Funding per USO 
(£’000) 
Source 
ETH Zurich 1998 
- 2007 
82 153,855k CHF = 
65,470 
798 Oskarsson and 
Schläpfer (2008) 
     
10 UK 
universities 
1998 - 2002 
172 494,446 2,874 Minshall and 
Wicksteed (2005) 
Cambridge, 
Oxford, Imperial 
College, 
University 
College London  
99 344,572 3,481  
Edinburgh, 
Newcastle, 
Southampton 
36 121,806 3,384  
Cranfield, 
Loughborough, 
Strathclyde 
37 28,068 759  
Table 3.8 Total third party external funding obtained by a university 
 
University Total 
USOs 
Total funding 
(£’000) 
Funding per USO 
(£’000) 
Source 
ETH Zurich 1998 
- 2007 
24 153,855k CHF = 
65,470 
6,411k CHF = 2,728 Oskarsson and 
Schläpfer (2008) 
     
US universities 606  $23.55m = 13,853 Zhang (2009) 
     
10 UK 
universities 
1998 - 2002 
111 494,446 4,454 Minshall and 
Wicksteed (2005) 
Cambridge, 
Oxford, Imperial 
College, 
71 344,572 4,853  
60 
 
 
University 
College London  
Edinburgh, 
Newcastle, 
Southampton 
25 121,806 4,872  
Cranfield, 
Loughborough, 
Strathclyde 
15 28,068 1,871  
     
20 UK 
universities 
2001 - 2006 
  2,300 Holi et al. (2007) 
     
Cambridge   5,500  
University 
College London 
  4,300  
     
UK universities 
1990 - 2007 
78  19,754 Mueller (2010) 
Table 3.9 Funding obtained per USO that attracted funding 
 
In summary, although the number of studies potentially comparable to this work is small, there 
is sufficient data across the three performance metrics chosen to allow interesting comparisons 
to be made. 
 
3.5 Impact of finance on USO performance 
As noted above, an area for potential investigation of this study is the impact of obtaining 
external financing upon the survival and IPO/exit prospects of a USO. There are a number of 
studies in the literature which explore this relationship, and these are discussed briefly below. 
 
The financing of new, technology-based companies has been explored previously in the 
literature, particularly that relating to venture capital financing. Many of the principles derived 
from these branches of the literature can be equally applied to USOs, which are usually formed 
to attempt to commercialise a newly developed technology discovered in a university setting. 
Shane (2004) notes that most newly-formed USOs need to develop their product or process 
from a technical perspective, as well as their potential market, which is likely to require 
significant external funding and will often be beyond the means of the academic entrepreneur 
to fund from their own resources. 
 
In an important summary study of USO finance, Shane (2004) identifies four key issues relevant 
to the subject of USO financing which are discussed in more depth below, highlighting their 
potential relevance to the current study: 
 
• The importance of capital acquisition for USOs 
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• The financing gap faced by many USOs and the importance of public sector funding in 
overcoming this gap and allowing USOs to develop 
• Uncertainty and information asymmetry making capital acquisition difficult for USOs, 
and how investors and entrepreneurs cope with these problems 
• The different sources of capital used to finance USOs 
 
 
3.5.1. Importance of capital acquisition 
 
Shane (2004) notes that USOs usually require significant amounts of capital to undertake both 
technical and market development. Shane and Stuart (2002) found that the average amount of 
capital raised by MIT USOs founded between 1980 and 1996 was $5.3 million while Aldrich 
(1999) noted that less than one per cent of all US start-ups raise more than $1m, highlighting 
the capital-intensive nature of USOs compared to other companies. Capital also provides USOs 
with a buffer against adverse conditions and events allowing consideration of alternative 
strategies and enhancing external perception of the USO. In addition, obtaining adequate 
capital may enhance the performance of USOs, with the greatest reason for abandoning setting 
up a USO being inability to obtain sufficient capital, and the amount of capital obtained by a 
USO has been shown to be positively associated with the likelihood of acquisition or IPO, and 
negatively associated with company failure (Shane and Stuart, 2002). This provides an early 
indication of the nature of the relationship between the three elements of the performance 
metrics ‘triumvirate’ of this work noted above, which will be tested to see if it applies for the 
West Midlands region.  
 
3.5.2 Public sector and the financing gap 
 
Shane (2004) notes that while the ability to raise private capital at the time of USO formation 
varies by institution (with more prestigious institutions more likely to do so), public sector 
finance is still valuable in attracting further private sector capital. This phenomenon has already 
been noted in the formation of UCFs by the UK government. The financing gap, where private 
investors are unwilling to provide funding to a USO at an early stage due to the levels of risk 
involved, is most severe for sectors outside biotechnology, where development times are 
accepted as being long in duration. It is likely that the current study will see a mixture of public 
and private funding for its USOs. 
 
3.5.3 Uncertainty and information asymmetry 
 
Two important concepts within the study of the attraction of external investment by start-up 
companies, including USOs, are uncertainty and information asymmetry (Manigart et al., 2012; 
Meoli et al., 2012; Shane, 2004). Uncertainty for potential funders of USOs arises due to 
fundamental uncertainty over whether the relevant technology can be commercialised, and 
whether any market for it indeed exists. Information asymmetry arises due to the fact that the 
management team of the USO have more knowledge of their potential product or service than 
an external party, a situation exacerbated where the technology is complex or novel in nature 
(Munari and Toschi, 2010). It is therefore likely that a number of externally-financed USOs in the 
current work will fail, or fail to make a successful IPO/exit, as a result of these two important 
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factors. Under both signalling and agency theory frameworks, both factors will serve to hinder 
decision-making by potential investors, so where a USO’s technology is particularly complex, on 
first principles the company may obtain lower amounts of funding. 
 
3.5.4 Sources of capital 
 
USOs raise capital from different sources depending on the company, with differences observed 
between USOs requiring minimal investment such as some software companies, and others 
requiring significant funding such as biotechnology companies. Shane and Stuart (2002) found 
that USOs from MIT with greater sales required less external financing than those with fewer 
sales, with a diverse range of funding sources which reflected the range of funding needs and 
the presence of uncertainty and information asymmetry in the funding process. Angel financing 
alongside venture capital funding, or by itself, was also common, reflecting its popularity with 
USOs given the longer timescales for returns, allowing more time for technology development 
for the USO, the tendency to invest earlier in the life cycle of the USO and the need for a lower 
rate of return. The current study is likely to reflect this range of sources of finance. 
 
 
3.6 USO funding and performance 
 
The effect of finance (particularly venture capital) upon financial performance, including the 
metrics of this study (survival and IPO/exit), has been considered in some studies both in USOs 
and wider start-up companies. 
 
Shane (2004) states that the obtaining of adequate financial capital is associated with success of 
USOs, perhaps most critically in that it allows technological development to be undertaken via 
the hiring of personnel and purchasing equipment. In addition, given the generic uncertainty 
associated with USOs, financial resources give flexibility to change company strategy where new 
facts about the technology or market are uncovered. The process of raising financial capital is 
time consuming, and the need to raise further rounds can adversely impact upon the founders’ 
time to spend developing their technology. Finally, financial resources imply quality and 
legitimacy making the USO more attractive to potential investors and leading to a virtuous 
circle. Prior research backs up these propositions: Shane and Stuart (2002) found for 134 MIT 
USOs founded between 1980 and 1996 that the cumulative amount of venture capital raised 
increased the probability of IPO and lowered the probability of company failure, with each $2m 
of venture capital raised doubling the probability of IPO. They used a database of MIT USOs that 
included all companies, freeing the sample from survivor bias, and noted that the majority of 
failures occur through lack of funding, demonstrating limitations of explaining how initial 
endowments affect USO performance in samples excluding early failures, a problem they 
consider to be rampant in research on new ventures. In addition, in the study there are no left 
censored company histories i.e. all USOs are observed from incorporation until a performance 
outcome is recorded or the observation is right censored by the end of the work. These are 
critical methodological issues that will be addressed in the current study. In a similar study, 
Lockett and Wright (2003) found that USOs with VC funding are ten times more likely to 
proceed to an IPO than other start-up companies. Nerkar and Shane (2003) similarly found that 
the more venture capital obtained by a USO, the more likely it was to survive. 
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Outside of the specific cases of USOs, the wider VC literature contains some examples of the 
effect that VC finance has upon company performance metrics similar to those already 
discussed. Hellman and Puri (2002) found that VC-backed firms show superior business 
performance that they attributed to the finance and business expertise provided by the VC. 
Other studies have shown that surviving VC-backed companies have higher growth rates in 
terms of assets, sales and number of employees (Al-Suwailem, 1995), and that VC-backed IPOs 
are on average larger than non VC-backed and experience less underpricing (Lin and Smith, 
1998). Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008) note that data about the financial performance of VC-
backed companies in terms of survival and IPO is limited, but Metrick (2007) found that five 
years after incorporation, 6% of companies had failed, 33% had experienced an IPO or sale and 
61% were still in the venture capitalists’ portfolios. After ten years, 14% had failed, 61% had 
exited and 25% were still in portfolio, although it was suggested that many of the final category 
may in fact have failed and that the ten year timed failure rate was in the region of 30-40%. 
Nadeau (2011) noted that other studies show similarly high IPO and sale rates although the 
ratio between the two varies significantly between countries. Giot and Schwienbacher (2007) 
investigated VC exits by studying the time to IPO, trade sale or liquidation for 6,000 VC-backed 
companies. There was initially an increased likelihood of IPO rising to a plateau before 
decreasing over time. Trade sales were found to be less time-varying, with large variations 
across sectors.  
 
Manigart et al. (2002) note that studies of VC impact on companies’ financial performance often 
have a major flaw of survival bias where companies fail and disappear from studies, and which 
therefore only include survivors. An example of this is in studies of companies that succeed in 
an IPO, which is already a select group, and they note that apart from anecdotal evidence, little 
is known of the impact of VC on company survival, even though it is assumed to have a positive 
influence, and is demonstrated to some extent in some studies e.g. Calvo et al. (2012). 
However, Manigart et al. (2002) note that the relationship is unlikely to be straightforward, as 
VC investors seek to maximise their financial returns from their portfolio rather than ensure the 
survival of a single company, and note four reasons why VC-backed companies may survive 
longer than non VC-backed. Firstly, VC companies undertake stringent due diligence to pick the 
best investments. Secondly, Diamond’s (1991) reputation-based theory suggests that investors 
such as VCs transmit positive signals to other potential investors and help to attract other 
resources. Thirdly, VC managers undertake monitoring after investment (Lerner, 1995), and 
finally provide valuable services to their portfolio companies such as access to networks and 
business knowledge (Fried and Hisrich, 1995). 
 
However, there are also arguments against VC having a positive influence on survival. Amit et al. 
(1990) argue that VC is a costly form of finance and the most promising projects may be able to 
acquire cheaper finance from other sources. VC investors also aim for maximum financial return 
so may seek out more risky companies than non VC-backed ones as part of a large portfolio of 
investments (Manigart and Sapienza, 1999). Finally, VC managers may act to liquidate ‘living 
dead’ companies that are surviving but not producing an adequate financial return (Ruhnka et 
al., 1992) to allocate their time more efficiently to their better-performing investments. Ruhnka 
et al. (1992) found that VCs could turn around 56% of their living dead investments by devoting 
more time to them, although Sapienza (1992) found a strong positive correlation between VCs’ 
time invested and the performance of the company, suggesting the latter strategy may lead to 
lower chances of survival. In one study focussing on the performance metric of survival, 
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Manigart et al. (2002) considered the survival of VC-backed Belgian companies compared to 
those without VC and found that, in opposition to previous views (e.g. Shane and Stuart, 2002; 
Timmons and Spinelli, 2002), VC-backed companies did not show higher rates of survival. 
 
Manigart et al. (2002) also propose that the type of VC obtained is likely to influence the 
survival of an investee company, distinguishing between private VC and government VC. 
Governments have often used VC to exploit public benefits and diminish perceived equity gaps, 
so government VC companies may look to social returns such as job creation rather than solely 
focussing on financial performance, which may lead to lower survival rates than private VC. In 
addition, government VC is managed by civil servants who may not be the best qualified to 
identify good investments and the lower salaries offered than private sector VC may again serve 
to diminish their effectiveness. However, government VC may actually be able to finance the 
best projects due to their ability to offer cheaper finance than private VC, and having societal 
goals may make it more likely that government VC managers will seek to turn around living 
dead companies rather than liquidate them, which could lead to greater survival rates than for 
companies funded by private VC. 
 
In conclusion, the relationship between finance and survival/IPO is not straightforward, as seen 
in the above studies. Although focussing mainly on VC funding, these conclusions are likely to 
apply to other sources of funding. The current study will therefore add important data to the 
discussion. 
 
 
3.7 Theoretical frameworks 
The collection of financial performance data in this work needs to be grounded within a suitable 
theoretical framework to provide structure to subsequent analysis. Selecting a framework is not 
always straightforward, and is unlikely to leave no unresolved queries or issues when 
attempting to explain observations and results. However, the existing literature can provide 
some guidance to enable a suitable framework to be identified and allow a more effective and 
challenging set of questions to be raised and conclusions to be reached. 
The overall aim of this work is to assess the effectiveness of the recent USO creation 
phenomenon in the UK by focussing on financial performance of USOs at a company level within 
the context of its parent university. Such performance data serves to demonstrate the 
underlying strength of the USO in terms of the resources it owns and the effectiveness of their 
use to external third parties. It also allows conclusions to be drawn upon the intrinsic 
commercial value of the underlying technology being developed and the ability of the 
university, via its technology commercialisation operations, to effectively identify technology, 
commercialise it and create financial value for the university. The overall research question is a 
broad, policy-focussed one and the aim of this work is to provide evidence to policy-makers 
through a detailed longitudinal study of a region rather than to examine relationships between 
financial variables and other data. This is likely to make the selection of a framework challenging 
and it may be that elements need to be borrowed from a number of frameworks. In addition, 
the data collected may only be sufficient to be acknowledged as in line with what a framework 
might predict. 
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As illustrated in Section 3.4 above, the majority of studies previously undertaken in the 
literature that provide comparable data to this work have been atheoretical in nature. Where a 
theoretical model has been used, the RBV (Resource-Based View) is the most common e.g. 
Mueller (2010). This framework is examined in more detail below. 
As can be seen from the broad nature of the overarching research question in Chapter 1, the 
key purpose of this work is to investigate absolute financial performance measures of USOs to 
address a broad policy question of whether such companies have been successful in a UK region 
from a financial perspective. This is to be achieved by collection of an extremely accurate and 
precise population to allow analysis to be made at an individual company level. A tight 
definition of a USO will be made for these purposes and data collected from a range of historic 
accounting records to allow comparison with other works. This is in contrast to the approach of 
previous studies. 
As a result of the methodological differences between this work and comparable studies, and 
the policy-focussed nature of the overarching research question, the RBV framework previously 
used in the literature may not provide a comprehensive overview for the requirements of this 
study.  
The RBV provides a theoretical viewpoint which focusses on the resources of a firm as a 
differentiator and predictor of competitive advantage, and gives rise to resource-based theory. 
It considers the starting resource configuration of a company and links superior performance to 
organisational resources and capabilities (Mustar et al., 2006), which the company may have 
when it is founded, or which it is able to acquire or develop over time. Barney (1991) developed 
a popular model which attempts to classify the complete set of resource characteristics needed 
to obtain sustainable competitive advantage, which is often known as the ‘VRIN’ model where 
resources must have the following properties: 
• valuable,  
• rare, 
• inimitable, and,  
• non-substitutable. 
 
Landry et al. (2007) have produced the following diagram focussing specifically upon the 
resources required in a successful process of USO formation and development. As can be seen, 
the quality of the underlying commercialisable technology and its protection is of paramount 
importance. Other mainstream resources such as finance and the personal and network 
resources of the founders are also listed. The institutional context is also represented with 
resources relating to the parent university included in the diagram; USOs have historically 
primarily been generated from science and technology departments at universities, so 
universities with significant research strengths in this field may lead to the formation of more 
USOs than those universities which do not.  
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Figure 3.2 Resources required for USO formation and development (Landry et al., 2006) 
 
As already noted, the RBV has already been used extensively in the academic study of USOs, 
including some financial performance studies at a company level, where the performance of 
USOs is linked to the resources that they hold e.g. Munari and Toschi (2010). In other studies, 
Arthurs and Busenitz (2006) built upon the RBV to explain how venture capitalists (VCs) endow 
new ventures with greater product dynamic capability resulting in significantly higher IPO and 
post-IPO performance, while Thornhill and Amit (2003) undertook an RBV analysis of company 
failures finding inability to adapt to environment change to be a key cause. It will therefore have 
some relevance in the current work as the possession of resources would be predicted to lead 
to outperformance under the RBV, implying that USOs with more effective resources will be 
more likely to attract external financial resources, survive or reach a successful exit. In 
particular, the attraction of finance, which is both a performance metric and a resource under 
the RBV, may lead to superior financial performance under the other two metrics. 
However, the RBV will not be used as the main theoretical framework for the current work 
which focusses on financial performance. While financial resources are a key resource within 
the RBV, the overall framework requires consideration many other categories of resource as 
illustrated in Figure 3.3, rather than simply the narrow consideration of the financial resources 
of the USO to allow effective analysis to take place. Within the confines of the methodological 
approach of the current study in focussing on collecting accurate financial data, it will not be 
possible, for example, to assess the strength of a USO’s technology, or its human and social 
capital which may serve to attract external investment. 
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It is therefore necessary to consider additional theoretical models. On this basis, two theoretical 
models popular in the literature that may be of some value are signalling theory and agency 
theory, which will be outlined briefly below. Signalling theory, which has been used in previous 
performance studies e.g. Mueller (2010) is concerned with signals given by entities to external 
third parties which may affect the relationship between the two parties going forward. Such 
signals will include financial performance data for USOs which will be the focus of this work. In 
addition, agency theory can potentially provide some insight into the relationship between two 
key parties in this work i.e. the principal (an interested external party) and agent (the university 
via its TTO). 
 
3.8 Signalling theory 
Signalling theory is a popular theoretical framework used in a variety of strands of academic 
literature, including that of entrepreneurship (Ahlers et al., 2015), and at its core is concerned 
with the reduction in information asymmetry between two parties (Spence, 2002). Information 
asymmetry has been described as occurring when ‘different people know different things’ 
(Stiglitz, 2002), and arises where imperfect information exists. Stiglitz (2002) identifies two 
broad categories of information where asymmetry is important: information about quality, 
which is important where one party is not fully aware of the characteristics of the other, and 
information about intent, which is important where one party is concerned about the other’s 
behaviour (Connelly et al., 2011). This second category is closely linked with agency theory, 
which is described in greater detail below. Connelly et al. (2011) define quality as ‘the 
underlying, unobservable ability of the signaller to fulfil the needs or demands of an outsider 
observing the signal’, although other interpretations exist in the literature. 
Connelly et al. (2011) prepared the following timeline to review the key elements of signalling 
theory, which includes the two key actors, namely the signaller and receiver, as well as the 
signal, and these concepts are discussed below. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Signalling timeline (Connelly et al., 2011) 
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3.8.1 Signaller 
Signalling theory identifies the signaller as an insider e.g. Spence (1973), who has information 
that is not available to outsiders. This may include positive or negative information, which in the 
context of a USO could include details of the company’s underlying technology. 
Entrepreneurship studies usually focus on signallers as leaders of start-up or IPO (Initial Public 
Offering) firms e.g. Zimmerman (2008). 
 
3.8.2 Signal 
Spence (1974) describes signals as ‘those activities or attributes of individuals in a market which 
by design or accident, alter the beliefs of, or convey information to, other individuals in the 
market’. 
Signalling theory studies generally focus on the deliberate communication of positive 
information by signallers to convey positive attributes about an organisation (Connelly et al., 
2011). To be an effective signal, it must be observable, so outsiders can notice it, and costly to 
produce (Bird and Smith, 2005), so signallers can be seen as well placed and able to absorb the 
cost. Ndofor et al. (2004) define effective signals as those that create a ‘separating equilibrium’, 
which is one where an uninformed agent is able to distinguish between superior and inferior 
endowed firms (Kreps and Wilson, 1982). 
A wide range of signals of quality have been considered in the literature. One important 
approach considers signalling theory alongside institutional theory where firms strive for 
legitimacy to survive, with typical signals being the quality of their directors or management, or 
of their shareholders. For start-up companies, founder share ownership can be a costly signal of 
quality given the need for them to invest their own resources. Arthurs et al. (2009) note, in the 
context of an IPO, that signals of quality include scientific capabilities (Deeds et al., 1997), 
venture capital backing (Megginson and Weiss, 1991), prestigious underwriting (Carter and 
Manaster, 1990) and length of lockup agreement, to reduce current and potential investors’ 
doubts of a company going through an IPO. 
 
3.8.3 Receiver 
Receivers are outsiders who lack but desire information about an organisation. Connelly et al. 
(2011) note that for signalling to occur, the signaller should benefit by some action from the 
receiver that the receiver would not otherwise have done, and often involves selection of the 
signaller from other alternatives. In entrepreneurship literature, this often includes a decision 
by the receiver over whether to invest as an existing or potential investor (Busenitz et al., 2005), 
including at IPO stage (Arthurs et al., 2009), and this will be applicable to USOs also. 
 
3.8.4 Relevance of signalling theory for USOs 
Signalling theory is likely to be of relevance in the study of USOs in the current work. USOs, as 
signallers, along with other start-up companies created to exploit new technology, are obvious 
cases where potential investors lack information (Gompers and Lerner, 1999), with limited 
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operating history available to allow external parties to make good investment decisions. 
Audretsch et al. (2012) note that new ventures are particularly prone to financial constraints 
and that innovative new ventures usually rely on external finance, although information 
asymmetry is a particular problem given the lack of any track record for the company, and 
uncertainty about the value of the technologies, particularly at an early stage of existence. In a 
similar vein, Cao and Hsu (2010) note that start-up firms are characterised by large intangible 
assets, negative cash flow, great technological uncertainty and low liquidation value, and hence 
must rely on venture capital for finance, with the existing literature showing a focus on how VCs 
mitigate information asymmetry through financing strategies. It is likely that the attraction of 
external investment will be a relevant performance metric for USOs in the current study, and 
data should be able to be evaluated for consistency with the signalling theory framework.  
Signalling theory may also be of value when considering financial performance data from USOs 
generated from a specific university and its TTO. Williamson (1996) identifies three mechanisms 
reducing uncertainty surrounding any transaction, namely trust built up through multiple 
transactions, greater information disclosure and bonding. There may therefore be a link 
between the number of USOs formed by a TTO and the level of external funding obtained, both 
of which may be performance metrics of relevance. The third element of bonding may include, 
among many factors, reputational capital of the TTO which would only seek to commercialise 
high quality technologies, or the ownership of an equity stake in the USO. Arthurs et al. (2009) 
consider such a bond as a stronger form of signal than those elements mentioned above, since if 
the information provided is incorrect the TTO itself will suffer financial or reputational loss.  
Finally, signalling theory may be able to provide a framework against which to gauge 
consistency when considering the survival of USOs, another performance metric likely to be of 
interest. Hsu and Ziedonis (2008) note that prior studies identify two mechanisms where quality 
is signalled, namely entrepreneurial experience of management teams and knowledge and 
capability transfer from a parent (Agarwal et al., 2004) which affects new ventures’ probability 
of survival. Linkages between the research strength of the parent university and the survival and 
performance of its USOs may therefore be possible to explore. 
 
3.9 Agency theory – introduction 
Eisenhardt (1989) states that the historical background behind the development of agency 
theory arose from work performed by economists in the 1960s and early 1970s on risk-sharing 
problems where co-operating parties have different attitudes to risk. Agency theory broadened 
this work to include the agency problem occurring where the parties have different goals and 
division of labour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory is directed at the agency 
relationship where one party (the principal) delegates work to another (the agent), and 
describes the relationship using a metaphor of a contract. 
Agency theory primarily considers two problems that can occur in agency relationships 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The first is the agency problem arising when a) the desires or goals of the 
principal and agent conflict, and b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the 
agent is doing and whether they are behaving appropriately. The second problem is that of risk 
sharing where principal and agent have different attitudes towards risk, and hence may prefer 
different activities to be undertaken. 
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Table 3.10 below gives an overview of the key tenets of agency theory which are discussed 
further below. 
 
Key idea Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient 
organisation of information and risk-bearing costs 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumptions Self-interest 
Bounded rationality 
Risk aversion 
Organisational assumptions Partial goal conflict among participants 
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion 
Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
Information assumption Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting problems Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
Risk sharing 
Problem domain Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly 
differing goals and risk preferences e.g. compensation, 
regulation, leadership, impression management, whistle-
blowing, vertical integration, transfer pricing 
Table 3.10 Agency theory overview (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
 
3.9.1 Agency theory in VC literature 
Agency theory has proved a popular theoretical framework in which to explore the relationship 
between a venture capitalist and entrepreneur (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003), where the VC is 
considering providing finance to a new company set up by the entrepreneur. Under agency 
theory, an agency problem can arise between the entrepreneur (agent) and VC (principal) as a 
result of different risk preferences and goals (Eisenhardt, 1989). As noted above, the theory 
assumes both parties are self-interested and boundedly rational, with individual utility-
maximising behaviour likely to occur if incentives and controls to align the goals of the 
entrepreneur with the VC are not put in place. 
While the current work focusses on the university TTO rather than the academic entrepreneur 
behind the USO, similar issues are likely to be at stake since the TTO, a quasi-commercial 
operation within an academic environment, may have quite different goals and risk appetite 
from those of an external financier (Vohora et al., 2008) who is likely to be focussed primarily on 
financial returns. It would seem therefore that agency theory may have some utility and 
relevance for the current work, given that attraction of external investment is likely to be an 
important performance metric. 
Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) note that bounded rationality of the two parties (principal and 
agent) may give rise to information asymmetry leading to adverse selection or moral hazard on 
behalf of the agent (Amit et al., 1998). Adverse selection is the misrepresentation of ability by 
the agent e.g. in the current study the TTO ‘overselling’ the quality of the USO’s underlying 
technology to the potential financier, while moral hazard relates to negative behaviour such as 
lack of effort by the agent e.g. the TTO might not perform proper internal due diligence on the 
quality of the technology or management team of the USO. 
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3.9.2 Boundaries of agency theory 
Within the context of a VC/entrepreneur relationship, Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) consider that 
agency theory is able to function as a theoretical framework better at certain points in the 
investee company’s lifecycle than at others. They note that a normative prescription of agency 
theory is that the principal should try to avoid or mitigate any agency problem, but that the 
problem will vary throughout the lifecycle of a company, hence agency theory is also likely to 
vary in its usefulness as a framework within which to explain observed results. In the current 
work, agency theory may be most efficient as a framework prior to financial investment when 
the TTO may have greater input into the management of the USO, when any agency problem 
may decrease as the TTO and financier’s goals become aligned. 
Figure 3.3 below is derived from Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) and identifies the nature of the 
agency problem depending on the goals of the TTO and financier; the outcomes are discussed in 
more detail below, with specific reference to the TTO and financier of this work. 
 
 
 
 
Actual goals between 
financier and TTO 
 
Perceived goals between financier and TTO 
 
 Same Different 
Same No agency problem Perceived agency 
problem 
Different Hidden agency 
problem 
Visible agency 
problem 
Figure 3.4 Goal congruence between financier and TTO (derived from Arthurs and Busenitz, 
2003) 
 
Where the goals of the financier and TTO are aligned, as in the upper left quadrant, there is no 
agency problem (Eisenhardt, 1989) e.g. both parties wish to maximise the value of their equity 
stake in the USO. Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) note that agency theory prescribes actions for the 
financier to move into this quadrant such as monitoring and evaluating the value of the USO’s 
underlying technology; however, agency theory has less value in describing behaviour once this 
situation of goal congruence has been reached and any agency problem mitigated or overcome. 
Such monitoring might include the financier appointing a representative director to the USO’s 
board or evaluating the USO’s financial performance by reviewing regular management 
accounts. 
In the upper right quadrant, the actual goals of the financier and TTO are the same but the 
financier perceives them to be different. Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) identify that a blind spot 
for agency theory develops in this scenario, as it mistakenly assumes goal misalignment as 
causing an agency problem. As a result, the financier may undertake excessive monitoring to 
overcome this perceived problem, with an example of this situation in the current work being 
where the financier feels that the TTO is focussing on other goals for the USO other than 
financial success, such as letting a failing company survive to protect its own reputation. Where 
research focusses only on either the principal or agent, agency theory will produce significant or 
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insignificant results respectively, leading to potential errors in the findings. The current work 
will therefore consider both TTO and financier perceptions to overcome this potential issue. 
Where goals of principal and agent are different, a potential agency problem exists and agency 
theory’s assumptions are valid for the bottom two quadrants. Agency theory advises that the 
principal should offer incentives to, or monitor the agent to move from the bottom left to 
bottom right quadrant, and thence to the top left, where goals are aligned. 
Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) state that actual and perceived goal alignment help to explain why 
agency theory may be more applicable as a theoretical framework before an investment 
decision is made than after it. Before investment, the financier is likely to focus on conducting a 
thorough due diligence of the USO to avoid a bad investment decision. The financier does not 
know the motivation of the TTO, and must assume the worst and protect his investment. The 
TTO’s primary goal is likely to be USO success, so actual goals of principal and agent are 
different, giving potential agency problems. However, after investment, the goals of the 
financier and TTO are likely to become USO success and are hence aligned, although the 
financier will undertake actions to safeguard its investment and avoid potential hidden agency 
problems. 
The due diligence process conducted by the financier occurs at the time when its uncertainty 
over the USO and TTO is likely to be highest, reducing adverse selection or moral hazard fears. 
Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) identify four other mechanisms that reduce potential for agency 
problems: TTO bonding (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) where the TTO (or university) has a 
significant equity stake in the USO, contractual obligations of the TTO specified in the financing 
agreement, incentives provided by the financier and ongoing monitoring of the USO by the 
financier. 
Following investment, the relationship between TTO and financier may develop to include 
working together on other projects as trust develops between principal and agent. In the 
current work, this may be observable if the same external financier returns on multiple 
occasions to provide finance to new USOs from the same TTO. The likelihood of an agency 
problem is therefore likely to decrease over time, although certain situations could reverse this 
e.g. the financier realises that a USO is not likely to be successful. 
In the current work, it may be that the TTO has a wider range of goals than that of the financial 
success of the USO, which as already noted is likely to be the key focus of the financier. For 
example, the TTO may have a reputational goal in that USOs that do not survive for many years 
may have a perceived negative impact on the TTO’s reputation for commercialising technology. 
As such, the TTO may prefer to keep USOs alive as ‘living dead companies’ e.g. Ruhnka et al. 
(1992) rather than take the pragmatic commercial decision of a financier to close and liquidate 
the USO to avoid further losses. The TTO may also have regard to the positive impact of a USO 
on the local economy to satisfy local government stakeholders, which could manifest itself in a 
TTO creating large numbers of USOs with a consultancy slant to their activities, but which would 
not grow rapidly e.g. the ‘lifestyle’ companies (Wright et al., 2006) seen in Chapter 2. These 
aspects will need to be considered carefully in analysing the financial results of this work. 
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3.9.3 Potential limitations of agency theory 
While agency theory can be helpful to describe observations in a financier/entrepreneur 
situation, there are certain limitations to its powers. Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) note that there 
is in fact a general lack of empirical support in the literature for an agency relationship between 
VCs and entrepreneurs (Busenitz et al., 2001). This may be due to previous studies focussing on 
inappropriate agency variables, or limitations in agency theory’s explicative ability. As already 
noted, they consider agency theory is more limited in its use after external investment than 
before, for three main reasons, as adapted for the current work: 
• The goals of financier and TTO become aligned, mitigating potential agency problems 
• After investing, the financier changes from wary investor to willing collaborator 
• The TTO retains a significant stake in the USO, either equity or a more intangible 
attachment 
However, in a more fundamental challenge to the usefulness of agency theory in a 
financier/entrepreneur relationship, Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) argue that an entrepreneur in 
fact rarely acts like an agent under agency theory. The entrepreneur is, in reality, unlikely to 
pursue short-term gain at the expense of success given the fundamental uncertainty over the 
USO’s future, so is unlikely to undertake any activity to jeopardise its survival. This may again 
serve to limit the theory’s ability to explain results from a study. Further, agency theory focusses 
primarily on protection of a financier against downside, whereas the field of entrepreneurship is 
usually about stakeholders pursuing upside potential and less about downside protection. 
Upside potential under agency theory is limited because the entrepreneur is supposed to have 
little concern for long-term success, but this is unlikely to be true in the current study as the TTO 
is likely to be concerned over the success of the USO, as observed in the simple fact that it 
engages the financier for funding to maximise long-term success.  
 
3.9.4 Agency theory – relevance to USOs 
As with signalling theory, at this stage it is possible that agency theory will be of some value as a 
theoretical framework for the current work, given its use in the more generic situation of a 
relationship between a VC and entrepreneur, in particular to explore the financial performance 
of USOs within the context of the relationship between the TTO and external financier. Not all 
USOs will attract external finance (Lambert, 2003), but those that do should yield results of 
interest. Agency theory has been used in some recent studies of USOs e.g. Prencipe (2016) 
However, results must be treated with care for a number of reasons due to limitations in the 
theory itself. 
Agency theory traditionally has a focus on the preservation of wealth of investors, which may 
provide an incomplete picture of the TTO, and to a lesser extent the financier, turning the focus 
from the TTO to the financier counter to entrepreneurship research (Arthurs and Busenitz, 
2003). The basic agency theory model may need to be adapted for issues such as accounting for 
trust in a relationship and view financier involvement as a form of collaboration to grow the 
USO, rather than simply a financial contribution. 
In general, agency theory has been considered to have varying degrees of utility depending on 
the stage in the lifecycle of a company. Previous work has considered it to have greater 
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explanatory value in the initial stages of a company to explain implications of separation of 
management and control, but a critical issue that limits agency theory relevance after 
investment is the assumption that VC and entrepreneur goals are divergent, which may not be 
the case in this work for the TTO and financier. 
 
3.10 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has identified two theoretical frameworks, namely signalling theory and agency 
theory, which may be of benefit for the current work within which financial performance data 
from USOs may be assessed. Both frameworks will offer some insight into the key performance 
metrics identified, in particular the attraction of external finance by the USOs, although this can 
be extrapolated to the successful exit metric which represents a special case of fundraising, and 
also to survival which will be impacted by the fundraising. However, given the restricted range 
of financial data to be collected, it is likely that reference can only be made to these frameworks 
to the extent that findings are consistent with their expected results. The overall emphasis of 
this work remains the detailed financial data obtained from a longitudinal study which seeks to 
inform policy-makers of the overall success or otherwise of USOs, rather than focussing on 
relationships between certain financial metrics. 
 
The RBV, while popular in similar studies to date, will not be used to any significant degree in 
this work as financial resources of a USO, which is one of the performance metrics in the chosen 
model, would be the only resource under consideration. The overarching research question of 
this work is broad and policy-based, and the focus will be on accurate analysis of secondary 
quantitative data rather than undertaking an econometric study using a framework which 
requires qualitative data.  
 
This chapter has also covered in some detail potential financial performance metrics to be used 
in the current work in order to answer the overarching research question, by analysing the 
wider literature to date and assessing the effectiveness of metrics already used. The three 
metrics chosen, designated the ‘triumvirate’, are attraction by a USO of external investment, 
survival and successful exit. A literature review was undertaken of all studies to date where 
these three metrics have been used to analyse the financial performance of USOs, and the 
results collated in tabular form for future comparison against the results of this study. A brief 
analysis of the methodology used by each of these studies was made to inform the proposed 
methodology of the current study, and the need to focus on obtaining an accurate dataset of 
USOs. 
 
Finally, a brief review of the existing literature, both for USOs and start-up technology 
companies in general, was performed into the effect of obtaining external investment on the 
performance metrics of survival and IPO/exit. A wide range of results observed leads to the 
conclusion that any relationship will not be straightforward, and means that any contribution 
from the current study will be valuable for the literature. The obtaining of external finance is the 
key metric in the ‘triumvirate’ of performance measures of this study, being both a metric itself 
and potentially influencing the other two. 
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Chapter 4: Research Paradigm, Methodology and Design 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses briefly the subject of research paradigms and identifies the most relevant 
paradigm in which this particular piece of work falls, as well as the generic research 
methodology which will be used to investigate the overarching research question of Chapter 1. 
It then undertakes a review of the methodologies used by key comparable studies in the 
literature and comments on their effectiveness. A detailed research design for the work is then 
laid out including identifying the external sources from which a database of USOs will be 
constructed, as well as the nature of the survival, exit and external investment data collected, 
following the identification of these key performance metrics in Chapter 3. The context of the 
region under analysis is considered and the need for a case study to verify the approach taken, 
using the University of Birmingham, is discussed. Finally, it considers the nature of the analysis 
to be performed upon the data collected, and the extent to which any trends observed are 
consistent with the theoretical frameworks of signalling and agency theories, also identified in 
Chapter 3 as of potential value in this work. 
 
4.2 Research Paradigms and Methodology 
This thesis seeks to investigate the financial performance of USOs at a company level, a topic 
that, in common with all areas of research, falls within a ‘research paradigm’. This may be 
thought of as a ‘world view’, or ‘position on the best ways to think about and study the social 
world’ (Thomas, 2009). The choice of a research paradigm influences the research subsequently 
undertaken in a number of ways (Murphy, 2013): 
• What is considered problematic i.e. what warrants research 
• The types of questions that follow from this 
• What kind of data, and therefore what kind of methods are chosen  
• Within those methods, how the concepts/constructs to be explored are operationalised 
and analysed 
Murphy (2013) notes that a research paradigm is by nature broad-based, and different research 
positions can be taken within a paradigm, even though researchers are agreed about the way 
particular problems exist and the ways they can be investigated. Within research paradigms, 
researchers have identified two important concepts: 
• Epistemology – theories about what we know about the world and how we know it 
• Ontology – theories about existence or being and how we understand the social world 
The research methodologies used in a piece of work, or ‘specifying how research questions 
should be asked and answered’ (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009) are determined by the above 
concepts as to how the research problems and questions are addressed, as well as practical 
operational matters such as the availability and completeness of data. 
There are a number of possible research paradigms which have been identified, but two of the 
most significant are positivism and interpretivism. Positivism is often associated with research in 
the field of natural sciences, focussing on a refusal to speculate beyond what can be supported 
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by the obtaining of empirical evidence, especially evidence derived by observing phenomena. 
Researchers within this paradigm often have a tendency to act in the following ways (Murphy, 
2013): 
• Use the experimental method and/or the forms of statistical analysis modelled on it, to 
engage in the careful measurement of phenomena 
• Rely on quantitative data 
• Seek causal or statistical relationships among variables 
Positivists also believe in an external, objective reality and that research should be able to be 
replicated by different researchers given that the research methods utilised are both 
transparent and objective. Samples of sufficient size and representativeness are required to 
ensure objectiveness (Mueller, 2010). Within social science research, positivism may sometimes 
be considered simplistic given the complexity of social entities. 
The second main research paradigm, which is often considered to be in contrast with that of 
positivism, is that of interpretivism. This paradigm considers phenomena investigated in 
research areas such as social sciences to be very different from those in natural sciences. A key 
tenet of interpretivism is that people interpret their environment and themselves in ways 
shaped by the culture in which they live (Murphy, 2013), which has the following implications 
for research: 
• Interpretivism has encouraged a shift towards qualitative research methods 
• The researcher should adopt an exploratory orientation 
• Data should be structured as little as possible by the researcher’s own prior 
assumptions 
Interpretivism thus usually relies on qualitative data and constructs theory on an inductive 
basis. In line with positivism, its strengths are that it can deal with complex scenarios, but may 
be difficult to relicate given the significant role of the individual researcher. 
 
4.3 Research Paradigm and Methodology for the Current Work 
The research undertaken in this thesis appears to fall clearly within the positivist paradigm as it 
focusses on obtaining empirical evidence in the form of financial performance data for USOs at 
a company level i.e. the USO is the unit of analysis, across a number of different universities 
using data collection and analysis methods that can readily be replicated. This is critical as the 
study seeks to compare the West Midlands region with other regions, and replicability is vital to 
make this work of value. On a more abstract level, the financial data is in numerical format and 
forms an external, objective reality. 
Expanding upon Murphy’s (2013) observations above, experimental methods in the form of the 
research methodology are used and financial performance data phenomena collected and 
measured carefully. Data is exclusively in quantitative format and relationships between 
universities and the financial performance of their USOs sought. Given that human beings and 
their interpretations do not form part of the data collected, the interpretivist paradigm is not of 
primary significance in this particular work. However, informal discussions were held with USO 
management and university staff to supplement the numerical data and provide some insight 
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into the trends revealed by the data collected. As a result, the positivist paradigm is the model 
of choice for this work. 
 
4.4 Methodology Review of Comparable Studies 
The table below shows, for the key comparable studies of USO financial performance in the 
literature, the theoretical models used, the main data source and the performance metrics 
investigated (those which correspond to those chosen in this work). 
Author Theoretical 
model used 
Main data source Performance 
metrics 
investigated 
Shane (2004) Range of 
models used 
Commercial US database 
and other studies 
Survival 
Clayman and 
Holbrook (2006) 
Atheoretical Canadian university-
industry liaison offices 
Survival 
Leung and Mathews 
(2011) 
Atheoretical Hong Kong university TTOs Survival 
Wennberg et al. 
(2011) 
Atheoretical Publicly-available 
government database and 
Statistics Sweden LISA 
database 
Survival 
Zhang (2009) Atheoretical Commercial database 
(VentureOne) 
Survival, external 
investment, IPO 
Holi et al. (2007) Atheoretical Private database (Library 
House) 
External investment 
Mueller (2010) RBV and 
signalling theory 
Library House database and 
questionnaires 
External investment 
Munari and Toschi 
(2010) 
Atheoretical Trade body (MNT Network) 
and commercial database 
(Venture Expert) 
External investment 
Minshall and 
Wicksteed (2005) 
Atheoretical University TTOs External investment 
Table 4.1 Comparable study research methodologies 
The above information assists in shaping the research methodology and design of the current 
work. As discussed in Chapter 3, the majority of the comparable studies to date are atheoretical 
in nature, so this work seeks to fill this gap in the literature. The sources of data are varied but 
questionnnaires and data supplied by TTOs have been frequently used, with the problems 
inherent in their accuracy as previously discussed. As a result, this work seeks to add to the 
literature by considering a range of sources to obtain an accurate dataset. Finally, the 
established nature of the three performance metrics chosen in Chapter 3 gives confidence that 
those are relevant to this field and are worth investigating. 
 
4.5 Research Design of the Current Study 
While the financial performance of USOs at a company level is the subject of an increasing 
number of academic papers, there are still methodological difficulties in conducting such 
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studies, as discussed above in Chapters 2 and 3, and as a result there remain significant gaps in 
the literature. As noted above, the key difficulties in conducting studies on USO financial 
performance include the lack of publicly available data from sources independent of the 
company itself or university (Lawton Smith and Ho, 2006), the lack of clarity over the definition 
of a USO (Zahra et al., 2007) and the difficulty in obtaining a complete population of USOs over 
a long period of time to avoid survivor bias (Shane and Stuart, 2002). The current study seeks to 
address all three of these concerns. 
The purpose of this work is to analyse the financial performance of USOs originating from 
universities in the West Midlands region. However, this will be done with a different focus to 
previous studies. This work relies upon analysing a number of independent objective sources in 
line with the overall positivist paradigm to create a very accurate data set of USOs formed over 
a long period of time. It then examines the published accounts of the USOs in great detail by 
extracting a range of accounting information, building up a narrative of the history of the 
company over a significant period of time, many of which are no longer in existence. Previous 
studies in this area, as noted in Chapter 3, have focussed more on the econometric analysis of 
data, which is often likely to be incomplete or be unable to make any allowance for the very 
different forms of USO that a single university will generate. 
Once an accurate data set of USOs has been created from this time-intensive process, it is much 
simpler to make comparisons of performance between companies and universities, and to be 
confident that trends observed in one university can be compared and contrasted with those in 
others. While the unit of analysis of this work is the USO, as noted above the relevant university 
and region will be closely associated with the USO and comparisons between universities and 
regions, where undertaken with care, are an important part of this work. Such a methodology 
overcomes the difficulties in other studies observed by Shane and Stuart (2002), who noted that 
many studies suffer from significant survivor bias, in that USOs that fail are often left out of 
datasets due to lack of information and knowledge. In addition, this study avoids the problem of 
left-censored company histories as companies are traced from incorporation throughout their 
whole life cycle. This study will produce descriptive quantitative financial performance data of a 
high quality and accuracy, which can then be compared with previous studies, as well as 
between the universities within the region. 
 
4.6 Further research questions 
The study examines survival, the ability to attract external investment and the reaching of an 
IPO or other successful exit as the USO financial performance metrics, as they are considered to 
be the best metrics in line with the analysis above in Chapter 3 (Rasmussen et al., 2012), with 
the unit of analysis being the USO. This selection fits well into the findings of the Library House 
(2008) report discussed earlier and form the ‘triumvirate’ model. As a result of this 
identification, the overarching research question from Chapter 1 is further expanded to 
incorporate the following three broad supplementary questions covering these chosen metrics: 
a. How do USOs originating in the West Midlands perform in terms of survival? 
b. How do USOs originating in the West Midlands perform in terms of attracting external 
third party investment? 
c. How do USOs originating in the West Midlands perform in terms of reaching a 
financially successful IPO or exit for the university? 
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As identified earlier, these three performance measures are closely linked, with the attraction of 
external finance being seen in other areas of academic literature as potentially influencing the 
success of a company in respect of the two other metrics e.g. Shane and Stuart (2002), and the 
performance model chosen can be further explored by considering the relationships between 
the metrics in two additional research questions: 
d. How does the attraction of external finance affect a USO’s survival? 
e. How does the attraction of external finance affect a company’s ability to reach an IPO or 
successful exit? 
Results from this section are compared with similar studies in the VC literature. The nature of 
these relationships will be descriptive in this work based on using the high quality data 
obtained, and this work will not attempt to examine the nature of the relationship using 
econometric analysis, but the findings will be compared with the results of existing studies. The 
attraction of finance is, of course, only one element in the subsequent performance of a 
company, and it should be noted that there is a danger of endogeneity in focussing only on a 
single factor. The RBV e.g. Landry et al. (2006), a theoretical model discussed briefly in Chapter 
3 highlights the fact that a USO needs a range of resources other than finance to be formed and 
undertake activity. 
The performance of the West Midlands USOs is compared against the results in the literature 
from other UK and foreign universities, again on a descriptive basis, to identify differences 
between regions, as well as potentially to evaluate differences arising from the research 
methodology of the current work, with the following question: 
f. How does the West Midlands USOs’ financial performance compare to USOs from other 
universities in the UK and abroad? 
Finally, in line with previous studies in the USO literature, although outside that of USO 
company performance, to incorporate elements of the university/institution effect, two further 
questions are raised to allow comparison with previous studies: 
g. Is the attraction of external financing by USOs influenced by the research strength of 
the parent university? 
h. Is the number of USOs created influenced by the research strength of the parent 
university? 
Given the wide range of universities and the support they provide to USOs, a wide range of 
results is expected. Background information on each university is provided alongside financial 
data and the range discussed in the analysis of subsequent chapters. 
 
4.7 Data sources: USO identification 
The data collected for this work is mainly secondary in nature i.e. obtained from existing data 
sources. This is a key component of the current research which aims to differentiate itself from 
the existing literature by producing a very accurate dataset of USOs from a number of objective 
sources independent of the USO or university technology transfer apparatus. The universities in 
the West Midlands geographical region were identified and an initial case study performed on 
the University of Birmingham to confirm that the proposed methodology and data sources were 
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viable, the results of which are discussed in Chapter 5. The case study was then reperformed for 
all other universities within the region. Data was collected between March 2014 and March 
2015. 
In addition, throughout the course of the financial data collection, informal conversations were 
held with TTO staff at Warwick and Birmingham universities, and a number of founders, 
directors and employees of USOs still trading across a range of the universities. These informal 
discussions served to inform subsequent analysis and provided potential justifications for trends 
in data observed, ensuring that such analysis was not solely the value judgements of the author. 
USOs for each university were identified by combining data from four separate independent 
sources, which were identified from analysis of options on the market and chosen for the 
accessibility and quality of data: 
 
4.7.1 The university’s published accounts 
Most of the UK’s universities are constituted as charities, and as a result of their size are 
required by law to prepare and file detailed financial accounts, prepared under relevant 
accounting standards and statements of practice, with the Charity Commission. These financial 
statements are available in the public domain. 
One of the requirements of such accounts prepared under appropriate accounting standards is 
that they provide full details of all companies in which the university owns an equity investment 
stake. This disclosure captures USOs generated by the parent university and is a source that is 
available over a number of years. It will also, of course, include companies that do not meet the 
definition of USOs such as property management companies, and will need to be compared 
with other independent sources to ensure that non-USOs are not accidentally included in the 
final data set. 
It is not known that this source of data has ever been explicitly used in any previous academic 
studies of USOs. This is a particularly useful source as it tracks USOs as they are created and 
subsequently dissolved as the university accounts are prepared annually. The university’s 
statutory accounts are also prepared by a finance team that is completely independent from the 
technology transfer team, and are audited and verified by an independent firm of chartered 
accountants who have no connection with the whole of the university’s knowledge 
commercialisation activities. This source is therefore also a powerful independent and objective 
source of identification of USOs. University accounts were therefore accessed from the Charity 
Commission’s website. 
 
4.7.2 The university’s technology transfer office (TTO) 
The technology transfer office at a university is usually primarily responsible for overseeing and 
facilitating the process of forming USOs and transferring technology derived at the university 
into the ownership of the company. As such, it will need to maintain records of all the USOs 
created for administrative purposes. It is therefore the most obvious and potentially easiest 
place from which to obtain data on the financial performance of USOs, aside from the 
management team of the USO itself, and this is reflected in many of the current studies to date 
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in this field of the academic literature which used it as the primary source of data e.g. Oskarsson 
and Schläpfer (2008), Minshall and Wicksteed (2005). 
However, there are some difficulties with obtaining the data from this source, particularly if it is 
not cross-checked against other sources. TTOs often do not maintain historic data on failed 
USOs which gives rise to the danger of survivor bias (Shane and Stuart, 2002). In addition, 
detailed financial records are often not kept over a particularly long period of time due to 
resource constraints, and changes of personnel at the TTO can also give rise to difficulties with 
loss of expertise and knowledge relating to USOs (Lawton Smith and Ho, 2006). There may also 
be legal constraints over the sharing of financial data on USOs with external third parties. 
As such, data from this source was treated with caution and cross-checked thoroughly against a 
number of other sources. The TTO website and other published material were used as well as 
any other relevant data in the public domain to provide a further list of potential USOs. 
 
4.7.3 Commercial databases 
Although there are issues with the quality and accessibility of company data from Companies’ 
House, as already noted, this is still the major source of publicly-available company financial 
performance data in the UK. All companies are obliged by law to file accounts with Companies’ 
House and the data contained therein is collected by a number of commercial databases, often 
for the purposes of providing a credit score for a company. 
During the course of this work two such databases were used: Experian Corpfin UK and Market 
IQ. As well as providing the basic balance sheet accounting data from filed company accounts, 
other documents such as annual returns and liquidation documents may be accessed which 
were useful in building up a picture of the activity of the company over a period of years. Annual 
returns detail the shareholders, officers and addresses of the company while liquidation 
documents provide information as to the actions of a liquidator when appointed to wind up a 
company. Changes in ownership and details of third party external investment can be obtained 
from such documents. 
The accessing and use of these supplementary documents to create a long term picture of the 
company has not been used in USO performance studies in the literature to date, particularly in 
the context of obtaining details of third party external investment. Such data has been very 
difficult to obtain in previous studies which have usually had to resort to asking the company 
itself. 
Both commercial databases used have a search function that allows for searches to be carried 
out by shareholder name. This is a useful tool for identifying potential USOs as the name of the 
relevant university can be used as a search term to identify companies in which it held an equity 
stake. While not all such companies will be USOs, this at least provides another independent 
source of companies to cross check against the other data sources. 
 
4.7.4 Specialist databases 
The final database used in this work is a specialist database called Spinouts UK, maintained by 
Young Company Finance, which attempts to list all USOs in the UK. A variety of data sources are 
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used (although not publicly disclosed) in the preparation of this database, although much of the 
data is thought to be derived directly from the universities and hence their TTOs. Again, the 
value of this database is to provide one more data source against which others can be checked. 
 
4.8 Finalising and refining the USO database 
Once a population of potential USOs for a university had been collected from each source, they 
were cross-checked in detail against each of the other sources and any anomalies, where 
companies appeared in one source but not another, resolved through detailed analysis of all 
available sources and other public sources of information, including the company’s website 
where appropriate. 
Where potential USOs were subsequently discovered as a result of this analysis not to meet the 
chosen definition of a USO, they were discarded from the database and a reason for exclusion 
noted. The final database of USOs for the university was then drawn up. 
 
4.9 Collection of performance data 
Basic classification data for each confirmed USO was then collected, usually from the 
commercial databases which reflect the public data held by Companies’ House, including: 
• the company registration number (to assist in further analysis),  
• principal activity, and  
• a general sector classification of its activities.  
As discussed above, and in line with the research questions of this thesis, the three key 
performance metrics to be used in this study of USO financial performance at a company level 
are survival, external investment received and IPO/successful exit achieved.  
• Survival data was collected mainly from the commercial database to determine dates of 
incorporation and dissolution.  
• External investment data was collected from all the sources although the company 
accounting information from sets of annual accounts held on the commercial databases 
was the key source. The share premium account in the USO’s balance sheet was the key 
source of data for investment received. Investment data collected included the identity 
of the investor, the amount of investment and the date of investment.  
• Where USOs achieved a successful exit for the university, a brief case study of their 
lifecycle was collected from a variety of sources, including news websites. 
 
4.10 Case study 
As previously noted, the focus of this work is on a post-industrial region in the UK: the West 
Midlands. Universities within the region have grown significantly over the last two decades and 
generate increasing weath and employment for the region as corresponding large-scale industry 
has declined. In certain cases they have become key actors in undertaking basic research and 
development (R&D) work in an academic context, developing new technologies as the 
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proportion of R&D undertaken on a national level by industry has declined. Such universities are 
thus prime candidates for generating USOs as they seek to commercialise their technologies and 
add to the overall economic growth of the region, an effect encouraged by various UK national 
governments and regional authorities. Of course, there is a wide range of entrepreneurial 
activity undertaken by universities within the same region, ranging from significant amounts to 
very little. 
Given the novelty of the data collection methodology, it was deemed appropriate to undertake 
a case study by selecting one university in the region and testing the data sources and analysis 
proposed, before repeating it for the other regional universities (Jelfs, 2016). The University of 
Birmingham was selected as an appropriate case study as it demonstrably had developed a 
technology transfer capability with a separate office and staff. It also publicly highlighted the 
number of USOs that it had created. Data was therefore collected for this university, a major 
contributor to the local economy and a ‘red brick’ Russell Group university with a good research 
pedigree. Alongside the data, a number of informal conversations were held with the Head of 
Spinouts and Head of Incubation, as well as USO management, to get a wider picture of the 
context of USO formation and provide valuable alternative opinions and explanations on trends 
suggested by the data collected. As a result of both forms of data collection, the approach was 
deemed to be acceptable and continued for other institutions in the region. 
 
4.11 Analysis of data 
Once all the data was collected and refined, the results were first compared for USOs from the 
universities within the West Midlands region and explanations for the trends observed were 
sought. Classification data includes the number of USOs created by an institution, the date of 
formation of each USO and their principal activities. Moving on to the three performance 
metrics chosen, survival for each USO was evaluated using a range of measures such as the 
aggregate and timed failure rates for a university (defined in Chapter 7), and measures of the 
time to failure on a company level, including identifying USOs that fail that attract external 
investment, linking two of the metrics. External investment was compared using measures such 
as the proportion of USOs from a university attracting funding, the total amount of funding 
obtained and the amount per USO, and the types of investor attracted to provide funding. 
Successful exits were measured as a proportion of USOs created, as well as the financial return 
to the university. 
These performance metrics were then compared against those comparable studies in the 
literature noted in Chapter 3, across a range of universities and countries, and explanations 
sought for the trends observed. Where possible, the predictions of the chosen theoretical 
models of signalling and agency theories are described and compared with the actual results 
observed, to see if the data and its trends are in line with these predictions. Where they differ, 
attempts are made to explain the difference using the rich data on performance obtained across 
the region.    
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4.12 Summary 
This chapter outlines and justifies the predominantly positivist research paradigm in which this 
study is carried out, as well as the methodology used. A detailed research design has also been 
constructed, and forms the basis for the range of data collected and analysed in the next 
chapters. In addition, this chapter identifies why the methodology used is different from that of 
previous studies and why it is predicted to lead to more accurate results, which can usefully be 
compared to other studies in the literature. A case study of the University was undertaken to 
provide validity for the selected approach. Finally, a wide range of supplementary research 
questions which back up the overarching research question in Chapter 1 has been constructed 
to provide the basis for a wide-ranging study. 
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5. Financial Performance Analysis of USOs: A Case Study of the University of Birmingham 
5.1 Background 
 
This chapter is a case study of the University of Birmingham (UoB) which is one of the 
universities situated in the West Midlands. It acts as a pilot study for the main body of this work 
in two main areas: firstly to apply the proposed research design and methodology from Chapter 
4 to test the validity of the data collection techniques in extracting performance metric data, 
and secondly to make some preliminary observations over whether such data is consistent with 
the predictions of the theoretical frameworks of signaling theory and agency theory, which 
were identified in Chapter 3 as of potential relevance for this work. 
Data was collected between March 2014 and March 2015, and the findings formed the basis of 
a peer-reviewed journal paper in the International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small 
Business (Jelfs, 2016). In Chapter 6 the sources and methods used in this case study have been 
replicated for all universities in the same geographical region, the West Midlands, and the 
results from both chapters are then discussed and analysed in greater depth in Chapter 7. 
 
5.2 Introduction to UoB 
UoB has been chosen as the subject of this case study as an example university of the West 
Midlands region, the geographical area whose universities and USOs are the investigation of this 
thesis. As an institution, it is also of more general interest as it represents the UK’s ‘redbrick’ 
universities i.e. the first universities founded after the mediaeval institutions, and defined in 
greater detail in Chapter 6. It is also a member of the Russell Group, a grouping of the top UK 
research universities. USO financial performance studies performed in the UK to date have 
considered Oxford (Lawton Smith and Ho, 2006), Cambridge and London Universities (Minshall 
and Wicksteed, 2005, Lawton Smith et al., 2014), which constitute the elite UK universities with 
particularly strong and well-funded science departments, from which the majority of USOs are 
known to originate, as well as larger populations of universities (Mueller (2010), Holi et al. 
(2007)). 
This case study will therefore provide an additional perspective on the financial performance of 
USOs from the next tier of UK universities below the elite, and help to determine whether the 
USO phenomenon has provided significant benefits to the university. It will also serve to 
complement a study of the redbrick Queen’s University, Belfast by Harrison and Leitch (2010) 
and provide further evidence as to whether the financial performance of USOs justifies the 
resources invested in them, although their paper considered only a small number of absolute 
metrics such as employee numbers to conclude that most USOs were very small, as part of a 
review of the entrepreneurial system in Northern Ireland, so is not directly comparable with this 
study. 
The UoB was established under its Royal Charter in 1900, incorporating elements of older 
institutions, and was the UK’s first ‘redbrick’ university. It was named ‘University of the Year 
2014’ in the Times Higher Education Awards and consistently ranks highly in various league 
tables of UK universities, with student numbers of nearly 30,000. A 2013 report by Oxford 
Economics noted that the University is a significant employer in the West Midlands region of the 
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UK, supporting 11,830 jobs in the region (a significant proportion of which are highly skilled), 
and generated over £1 billion of spending in the local economy. 
5.3 Constructing the USO database 
5.3.1 Sources of data 
Four independent, third party data sources were identified and used to create the USO 
database, in line with the methodology discussed in Chapter 4: 
 
i)  The UoB’s annual accounts obtained from the University website covering the years 
ended 31 July 2001 to 31 July 2013 inclusive. Under UK financial reporting 
requirements, the UoB is required to prepare and file public accounts, and to disclose, 
in notes to its accounts, details of any shareholdings it owns in other companies, which 
will include holdings in USOs. 
ii)  The website of the UoB’s Technology Transfer Office, Alta Innovations, provided 
details of companies described as USOs with which it had had some involvement. 
Three different versions of the relevant webpage were accessed and utilised during 
the course of the study. 
iii)   Company searches were performed using the Experian Corpfin UK business database, 
which extracts data from all UK company accounts filed at Companies’ House, to 
identify companies in which the UoB was a current shareholder. A range of search 
terms derived from the descriptor “University of Birmingham” were used to capture 
USOs as variations were present in recording the identity of the University as a 
shareholder in companies’ annual returns. 
iv)  A search of the Spinouts UK database was performed to find all USOs identified as 
associated with the UoB by this specific database. Spinouts UK is a database compiled 
and updated by Young Company Finance, which seeks to list all spin offs from UK 
universities since 2000, obtaining data from a range of sources. 
 
Each of these four sources gave rise to a different population of companies that were 
potentially USOs. These were cross-checked and amalgamated to form a single set, which is 
shown below in Table 5.1. The data was then refined through in-depth analysis of each potential 
USO’s historic financial data, primarily in the form of company accounts and annual returns, in 
order to reject companies that did not meet the chosen definition of a USO. The rationale 
behind the decision to reject a company as a USO is also given below in Table 5.2. 
 
  
Company Website 
current 
Website 
v1 (old) 
Website 
v2 (old) 
Experian Uni 
accounts 
Spinouts 
UK 
USO? 
Bioscience 
Ventures Limited 
Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
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Alta Biosciences 
Limited 
Y Y    Y Y 
Serascience 
Limited 
Y     Y Y 
Linear 
Diagnostics 
Limited 
Y     Y Y 
PsiOxus 
Therapeutics 
Limited 
Y Y  Y Y  N 
The Native 
Antigen Company 
Limited 
Y Y  Y Y  Y 
Celentyx Limited Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Neuregenix 
Limited 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cytox Limited Y Y  Y Y  N 
Circassia Limited Y Y   Y  N 
Inanovate 
Limited 
Y Y Y  Y Y N 
Irresistible 
Materials Limited 
Y      Y 
Applied 
Functional 
Materials Limited 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Biowaste2energy 
Limited 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cambridge 
Mechatronics 
Limited 
Y Y   Y  N 
Metal 
Nanopowders 
Limited 
Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Ad Surf Eng 
Limited 
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Interface Spectra 
Limited 
 Y Y  Y Y Y 
McBurney 
Limited 
 Y  Y Y Y Y 
The Speech Ark 
Limited 
 Y Y  Y Y Y 
Birmingham 
Health Science 
Devices Limited  
  Y  Y Y Y 
Crimson 
Technologies 
Limited 
  Y  Y Y N 
Health 
Integration 
Limited 
  Y    N 
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Hybrid Systems 
Limited 
  Y  Y  Y 
Oral Health 
Innovations 
Limited 
  Y Y Y Y Y 
Ortus Medical 
Limited 
  Y  Y Y Y 
Plasgene Limited   Y  Y Y Y 
RB Scientific 
Solutions Limited 
  Y   Y N 
Stemtrax Limited   Y   Y N 
Astron Clinica 
Limited 
  Y  Y  N 
CDS Telepath 
Limited 
  Y   Y Y 
Entice 
Technology 
Limited 
  Y  Y Y Y 
Mermaid 
Diagnostics Ltd 
  Y  Y Y Y 
Scyron Limited   Y  Y Y Y 
The Binding Site 
Limited 
  Y   Y N 
Cryo Technology 
Limited 
   Y Y  Y 
Prolego 
Technologies 
Limited 
   Y Y  Y 
CPD HQ Limited    Y Y Y Y 
Vfridge Limited    Y   Y 
Cobra 
Biomanufacturing 
Limited 
    Y  N 
Intrec Limited     Y  N 
Practice 
Management 
Services Limited 
(Exmet) 
    Y  N 
Hyperspace Ltd     Y  Y 
Table 5.1 Potential USOs from UoB identified from the data source 
 
5.3.2 Refining the database 
The refining of the raw data obtained from a range of independent sources through extensive 
analysis of historic financial performance data is a key feature of this study. Previous USO 
financial performance studies have rarely used independent sources or made detailed attempts 
to construct a ‘narrative’ for a company over a long period of time based on analysis of its 
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historic financial data, backed up by other sources, to decide whether it is a true USO based on 
the selected definition. 
As a result of the refining process, a number of potential USOs were rejected from the final 
database for a variety of reasons, which may be summarised by the following categories: 
 
i)  Companies where the University held an equity stake, but which had been set up by 
the University for some specific administrative purpose such as management of 
property rather than transferring and commercialising intellectual property. 
ii)  Companies which were described by one or more of the sources as a USO but where 
detailed financial analysis revealed that the University had never held an equity stake. 
It is possible that some of these companies do meet one of the alternative HEFCE 
definitions of a USO, such as those companies that were set up by former or current 
University staff or students, and were assumed or adjudged to be USOs by the creator 
of the data source, but the extent of university involvement is not recorded in the 
public domain. 
iii)  Companies where the University appeared to have acquired a small equity stake some 
time after its formation but where it did not appear to be the primary source of the 
company’s intellectual property. Clearly a judgment had to be made in removing this 
kind of company from the database, but the evidence was generally fairly clear cut 
including cases where the company was clearly a USO associated with another 
University. 
 
Companies identified as potential USOs by one or more of the sources, but which were rejected 
from the final data set upon further analysis, are shown in Table 5.2 together with the reasons 
for rejection. 
 
Refining the data in this way gave a final total population of 29 USOs incorporated between 
1987 and 2011. 2001 and 2002 were the most popular years with 4 USOs being incorporated in 
each, which may be linked to the introduction of UCFs in the UK to encourage USO formation, 
and at least one USO was formed each year by the UoB between 2000 and 2011 (Graph 5.1). No 
USOs were formed at all between 1987 and 1997 highlighting the fact that the USO 
phenomenon is a relatively new one. In addition, no USOs were formed after 2011, which could 
imply that this route is losing attractiveness as a means of commercialising university 
technology. The pattern of formation of USOs is discussed in more depth in Chapter 7 along 
with the results from other USOs in the region. 
 
Company name Reason for rejection as USO 
PsiOxus Therapeutics Limited Hybrid Systems Limited, a UoB USO, was acquired by 
Myotec Therapeutics Limited, an Imperial College USO via a 
share for share exchange in 2010 to form PsiOxus. UoB has 
a small stake in the new company but no management 
input. The new company is still in the development phase 
so any realisation of its shareholding is unlikely at present. 
90 
 
 
Cytox Limited An Oxford University USO; one of the academic founders 
moved to a post at UoB which has a very small equity stake 
in the company, probably as a result of some technology 
transfer or licensing agreement. Company is based in 
Oxford. 
Circassia Limited Originally an Oxford/Imperial USO, the company acquired 
the proprietary technology to ToleroTrans, an organ 
transplant anti-rejection technology from UoB in 2007 for 
which it received a small equity stake 
Inanovate Limited UoB holds no shares 
Cambridge Mechatronics 
Limited 
UoB holds a tiny equity stake, again most likely from a 
licensing of technology in the past. Company appears likely 
to cease trading in the near future meaning the equity 
stake has no value 
Crimson Technologies Limited UoB holds no shares 
Health Integration Limited Company cannot be found in Experian Corpfin 
RB Scientific Solutions Limited Company dormant until dissolved; UoB had no 
shareholding 
Stemtrax Limited UoB holds no shares 
Astron Clinica Limited UoB held an equity stake from 2005 although company was 
founded in Cambridge in 1998, most likely from a licensing 
of technology. Company has been dissolved. 
The Binding Site Limited UoB holds no shares. The Binding Site was formed in the 
1970s by researchers within the Medical School of UoB to 
develop innovative ways of producing antibodies, but were 
unable to secure government funding so set up a private 
company. This is a classic situation that supporters of USOs 
wish to avoid occurring whereby university-generated IP 
did not generate a commercial return for the university. 
Cobra Biomanufacturing 
Limited 
UoB only had small equity stake taken in 2006; company 
now dissolved 
Intrec Limited Company was a training consortium and not a USO 
Practice Management Services 
Limited 
UoB only ever held less than a 1% equity stake and 
company was dissolved in 2011 
Table 5.2 Rationale for rejection of UoB companies as USOs 
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Figure 5.1: UoB USOs, total population, number by year 
5.3.3 Independent source validation  
In arriving at the final population of USOs, it became clear from Table 5.1 that none of the four 
sources would have been sufficient by themselves to give an adequate reflection of the true 
USO population. 
 
Source i)  correctly identified 23 USOs, identified 11 companies that turned out not to be 
USOs and missed 4 USOs (other USOs were outside the date range of the 
accounts). As a source, it was invaluable in identifying companies where the 
university had at one time held an equity stake but no longer did so at the 
date of this study, either through a successful exit such as a trade sale of the 
shares or, more negatively, the company failing and being dissolved. 
Source ii)  was the least comprehensive of the sources, with a number of older USOs 
being missed entirely from the website. None of the three versions of the 
website was significantly more accurate than the others. This may be due to 
lack of historical knowledge among the TTO staff concerning the older USOs, 
or simply a desire to overlook USOs that ultimately failed or had effectively 
ceased trading. This finding is of particular interest in that a number of 
previous performance studies relied significantly upon data provided by a 
university TTO with which to construct a database, although the accuracy of a 
TTO as a USO data source has already been questioned (Kenney and Patton, 
2009). The value of the present study in using a number of independent 
sources of data is thus emphasised. 
Source iii)  did not identify cases where the University no longer held an equity stake. 
However, it was of critical importance in providing the historic financial data 
with which to determine whether a number of companies met the USO 
definition. It correctly identified 12 USOs. 
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Source iv)  provided a useful additional corroboration although some USOs were missed 
and other companies incorrectly identified as USOs. 22 USOs were correctly 
identified with 5 companies defined as USOs proving not to be. 
The combination of these four sources thus provided a comprehensive and extremely accurate 
database of USOs from which relevant financial performance measures could be obtained. 
5.3.4 Financial performance data 
This study differs from many previous studies of USOs in the way it collects financial 
performance data. Following on from Chapter 3, it does not attempt to collect data based on 
USO turnover or number of employees either by considering absolute values or growth 
measures, even though these are popular measures in financial performance literature in 
general and have been used in USO financial performance studies e.g. Harrison and Leitch 
(2010), Wennberg et al. (2011). There are two main reasons for this choice. Firstly, as already 
noted, this data is not available from independent third party sources which is a key 
differentiating factor of this study, as previous studies have often had to resort to asking the 
USOs themselves for such data e.g. Mueller (2010). Secondly, the data gives only a partial 
picture at best as to the financial performance of a USO in generating value for its shareholders. 
As a result, this study focused on collecting performance data based on the key performance 
metrics discussed in Chapter 3, namely survival, third party investment obtained and IPO/exit. 
Such metrics have, as previously noted, been widely accepted as suitable by a number of recent 
studies e.g. Library House (2008). 
The following performance data was therefore collected from the above four sources and laid 
out in the tables below: 
 
1.  Basic data 
i)  Company registration number 
ii)  Principal activity 
iii) SIC code (denotes the directors’ evaluation of the company’s principal activity and 
assists in classification) 
 
2.  Survival measurement 
i)  Date of incorporation 
ii)  Date of dissolution 
 
3. Investment and exit measurement 
i)  Amount of independent third party funding received 
ii)  Whether a successful exit was achieved and financial details of the exit 
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5.4 Results 
USO name Company 
registration 
number 
Principal activity Classification 
Bioscience Ventures Limited 7384973 Diagnostic development Life science 
Alta Bioscience Limited 7278564 Healthcare Life science 
Biowaste2energy Limited 6477432 Convert waste sugar to 
energy 
Chemistry 
CPD HQ Limited 4481112 Dental e-learning IT 
Hybrid Biosystems Limited 3421781 Cancer treatment Life science 
V Fridge Limited 4023297 Software consultancy and 
supply 
IT 
Ad Surf Eng Limited 4155505 Surface engineering Materials 
Applied Functional Materials 
Limited 
4562522 Ultrasonic transducer 
development 
Materials 
McBurney Scientific Limited 4989529 Soil moisture detectors Materials 
Neuregenix Limited 5332791 Neural tissue screening 
and consultancy 
Life science 
Oral Health Innovations 
Limited 
6033739 Licenses dental software IT 
Prolego Technologies Limited 5494857 Develop network analysis 
tool 
IT 
Scyron Limited 4341195 Software development IT 
Celentyx Limited 5304904 Drug development service Life science 
Interface Spectra Limited 6422685 Spectroscopy Chemistry 
Metal Nanopowders Limited 4562587 Manufacture metal 
powders 
Materials 
The Speech Ark Limited 5686224 Speech technology IT 
Linear Diagnostics Limited 7582291 Detect infectious agents Life science 
Serascience Limited 7591669 Cancer diagnostic Life science 
Irresistible Materials Limited 6847082 Develop novel fullerenes Materials 
Birmingham Health Science 
Devices Limited 
4923889 Devices for wound 
assessment 
Life science 
Ortus Medical Limited 4562564 Develop biomaterials Life science 
Plasgene Limited 5812161 Bacterial plasmid research Life science 
CDS Telepath Limited 2128488 Computer turnkey 
solutions for laboratories 
IT 
Entice Technology Limited 4239448 Deliver road weather 
information (software) 
IT 
Mermaid Diagnostics Limited 3638617 Design clinical diagnostic 
devices 
Life science 
Hyperspace Limited 3435052 Software development IT 
The Native Antigen Co Limited 7386339 Antigen R&D Life science 
Cryo Technology Limited 4265434 Cryogenic technology 
development 
Chemistry 
Table 5.3 Basic classification of UoB USOs 
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USOs seeking to commercialise technologies within the fields of life sciences and IT (information 
technology) comprise the vast majority of those originating from the UoB, a feature commonly 
observed in studies at other universities e.g. Lawton Smith and Ho (2006), Oskarsson and 
Schläpfer (2008). 
 
5.4.1 Survival measurements 
 
USO Date of 
incorporation 
Date of 
dissolution 
Time to failure 
(months) 
Third 
party 
funding? 
Ad Surf Eng Limited 7/2/01    
Alta Bioscience Limited 9/6/10    
Applied Functional Materials 
Limited 
15/10/02    
Bioscience Venture Limited 22/9/10    
Biowaste2energy Limited 18/1/08 20/5/14 76 Y 
Birmingham Health Science 
Devices Limited 
7/10/03 20/10/09 72 N 
CDS Telepath Limited 6/5/87 11/6/02 181 N 
Celentyx Limited 6/12/04    
CPD-HQ Limited 9/7/02 5/5/09 81 Y 
Cryo Technology Limited 6/8/01 17/7/07 71 Y 
Entice Technology Limited 22/6/01 18/10/11 123 N 
0
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4
6
8
10
12
14
Life science IT Chemistry Materials
Figure 5.2 Classification of UoB USOs by principal activity
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Hybrid Biosystems Limited 19/8/97    
Hyperspace Limited 16/9/97 31/7/01 46 Y 
Interface Spectra Limited 9/11/07 1/10/14 82 N 
Irresistible Materials Limited 16/3/09    
Linear Diagnostics Limited 29/3/11    
McBurney Scientific Limited 9/12/03 15/7/14 127 Y 
Mermaid Diagnostics Limited 25/9/98    
Metal Nanopowders Limited 15/10/02    
Native Antigen Company 
Limited 
23/9/10    
Neuregenix Limited 14/1/05    
Oral Health Innovations 
Limited 
20/12/06    
Ortus Medical Limited 15/10/02    
Plasgene Limited 10/5/06    
Prolego Technologies Limited 29/6/05 18/11/08 40 Y 
Scyron Limited 17/12/01 1/10/11 117 Y 
Serascience Limited 5/4/11    
The Speech Ark Limited 24/1/06    
Vfridge Limited 28/6/00 28/9/04 51 Y 
Table 5.4 Survival data for UoB USOs 
 
 
As noted above, 29 USOs in total were identified with dates of incorporation ranging from 1987 
to 2011. Even where a USO has been formally dissolved, the UoB is still shown as a shareholder 
on Experian Corpfin (source iii), providing a powerful validation that older USOs were not 
missed as a matter of routine in the study. Of the 29 USOs identified, 12 had been formally 
dissolved. This represents an aggregate failure rate of 41%. 
 
Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008) identify two methods for calculating failure rates which have 
been studied in the literature and will be used here. The ‘aggregate failure rate’ is the total 
number of failed USOs by the end of the study period’s last year divided by the total number of 
USOs created during the study period. This measure clearly does not consider the age of the 
USO and is therefore difficult to compare effectively with other studies. The second method is 
the ‘timed failure rate’ which refers to the percentage of USOs that fail within a specific number 
of years from incorporation and thus better reflects the age factor. Table 5.5 below shows the 
timed failure rate of the 29 UoB USOs. The average time to failure of the 12 dissolved 
companies was 89 months and ranged from 40 months to 181 months. 
 
 
 
 
96 
 
 
 
 
 
Years to failure 
 
Incorporated 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 15 
1987 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
1997 0% 0% 0% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
1998 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2000 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  
2001 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 25% 25% 25% 75% 75% 75%  
2002 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%  
2003  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 50% 50% 50% 50% 100%   
2004 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%    
2005 0% 0% 0% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%     
2006 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%      
2007 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100%       
2008 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%        
2009 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%         
2010 0% 0% 0% 0%          
2011 0% 0% 0%           
 
Table 5.5: UoB spin offs: timed failure rates (author-derived data) 
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5.4.1.2 ‘Twilight’ USOs 
During the collection and analysis of the data it became clear that a number of USOs, although 
not formally dissolved, had minimal trading activity. This study designates this important group 
of companies as ‘twilight USOs’. While an element of judgment has to be made as to whether a 
company has reached ‘twilight’ stage, a further 8 companies (29% of the sample) were 
identified as twilight USOs. The population’s total effective aggregate failure rate is thus 69% 
(20 out of 29 USOs). Table 5.6 below reveals the identity of the twilight USOs, as well as the 
rationale behind their designation as such. Typical attributed of a twilight USO include minimal 
trading activity and no external funding received, or received many years previously. 
Twilight USOs are an important concept for the USO literature, as similar entities have already 
been discussed and studied in the wider literature. These have been given a range of names, 
including ‘living dead’ companies (Ruhnka et al., 1992) and ‘zombie’ companies (Hoshi, 2006), 
although the latter designation has often been used in the specific case of companies that are 
so highly leveraged that they can barely afford to pay the interest on their loans. This concept 
has not been explored in any significant depth in the existing USO literature although certain 
studies have commented in a broad manner on the phenomenon e.g. Royal Society of 
Chemistry (2005), which applied Ruhnka et al.’s (1992) descriptor of ‘living dead’ to a group of 
chemistry-based USOs, and de Cleyn (2011) who identified the concept in a wider study of 
European USOs. Steinberg (2014) noted the concept of ‘not successful’ USOs, which has a 
similar rationale. It may be of potential interest in interpreting phenomena such as the apparent 
long survival times for USOs compared to other start-up companies (Zhang, 2009). Data on 
twilight USOs has been collected from the other West Midlands universities to allow analysis to 
take place on a wider scale in Chapter 6. 
 
USO Rationale for ‘twilight’ designation 
Ad Surf Eng Limited No funding ever received – has developed into a 
profitable consulting company – little activity 
Applied Functional Materials 
Limited 
Last funding in 2006 – very little activity 
Celentyx Limited Last funding 2009 – very little activity 
Metal Nanopowders Limited Last funding 2006  - consultancy company with little 
trading 
Neuregenix Limited No funding – consultancy company 
Oral Health Innovations Limited Not for profit joint venture with PreVis – no funding 
Ortus Medical Limited No funding – little activity 
Plasgene Limited No funding – little activity 
Table 5.6: Rationale for ‘twilight’ designation 
 
5.4.1.3. Analysis of survival data 
While analysis of survival data will be performed on a regional basis in much greater depth in 
Chapter 7, preliminary analysis of the UoB data shows some interesting trends that merit 
further investigation. Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008) note the lack of academic studies in 
general providing data on the failure rates of generic early stage venture capital supported 
companies. Metrick (2007) undertook an extensive study of the Sand Hill Econometrics (SHE) 
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database and determined the ‘timed’ failure rate after 10 years to be in the region of 30-40%. 
Dean and Giglierano (1990) studied 38 Silicon Valley–based venture capital funds reporting an 
aggregate failure rate of 15-16% while Mason and Harrison (2001) reported an aggregate failure 
rate of 34% in their study of 127 early stage investments by UK business angels. 
In comparison with USOs, one might expect the USO failure rate to be higher than these studies 
given that only a proportion will be successful in attracting venture capital funding. This does 
presume that venture capitalists are inherently more likely than not to support a company that 
is less likely to fail, and would be in line with the predictions of signaling theory in that USOs 
which could send out positive signals e.g. about the strength of their technology, to a 
prospective investor, are more likely to attract funding and hence survive for longer than 
companies which do not. Zhang (2009) found much higher rates of survival among venture 
capital-backed USOs than more generic venture capital-backed companies although the reasons 
for this are disputed. Cressy (2006) notes that a number of studies of all startups show that 
about 50% fail within two and a half years of staring to trade, which is clearly sugnfucantly 
faster than for USOs. However, the current study appears to show much higher failure rates 
than these earlier studies from the venture capital literature, in contrast to earlier studies. 
In this study of the UoB, eight of the dissolved USOs had attracted third party funding. In 
addition, three of the twilight USOs had attracted third party funding. This overall equates to 
55% of the failed USOs, and is in line with the 48% (14 out of 29) of the total population of USOs 
that attracted external funding. Hence, third party funders have not, for this small sample, 
shown a superior judgment of a USO’s survival prospects in assessing which USO to fund. 
Comparison of UoB’s USOs’ survival rates with existing academic studies of USO financial 
performance reveals a number of interesting findings. Previous studies have considered survival 
rates at both a country and university level (Tables 5.7 and 5.8). In general, it is clear that this 
study shows a lower rate of survival amongst USOs than most other studies when considering 
only formally dissolved USOs (59%), and a significantly lower rate than all other studies in Tables 
5.7 and 5.8 below if ‘twilight USOs’ are included (31%), which again implies that ‘twilight USOs’ 
are an important class of USO that may shed some light upon the apparent longevity of USOs 
compared to other start-up companies as noted in the academic literature to date. Tables 5.7 
and 5.8 show a wide range of survival rates, which again highlights the care that needs to be 
taken in comparing studies, particularly around different definitions of USOs. 
When comparing UoB’s survival rates against the other single university studies in Table 5.8, the 
lower survival rates are again potentially consistent with signaling theory in that the UoB is not 
as prestigious a research institution as MIT, Oxford or ETH Zurich, so on first principles its 
technologies would be less strong, and when coupled with its lower prestige, give out less 
attractive signals to investors and attract less finance, leading to shorter survival times. Agency 
theory might predict a lack of goal congruence between TTO and investor where technology 
appears weak, leading to a lack of further investment and lower survival times. Such a 
hypothesis is only a preliminary judgment and will be considered further in Chapter 7. Studies 
on a country basis are more difficult to compare due to the range of universities contained 
therein. 
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Country Survival rate 
(%) 
Period Years Sample size Source 
USA 68 1980-2000 21 3376 Shane (2004) 
Canada 73 1995-2003 9 301 Clayman and 
Holbrook (2006) 
Hong Kong 
(timed rate 
after 5 years) 
79 1997-2004 8 56 Leung and Mathews 
(2011) 
Netherlands 83 1984-1992 9 92 Shane (2004) 
France 84 1984-1987 4 100 Mustar (1997) 
Sweden 87 1960-1993 34 30 Shane (2004) 
Northern 
Ireland 
94 1984-1995 12 17 Shane (2004) 
Sweden 
(timed rate 
after 2 years) 
73 1994-2002 9 528 Wennberg et al. 
(2011) 
Sweden 
(timed rate 
after 5 years) 
53 1994-2002 9 528 Wennberg et al. 
(2011) 
USA 94 1991-2001 11 655 Zhang (2009) 
UK >90 1998-2002 5 174 Minshall and 
Wicksteed (2005) 
UK 57 2003-2010 8 2,356 HEFCE 
UK 59 1987-2013 15 29 Current study 
UK 31 1987-2013 15 29 Current study 
(including twilight 
USOs) 
Table 5.7: USO Survival data by country (Oskarsson and Schläpfer, 2008) and current study 
(excluding 1987 outlier) 
 
 
University Survival rate 
(%) 
Period Years Sample size Source 
USA – MIT 80 1980-1996 17 134 Shane (2004) 
Oxford 90 1950-2004 55 64 Lawton Smith and 
Ho (2006) 
ETH Zurich 88 1998-2007 10 130 Oskarsson and 
Schläpfer (2008) 
UK 59 1987-2013 15 29 Current study 
UK 31 1987-2013 15 29 Current study 
(including twilight 
USOs) 
Table 5.8: USO Survival data by University (Oskarsson and Schläpfer, 2008) and current study 
(excluding 1987 outlier) 
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5.4.2 Third party investment results 
Table 5.9 below shows which of the UoB USOs obtained external third party funding and the 
amount of such funding received by each company. The data on funding was obtained primarily 
from analysis of USO statutory accounts, particularly from review of the share premium account 
movements, which represent the excess amount of the total investment by an investor over the 
nominal value of the share capital acquired. 
 
This is a very different approach from other studies to date which attempted to measure 
funding by approaching the USO directly for information e.g. Mueller (2010) or by reviewing 
external press releases, often issued by the investor. The approach in this work is considered to 
be much more accurate as it only records money actually received by the USO and does not rely 
on individuals’ memories or press statements which may be misleading. In addition, a number 
of deals do not publically disclose the total amount of money invested, particularly where the 
investor is a larger company and the deal deemed confidential, and data on older deals may no 
longer be in the public domain.  
 
USO Investment received Amount (£) 
Ad Surf Eng Limited N  
Alta Bioscience Limited N  
Applied Functional Materials Limited Y 78,557 
Bioscience Venture Limited Y 360,000 
Biowaste2energy Limited Y 139,993 
Birmingham Health Science Devices 
Limited 
N  
CDS Telepath Limited N  
Celentyx Limited Y 230,842 
CPD-HQ Limited Y 148,500 
Cryo Technology Limited Y 250,000 
Entice Technology Limited N  
Hybrid Biosystems Limited Y 900,019 
Hyperspace Limited Y 250,000 
Interface Spectra Limited N  
Irresistible Materials Limited Y 403,947 
Linear Diagnostics Limited N  
McBurney Scientific Limited Y 42,000 
Mermaid Diagnostics Limited N  
Metal Nanopowders Limited Y 205,137 
Native Antigen Company Limited Y 508,971 
Neuregenix Limited N  
Oral Health Innovations Limited N  
Ortus Medical Limited N  
Plasgene Limited N  
Prolego Technologies Limited Y 39,632 
Scyron Limited Y 1,156,924 
Serascience Limited Y 986,760 
The Speech Ark Limited N  
Vfridge Limited Y 173,250 
Table 5.9: Third party investment attracted by UoB USOs 
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14 out of 29 USOs received external third party investment which represents 48% of the total 
population. A total of £5,365,569 of investment was received from third parties which aimed to 
commercialise UoB IP, and the overall level of funding received is compared to universities from 
other countries in Chapter 8. Table 5.10 provides more detail on the identities of the investors.
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USO University 
Challenge 
Fund 
(Mercia 
Fund) 
Other private 
equity 
Companies Individuals Other Detail 
Applied Functional 
Materials Limited 
    Y University of West of Scotland 
Bioscience Venture Limited   Y   Joint venture between Abingdon Health Limited 
and UoB 
Biowaste2energy Limited   Y   Modern Waste Limited 
Celentyx Limited Y      
CPD-HQ Limited Y      
Cryo Technology Limited Y  Y   Mercia and Cryo Services Limited 
Hybrid Biosystems Limited Y   Y   
Hyperspace Limited   Y   Global Service Investments Limited 
Irresistible Materials 
Limited 
 Y  Y Y Mercia Fund Management, business angels and 
the Technology Strategy Board 
McBurney Scientific Ltd    Y   
Metal Nanopowders 
Limited 
 Y    Oxford Technology VCT 
Native Antigen Company 
Limited 
Y    Y Mercia and Cancer Research UK 
Prolego Technologies Ltd   Y   Ideas Network Limited 
Scyron Limited Y  Y Y Y Mercia, Dataset Communications Limited, AEGF, 
NESTA, individuals 
Serascience Limited  Y  Y  Thornapple LLP and individuals 
Vfridge Limited Y      
Table 5.10 Identities of external investors in UoB USOs 
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Given the number of investors and funding rounds, it was not always possible to identify the amount 
invested by each individual investor as such data was not publicly available. 
The Mercia Fund, which was a University Challenge Fund set up by the UK government to provide 
early stage funding to USOs (see earlier chapter for more details) was unsurprisingly the most 
regular investor, acquiring equity stakes in seven of the USOs. It might be supposed that UCFs would 
be less likely to be concerned about the ultimate survival and success of a USO than an investor who 
was looking for a financial return, given its nature as a publicly funded body set up specifically to 
provide funding to a narrow group of target companies. The relative success of the Mercia Fund’s 
investments is shown below in Table 5.11. 
 
USO Dissolved Twilight USO Still trading Successful 
exit 
Celentyx Limited  Y   
CPD-HQ Limited Y    
Cryo Technology 
Limited 
Y    
Hybrid Biosystems 
Limited 
   Part of 
PsiOxus 
Native Antigen 
Company Limited 
  Y  
Scyron Limited Y    
Vfridge Limited Y    
Table 5.11 Mercia Fund investments in UoB USOs 
 
One out of the seven investments could be judged a partial success, although as noted above there 
is little prospect of any imminent realisation of any value of the equity stake in PsiOxus. 
The amounts of investment secured and range of investors show some consistency with the 
predictions of both signaling and agency theory. The UoB, as a Russell Group university, is regarded 
as a significant research university which sends a strong signal to potential investors over the 
attractiveness of its USOs, hence the significant proportion of USOs that attract funding and the 
wide range of investors. This latter observation is also in line with agency theory which predicts that 
trust will build between university TTOs and investors once an investment has been secured and 
both sides realise that their goals of USO success are aligned. However, it should also be noted that 
that not all USOs obtain funding, which is in line with agency theory where the significant 
information asymmetry present in the case of a USO and potential investor will inhibit investment, 
even where the strength of the parent university and its TTO send a strong signal, thus highlighting 
the conflict between the two factors. 
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5.4.3 USOs achieving an exit 
As already noted, an important goal of a USO created to commercialise university technology is to 
achieve a financial return for the university by an exit from the company, via a public listing of shares 
or other form of share disposal such as a trade sale. Of the 29 UoB USOs, only 2 led to an exit for 
shareholders via a trade sale of the entire share capital to a third party. None of the USOs offered 
any shares to the public via a stock market listing. 
A detailed analysis of the history of the two USOs was undertaken through review of their financial 
accounts and other publicly available information to provide more details about the nature of the 
trade sale and whether the terms of the sale were beneficial to the UoB. 
 
5.4.3.1 Mermaid Diagnostics Limited 
This USO was founded in 1998 with the aim of commercialising UoB technology in the field of 
smoking diagnostic testing designed by a UoB academic Graham Cope. The UoB transferred relevant 
IP to the company in exchange for £83,750 of share capital, although the company received no other 
external funding. 
In 2006 the entire share capital of the company was sold to Personal Screening Plc. The total 
consideration was £75,000 which consisted of £35,000 of cash and £40,000 of shares in the acquiring 
company. UoB received its share of both elements of the consideration in line with the other equity 
investors in the company. Personal Screening Plc subsequently ceased trading meaning that UoB 
realized no value on the share portion of the consideration, and £12,342 represented its share of the 
cash portion. 
At the date of sale the USO had net assets of £18,553 and a deficit on its profit and loss reserve of 
£370,518, so the technology in the USO was clearly not at a stage of development to generate 
profits. This was ultimately reflected in the low sale price which only repaid the original investors, 
including UoB, a small part of their investment. 
 
5.4.3.2 Entice Technology Limited 
This USO was founded in 2001 to commercialise software developed at UoB. The software predicted 
road, rail and runway conditions which allowed local councils to decide when to salt or grit roads, 
predicted when rail routes might suffer after icing or buckling and when runways were unsafe to 
land on. The UoB transferred IP to the company in exchange for 57,500 ordinary 1p shares i.e. the IP 
was valued at £575. The company did not receive any other funding. 
In 2006 the entire share capital of the company was acquired by Weather Services International 
Limited for £839,000 in cash, and in line with the other equity investors, UoB received £482,425 in 
return for its stake. At the date of acquisition, the company had net assets of £50,088 and a profit 
and loss reserve of £49,088, showing that it was already a profitable company at this stage. 
To date, this is the single example of UoB making a financial return on its equity stakes in all of its 
USOs. Agency theory is of relevance in explaining this low level of performance with the significant 
information asymmetry present in the case of USO and potential investment, meaning that despite 
the scale and range of investment obtained by UoB USOs, in general investment decisions by 
external parties were poor ones, particularly as the only ‘successful’ USO did not obtain any external 
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funding. This lack of quality of underlying technology proved critical in the exit outcomes, despite 
the apparently strong signals that the UoB could send out based on its research strength. 
5.5 Discussion of the performance data 
While the focus of this chapter is largely to validate the proposed methodology from Chapter 4 to 
collect relevant data, some preliminary discussion of the financial performance data of the USOs has 
been included at this stage. The data from UoB will be analysed in much more detail in Chapter 7 
alongside that collected from all other universities in the West Midlands region. 
 
5.5.1 Survival results 
Analysis of the survival results obtained leads to some interesting discussion points. The data on 
survival of USOs identifies clearly a concept not discussed in great depth to date in the academic 
literature on financial performance of USOs, namely a class of USO that has not secured any funding 
for a period of time and has effectively ceased trading but has not been formally dissolved. These 
have been designated ‘twilight USOs’ in this study. 
It has long been received wisdom that USOs survive longer than other start-up high-tech companies 
(Shane, 2004; Zhang, 2009). Other USO performance studies have shown extremely high survival 
rates among USOs, even after significant periods of time have elapsed (Tables 5.7 and 5.8). However, 
it is clear that these studies only considered USOs that had been dissolved. The existence of twilight 
USOs could significantly change this analysis as they represent companies that have effectively failed 
and are unlikely to lead to any financial return for the university. In this small sample of USOs, as 
already noted 41% had been formally dissolved with a further 29% of the sample being designated 
as twilight USOs. However, this sample clearly includes USOs that have only recently been formed 
and have not had time to fail. Given that 5 USOs which were still surviving in 2014 were formed in 
2010 and 2011, among the older USOs the failure rate will be significantly higher even than these 
headline figures. 
Analysis of the twilight companies shows a range of companies, some of which obtained external 
funding and some of which did not. In most cases, the technology transferred from the UoB does not 
appear to have reached a stage at which it can be commercialised, and the company has effectively 
ceased operations, possibly in hope of future funding. Where a company has obtained funding in the 
past, a significant gap since the last funding date is indicative of a ‘twilight USO’. Other companies in 
the set appear to be moderately profitable consulting companies, which may have originally been 
set up for this purpose, or gradually moved towards this form of activity when an early stage 
technology did not appear to be readily commercialisable. The set of ‘twilight’ USOs is small and 
further study of similar companies at other universities will be undertaken. It should also be noted 
that twilight USOs may start trading again for a range of reasons such as technology becoming more 
useful, although this situation is not observed in this work. 
Consideration also needs to be given as to the reasons why USOs appear to survive longer than 
other high-tech start-up companies. USOs contain IP transferred from the university, so it may be 
preferable for the university and any external funders to keep the company alive in the hope that 
the IP may have some value to a third party, especially if the running costs of the company are low. 
For non-USOs, the owners may have shorter timescales, especially where there are no external 
funders and hence no funders and hence no cash to cover ongoing running costs. This is likely to be a 
better explanation than some of the reasons given in the existing literature e.g. Zhang (2009). 
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5.5.2 External investment results 
A number of positive financial indicators related to external investment have been identified. USOs 
from the UoB attracted over £5 million of external funding to develop UoB technology, and almost 
50% of the USOs secured external funding. A wide range of external investors were attracted to the 
prospect of the USOs’ technologies to provide such funding. While the financial results for the UoB 
are mixed, as discussed in the next section, such funding will have at least maintained skilled jobs 
within the region and may have given rise to new IP amongst USO employees and companies in their 
supply chains. It should also be noted that it is perfectly normal for investors, even highly 
sophisticated ones, in any start-up companies to see the majority of their investments fail due to the 
inherently risky nature of the companies. Statistics such as survival data and attraction of external 
investment must therefore be analysed and interpreted with great care, and the additional, non-
financial benefit to a university must be considered too. USOs provide only a limited view of 
university knowledge spillover (Lester, 2005; Ortin-Angel and Vendrell-Herrero, 2014), which is likely 
to have been relevant for the regional UCF (the Mercia Fund), which saw little financial return on its 
investments. However, financial performance data such as those in this study should play a key part 
in the decision of a university to establish or retain a USO programme when compared to other 
means of exploiting its IP. 
In addition, any conclusions based on such a small set of data must be interpreted with great care 
especially as it is from a single university which may have a different USO creation policy from other 
universities. The results from this study do back up those of Harrison and Leitch (2010) which 
questioned the value of a USO programme to another “redbrick” university. However, it is equally 
clear that other UK universities have generated significant amounts of money through the successful 
exit from USOs. Data from many more universities will need to be collected and analysed to test the 
validity of the results of this study, and this will be undertaken during the subsequent chapter where 
all universities within the West Midlands region are studied.  
 
5.5.3 Exit results 
None of the UoB’s 29 USOs achieved an IPO during the period under review (Bonardo et al.’s (2011) 
‘crowning achievement’ for a USO), and only two reached an exit via a trade sale, of which only one 
can be deemed a financial success. Such a return is likely to have been a major disappointment given 
the length of time of the USO programme and the amount of third party investment obtained. In 
addition, it compares unfavourably with other UK universities such as Oxford (Lawton Smith and Ho, 
2006) where USOs reached IPO stage. Overall, the UoB cannot be said to have gained financially 
from its USO programme, given the ongoing costs it incurred in running its technology transfer 
operations over the period. Chapter 7 will detail whether this experience was a common one 
throughout the region. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
Overall, this case study has been a success in that it validates the data collection techniques 
proposed in Chapter 4. Using four independent sources of data produced an accurate dataset and 
clearly highlighted the inadequacies of using a single source. A stringent refining process was needed 
to remove companies that appeared potentially to be USOs, but in fact were set up for some 
function other than to commercialise technology. Given the quantity and quality of data collected, 
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this proved relatively straightforward, although the process was time-consuming. In addition, some 
preliminary observations were made about the consistency of the data with the theoretical 
frameworks of signaling and agency theory, as chosen in Chapter 3. 
Survival, investment and exit data were collected and a very brief analysis of such data was 
performed. Even at this early stage of the overall work, interesting observations were made such as 
the potential identification of a class of USO which was designated ‘twilight USOs’ and which may 
offer an explanation to the long-held view that USOs survive for longer than other high-tech startup 
companies. In addition, two short histories of the only two USOs to achieve any form of exit were 
constructed using solely the financial data available from the sources. 
In addition, further information was obtained of wider interest to USOs from the sources. The 
Binding Site is a hugely successful company which was based on UoB technology, but the UoB never 
held any equity stake in the company as the inventor academics had to attract external finance to 
commercialise their technology, so did not benefit financially from its success. These events took 
place many years before the UK’s recent policy focus on USOs, and is a clear indication of some of 
the motivations behind such a programme; namely, to ensure that universities obtain some financial 
benefit from their commercialisable technology. Unfortunately, the subsequent USO programme 
seems to have largely failed to achieve this, with only one financially successful exit meaning that 
the UoB has not secured any lasting financial benefits.  
Given the success of this case study, its data collection methods and consistency with theoretical 
frameworks will now be applied with confidence to the other universities within the region in the 
following chapter.   
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6. Financial Performance Data from Spin Off Companies from other West Midlands universities 
6.1 Background 
Following the conclusion of the case study performed for the UoB in the previous chapter, similar 
financial performance data was collected from all other universities located in the West Midlands 
area and some preliminary observations made, as for UoB, over the consistency of the data with 
signaling and agency theories. Data were collected between March 2014 and March 2015 for the 
twelve universities based in the West Midlands, which are identified as those represented by 
‘Universities West Midlands’, a not-for-profit organisation which supports its constituent members, 
namely: 
Aston University 
University of Birmingham 
Birmingham City University 
University College Birmingham 
Coventry University 
Harper Adams University 
Keele University 
Newman University 
Staffordshire University 
University of Warwick 
University of Wolverhampton 
University of Worcester 
 
 
In order to provide some structure to this chapter, these universities can be classified together into 
different groups, based to some extent on their date of obtaining university status. This provides an 
additional level of analysis to enable comparisons to be made between financial data from different 
types of universities. A number of classifications are in general use, and those of relevance to the 
West Midlands are Russell Group universities, Plate Glass universities and Post-92 universities.  
 
Sometimes referred to as Plate Glass universities, a number of universities gained their status during 
the 1960s, many of which were previously Colleges of Advanced Technology. These include Aston 
University (formerly Birmingham College of Advanced Technology) and Keele (formerly North 
Staffordshire University College). 
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Post-92 universities refer to academic institutions granted university status in the UK through the 
Further and Higher Education Act of 1992, as well as those granted university status since 1992 
without receiving a royal charter. Of the West Midlands universities, four are Post-92 universities 
with polytechnic roots, namely Coventry University (formerly Lanchester Polytechnic then Coventry 
Polytechnic), Birmingham City University (formerly Birmingham Polytechnic), Staffordshire University 
(formerly Staffordshire Polytechnic) and Wolverhampton University (formerly Wolverhampton 
Polytechnic). Those that fall into the second category are the University of Worcester (formerly 
Worcester College of Higher Education), University College Birmingham, Harper Adams University 
(formerly Harper Adams University College) and Newman University (formerly Newman College of 
Higher Education). 
 
The Russell Group has already been mentioned, and this includes Birmingham and Warwick from 
this sample. Birmingham is also often referred to as a ‘redbrick’ university, which is a term 
sometimes used to describe nine civic universities founded in major industrial cities of England 
during the 19th and early 20th century. 
 
It can therefore be seen that a wide range of universities exist in this single region, and the USO 
formation and performance may therefore reflect this diversity (Steinberg, 2014). It is clear from the 
outset that the Post-92 universities have only participated in the USO phenomenon to a minor 
extent, with none of the universities in the region which were not former polytechnics creating any 
USOs at all. This is likely to be related to the observation that most USOs come from science or 
technology departments, which require heavy investment to maintain and are not featured 
significantly among those less research-oriented institutions. In simplistic terms, one would expect 
to see USOs showing stronger financial performance from more research-focused universities, which 
for this sample would be in descending order: Russell Group, Plate Glass, Post-92. Whether this is 
seen in practice will be an important part of this work, and given that single UK university studies in 
the existing literature are scarce (Oskarsson and Schläpfer, 2008), this work will make an important 
addition to those studies. 
6.2 Plate Glass universities - Aston and Keele 
Aston University (Aston) received its Royal Charter in 1966, although it was originally founded as far 
back as 1895 as the Birmingham Municipal Technical School, which was later transformed into the 
College of Advanced Technology. Its history reflects its status as a research-led university with a bias 
towards technology, and it currently hosts about 12,000 students. Interesting comparisons can be 
drawn with the UoB as Aston achieved university status more recently, and is not a member of the 
research-led Russell Group, although its historical bias towards technology as noted above is one of 
the academic areas in which USOs are prevalent. It will be revealing to see whether this difference is 
reflected in the financial performance of its USOs.  
Keele University (Keele) received its Royal Charter in 1962, although it was originally founded as the 
University College of North Staffordshire in 1949. The new university attempted to break away from 
the pattern of the specialised honours degree, and most students read four subjects in their degree 
course, two at honours level and at least two as a subsidiary. At least one of these subjects had to be 
from the arts or social sciences, and at least one from the natural sciences. Until the 1990’s most 
students followed a unique four-year course, beginning their studies with a Foundation Year, which 
was a broad course covering the development of Western civilisation through the perspective of 
almost every academic subject. Keele currently hosts about 10,000 students. 
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6.2.1 Constructing and refining the USO database 
Three independent, third party data sources were identified and used to create both the Aston USO 
and Keele USO database, in line with the methodology discussed in the previous chapter. Unlike the 
UoB, neither Aston nor Keele had a dedicated technology transfer website listing out potential USOs. 
The three are: 
 
i)  Annual accounts obtained from the relevant University website covering the years ended 
31 July 2002 to 31 July 2013 inclusive for Aston and 31 July 2005 to 31 July 2013 for Keele.  
ii)   Company searches were performed using the Experian Corpfin UK business database which 
provides data from all UK company accounts filed at Companies’ House, to identify 
companies in which Aston or Keele was a current shareholder. A range of search terms 
derived from the descriptors “University of Aston” and “Keele University” was used to 
capture USOs as variations were present in recording the identity of the University as a 
shareholder in the companies’ Annual Returns. 
iii)  A search of the Spinouts UK database was performed to find all USOs identified as 
associated with Aston and Keele by this specific database.  
 
As with the UoB, each of these three sources gave rise to a different population of companies that 
were potentially USOs. These were cross-checked and amalgamated to form single sets, which are 
shown below in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. The data was then refined through in-depth analysis of each 
potential USO’s historic financial data, primarily in the form of company accounts and annual 
returns, in order to reject companies that did not meet this study’s chosen definition of a USO.  
 
 
 
Company Experian University 
accounts 
Spinouts UK USO? 
Academy Optics Limited Y  Y N 
Aerbuddies Limited Y Y Y Y 
Applied Search Technology 
Limited 
  Y N 
Astals Training Limited Y Y Y N 
Astasense Limited   Y N 
Astelics Limited  Y  Y 
Astisen Limited Y Y  N 
Aston Business Assessments 
Limited 
Y Y Y Y 
Aston Molecules Limited   Y Y 
Aston Organisation 
Development Limited 
  Y N 
Aston Student Limited Y Y Y N 
Halsa Pharmaceuticals Inc   Y N 
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Aston Photonic Technologies 
Limited 
 Y Y Y 
Midland Pharma Training 
Limited 
Y  Y N 
Protomax Limited Y Y Y Y 
Sapere Systems Limited Y Y Y Y 
X-link Limited   Y N 
Table 6.1 Potential Aston USOs identified from the data sources 
 
 
Company Experian University 
accounts 
Spinouts UK USO? 
Intelligent Orthopaedics 
Limited 
Y Y Y Y 
SciCorr Limited Y Y Y Y 
Prescribing Decision Support 
Limited 
Y Y Y Y 
nanoTherics Limited Y Y Y Y 
MagneCell Limited Y Y Y Y 
Mica Biosystems Limited   Y N 
SciSite Limited Y Y Y Y 
Table 6.2 Potential Keele USOs identified from the data sources 
 
Companies identified as potential USOs by one of the sources, but which were rejected from the 
final dataset upon further analysis, are shown in the following tables (Tables 6.3 and 6.4) together 
with the reasons for rejection. 
Company name Reason for rejection as USO 
Academy Optics Limited Company dormant since incorporation and now dissolved; 
Aston owned 100% of the shares 
Applied Search Technology 
Limited 
Aston never held an equity stake – may have been a start-up 
company 
Astals Training Limited Company dormant since incorporation and now dissolved; 
Aston owned 100% of the shares 
Astasense Limited Company formed by Aston academics; Aston never held an 
equity stake i.e. likely to be a start-up rather than a USO 
Astisen Limited Company dormant since incorporation and now dissolved; 
Aston owned 50% of the shares 
Aston Organisation 
Development Limited 
Company formed by Aston academics; Aston never held an 
equity stake i.e. likely to be a start-up rather than a USO 
Aston Student Limited Company dormant since incorporation; Aston owned 100% of 
the shares 
Halsa Pharmaceuticals Inc An American company funding Aston research – no UK 
company hence not a USO 
Midlands Pharma Training 
Limited 
Company dormant since incorporation and now dissolved; 
Aston owned 50% of the shares 
X-link Limited Start-up formed by Aston academic 
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Table 6.3 Rationale for rejection of companies as Aston USOs 
 
Company name Reason for rejection as USO 
Mica Biosystems Limited Company based on University technology but Keele holds no 
shares 
Table 6.4 Rationale for rejection of companies as Keele USOs 
 
Refining the data gave a final total population for Aston of 7 USOs incorporated between 1983 and 
2010, and 6 for Keele between 2002 and 2011. 2007 and 2010 were the most popular years for 
Aston with 2 USOs being incorporated in each (Figure 6.1), while Keele never formed more than one 
USO in a year (Figure 6.2). No USOs were formed at all before 2000 highlighting the fact that the 
phenomenon of significant increase in creation of USOs is a relatively new one. In addition, as with 
the UoB, no USOs were formed after 2010, which could imply that this route is losing attractiveness 
as a means of commercialising university technology. Unlike UoB, however, there is no discernible 
pattern in terms of increasing or decreasing numbers of USOs, and numbers overall are much lower. 
Aston and Keele may have had less enthusiasm for setting up USOs over the same period of time as 
a means of attempting to commercialise their technology, or simply less technology to 
commercialise as a result of having lower quality research, as illustrated in the fact that neither are 
part of the Russell Group, unlike UoB. 
 
  
Figure 6.1: Aston USOs, total population, number by year 
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Figure 6.2: Keele USOs, total population, number by year 
 
In arriving at the final population of USOs for Aston, as with the UoB, it became clear that none of 
the three sources would have been sufficient by themselves to give an adequate reflection of the 
true USO population. In particular, unlike UoB, Spinouts UK proved inaccurate in identifying a 
number of USOs which further investigation proved not to be, implying that the database received 
inaccurate information from its sources. This again highlights the need, in order to obtain an 
accurate dataset, not to rely on one source and to check it thoroughly against published financial 
data. In the case of Keele, however, USOs were consistent across the three data sources, with only 
one potential USO being discarded from the original sample. 
6.2.2 Results 
The tables below (Tables 6.5 and 6.6) shows basic classification data for the USOs obtained from the 
sources noted above, and summarized in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. 
 
USO name Company 
registration 
number 
Principal activity Classification 
Aerbuddies Limited 6439351 Develop treatment for ear 
pain 
Life science 
Astelics Limited 6113352 Develop components for 
telecoms 
IT 
Aston Business Assessments 
Limited 
7200897 Business Psychology 
Training 
Consultancy 
Aston Molecules Limited 1709877 Pharmaceutical 
development 
Life science 
Aston Photonic Technologies 4139246 Photonic technology Physics 
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Limited 
Protamax Limited 5200397 Biotechnology services Life science 
Sapere Systems Limited 7171338 Develop computer assisted 
devices 
IT 
Table 6.5 Basic classification of Aston USOs 
 
 
USO name Company 
registration 
number 
Principal activity Classification 
Intelligent Orthopaedics 
Limited 
4504094 Develop orthopaedic 
trauma devices 
Life science 
SciCorr Limited 7862592 Identifying corroded steel Materials 
Prescribing Decision Support 
Limited 
5789221 Software to assist 
pharmacist decisions 
IT 
nanoTherics Limited 6332067 Magnetic nanoparticle 
research 
Materials 
MagneCell Limited 4696405 Tissue engineering Life science 
SciSite Limited 5398570 Ferrous corrosion 
consultancy services 
Consultancy 
Table 6.6 Basic classification of Keele USOs 
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Figure 6.3 Classification of Aston USOs by principal activity
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As for UoB, USOs seeking to commercialise technologies within the fields of life sciences and IT 
(information technology) comprise the majority of those originating from both Aston and Keele, a 
feature commonly observed in studies at other universities e.g. Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008). It 
should be noted that the classifications used are broad and, especially in the cases of USOs dissolved 
many years prior to the data collection, it was not always easy to find out the exact nature of their 
activities. This was a common issue for all the data considered in this chapter. 
 
6.2.3 Survival measurements 
Dates of incorporation and dissolution (where relevant) were obtained for each of the USOs from 
Experian Corpfin and are tabulated below. 
 
 
USO Date of 
incorporation 
Date of 
dissolution 
Time to failure 
(months) 
Third 
party 
funding? 
Aerbuddies Limited 28/11/07    
Astelics Limited 19/2/07 5/7/11 52 Y 
Aston Business Assessments 
Limited 
24/3/10    
Aston Molecules Limited 25/3/83 28/11/13 368 Y 
Aston Photonic Technologies 
Limited 
14/6/94 14/1/14 235 Y 
Protamax Limited 9/8/04 28/7/11 83 Y 
Sapere Systems Limited 26/2/10    
Table 6.7 Survival data for Aston USOs 
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Figure 6.4 Classification of Keele USOs by principal activity
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USO Date of 
incorporation 
Date of 
dissolution 
Time to failure 
(months) 
Third 
party 
funding? 
Intelligent Orthopaedics 
Limited 
6/8/02    
SciCorr Limited 28/11/11    
Prescribing Decision Support 
Limited 
21/4/06    
nanoTherics Limited 2/8/07    
MagneCell Limited 13/3/03 27/10/09 79 N 
SciSite Limited 18/3/05 28/6/13 99 Y 
Table 6.8 Survival data for Keele USOs 
 
 
As noted above, 7 Aston USOs in total were identified with dates of incorporation ranging from 1983 
to 2010. Of the 7 USOs identified, 4 had been formally dissolved. This represents an aggregate 
failure rate of 57%, although two of the USOs survived for 20 years or more, which is a significant 
lifespan for a company. For Keele, 6 USOs in total were identified with dates of incorporation ranging 
from 2002 to 2011. Of the 6 USOs identified, 2 had been formally dissolved. This represents an 
aggregate failure rate of 33%. The average time to failure of the 4 dissolved companies from Aston 
was 185 months and ranged from 52 months to 368 months, while that of the two dissolved 
companies from Keele was 89 months and ranged from 79 to 99 months 
As with UoB, a number of ‘twilight USOs’ were identified during the data collection. While an 
element of judgment has to be made as to whether a company has ceased to trade, a further 2 
companies from Aston (29% of the sample) and 2 companies from Keele (33% of the sample) were 
identified as twilight USOs. The population’s total effective aggregate failure rate is thus 86% (6 out 
of 7 USOs) and 66% (4 out of 6 USOs) respectively. Tables 6.6 and 6.7 below reveals the identity of 
the twilight USOs, as well as the rationale behind their designation as such. 
 
USO Rationale for ‘twilight’ designation 
Aerbuddies Limited Company effectively dormant – very little activity 
Aston Business Assessments Limited No funding since incorporation – very little activity as a 
consulting company 
Table 6.9: Rationale for Aston ‘twilight’ designation 
 
 
USO Rationale for ‘twilight’ designation 
Intelligent Orthopaedics Limited Last funding in 2010 but credit report shows adverse 
information (company subsequently dissolved) 
Prescribing Decision Support Limited No funding since incorporation – very little activity as a 
consulting company 
Table 6.10: Rationale for Keele ‘twilight’ designation 
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As with UoB, comparison of Aston and Keele’s USO survival rates with existing academic studies of 
USO financial performance reveals a number of interesting findings. In general, it is clear that this 
study shows a lower rate of survival amongst USOs than most other studies (as summarized in 
Oskarsson and Schläpfer, 2008) when considering only formally dissolved USOs (43% for Aston, 66% 
for Keele), and a significantly lower rate than all other studies identified in the previous chapter if 
‘twilight USOs’ are included (14% for Aston, 33% for Keele), which again implies that ‘twilight USOs’ 
are an important class of USO that may shed some light upon the apparent longevity of USOs 
compared to other start-up companies as noted in the academic literature to date e.g. de Cleyn 
(2011). As with UoB, this initial finding shows some consistency with signaling theory as these Plate 
Glass universities are less research-intensive than the single universities studied to date (Oskarsson 
and Schläpfer, 2008) and hence less prestigious, sending out weaker signals to potential investors. 
However, such conclusions must be made with care, and as already noted, other studies have shown 
little correlation between research strength of a university and the number of USOs generated 
(Shane, 2004); this may imply a similar lack of correlation with USO survival. 
 
6.2.4 Third party investment results 
Tables 6.11 and 6.12 below show which of the Aston and Keele USOs obtained external third party 
funding and the amount of such funding received by each company. The data on funding was 
obtained primarily from analysis of USO statutory accounts, particularly from review of the share 
premium account movements, which represent the excess amount of the total investment by a third 
party over the nominal value of the share capital acquired. 
 
 
USO Investment received Amount (£) 
Aerbuddies Limited Y 8,000 
Astelics Limited Y 13,500 
Aston Business Assessments Limited N  
Aston Molecules Limited Y 161,920 
Aston Photonic Technologies Limited Y 4,270,938 
Protamax Limited Y 14,600 
Sapere Systems Limited Y 12,470 
Table 6.11: Third party investment attracted by Aston USOs 
 
 
USO Investment received Amount (£) 
Intelligent Orthopaedics Limited Y 1,332,232 
SciCorr Limited Y 158,800 
Prescribing Decision Support Limited N  
nanoTherics Limited Y 1,907,367 
MagneCell Limited N  
SciSite Limited Y 99,920 
Table 6.12: Third party investment attracted by Keele USOs 
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6 out of 7 Aston USOs received external third party investment which represents 86% of the total 
population, and 4 out of 6 for Keele (66% of the population). A total of £4,481,428 of investment was 
received from third parties for Aston USOs and £3,418,319 for Keele. Tables 6.13 and 6.14 provide 
more detail on the identities of the investors. 
  
 
USO UCF 
(Mercia 
Fund) 
Other 
private 
equity 
Individuals Other Detail 
Aerbuddies 
Limited 
  Y   
Astelics 
Limited 
 Y   H20 Venture Partners 
Aston 
Molecules 
Limited 
   Y Birmingham City Council via 
Birmingham Technology (Venture 
Capital) Limited 
Aston 
Photonic 
Technologies 
Limited 
 Y Y  3i (£4m) and individuals 
Protamax 
Limited 
  Y   
Sapere 
Systems 
Limited 
 Y   H20 Venture Partners 
Table 6.13 Identities of external investors in Aston USOs 
 
 
 
USO UCF 
(Mercia 
Fund) 
Other 
private 
equity 
Individuals Detail 
Intelligent 
Orthopaedics 
Limited 
Y Y  Other private equity was Catapult Venture 
Managers 
SciCorr 
Limited 
  Y  
nanoTherics 
Limited 
Y Y  Other private equity was Catapult Venture 
Managers 
SciSite 
Limited 
 Y  Advantage Early Growth Fund 
Table 6.14 Identities of external investors in Keele USOs 
 
 
119 
 
These findings are slightly different from what would be expected from agency and signaling theory 
when compared to UoB. Plate Glass universities are generally considered to be slightly less 
prestigious from a research perspective than Russell Group universities, yet Aston and Keele show 
higher rates of attracting finance, as well as a wide range of investors. Clearly the relationship 
between research prestige of a university and attracting finance for its USOs is not a simple one, and 
a wider comparison across the region and with other UK universities will need to be performed to 
shed more light. This may hint that the policy of the university in creating USOs is of importance, 
with lower numbers of higher quality USOs being of more significance in sending out positive signals 
to, or building trust with, potential investors than simply the research prestige of the sponsoring 
university. However, care should be taken in drawing conclusions, as it should be noted that Aston 
and Keele have very small numbers of USOs so results can easily be distorted, and Aston in particular 
may still have strong roots in science and technology from its initial formation as a College of 
Advanced Technology. 
Given the high number of investors and funding rounds in some cases, it was not always possible to 
identify the amount invested by each investor as such data was not publicly available. The Mercia 
Fund, which was the University Challenge Fund set up by the UK government to provide early stage 
funding to USOs (see earlier chapter for more details), unlike UoB did not invest of any of Aston’s 
USOs. The Fund underwent a management buy-out some years after its formation and launched 
additional investment funds; these have all been grouped together under the ‘Mercia Fund’ 
designation for this study. 
 
6.2.5 USOs achieving an exit 
As already noted, an important goal of a USO created to commercialise university technology is to 
achieve a financial return for the university by an exit from the company, via a public listing of shares 
or other form of share disposal such as a trade sale. Of the 7 Aston USOs, 2 led to a successful exit 
for shareholders via a trade sale of the entire share capital to a third party. None of the USOs offered 
any shares to the public via a stock market listing. However, this is a much higher proportion of 
successful exits than the UoB. None of the 6 Keele USOs exited successfully which may be a result of 
its lower scientific heritage and less research-intensive focus. 
A more detailed historical analysis of the two USOs was undertaken through review of their financial 
accounts and other publicly available information to provide more details about the nature of the 
trade sale and whether the terms of the sale were beneficial to Aston. 
 
6.2.5.1 Aston Molecules Limited 
This USO was founded in 1983 with the aim of commercialising Aston technology in the field of 
providing discovery and pharmaceutical development services to the worldwide pharmaceutical 
industry. Aston held a very small stake of 10 shares with a number of university academics holding 
1650 shares between them. External funding was provided to the tune of £161,920 by Birmingham 
City Council via its wholly owned entity Birmingham Technology (Venture Capital) Limited. 
In 1996 the entire share capital of the company was sold to Oncogene Science Inc., an American 
group listed on the NASDAQ Stock Exchange. The total consideration was $3million which consisted 
of shares in the acquiring company. Aston received its share of the consideration i.e. £7,831. At the 
date of sale the USO had net assets of £139,462 and a deficit on its profit and loss reserve of 
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£24,118, so the technology in the USO was still in development phase, although was clearly worth 
significantly more than the overall net asset position of the company given the price paid. 
It is notable that the date of formation of this USO is very early, and even before the 1985 UK 
government reform designed to open up universities to allow their technologies to be 
commercialised. The company was very successful in that its technology had significant financial 
value which was recognised by an external purchaser. However, it should be noted that Aston 
received hardly any of the sale proceeds, a situation which was remedied in later USOs with a larger 
university equity stake being taken. The main beneficiary from the sale was the local City Council, an 
unusual investor and certainly not one seen in later USOs. Interestingly, the profits on sale were 
therefore probably genuinely ploughed back into the local community, a very rare example of a 
‘people’s USO’. 
From a theoretical perspective, signaling theory would suggest that this USO gave off very strong 
positive signals to investors about the strength of its technology both to the initial early investors 
and the subsequent purchaser, possibly through patents or other protection obtained, or the quality 
of the management team and their experience in the technology field. Agency theory would suggest 
little goal incongruence between the original shareholders as all parties wished to achieve a 
subsequent sale of the company. In this example, the two frameworks complement each other and 
observation of the lifestyle of the USO is consistent with the predictions of both. 
 
6.2.5.2 Aston Photonic Technologies Limited 
This USO was founded in 1994 as Indigo Photonics Limited to commercialise photonic technology 
developed at Aston. Funding of £4 million was received from UK-listed private equity group 3i in 
2001. Aston transferred IP to the company in exchange for 63,750 ordinary £1 shares. Academics 
and individuals also contributed £270,938 of investment. 
In 2003 the entire share capital of the company was acquired by Insensys Limited for £482,941 via a 
share for share exchange. Aston received £52,210 in return for its stake. At the date of acquisition, 
the company had negative net assets of £70,891 and a profit and loss deficit of £995,924, showing 
that the company was still in the development phase with respect of its technology. Again, this is a 
very early USO, formed well before the phenomenon increased in popularity in the UK, and was 
again successful in attracting investment, although did not make financial returns for its investors. 
 
6.2.5.3 Summary – Plate Glass universities 
The Plate Glass universities of Aston and Keele reveal a number of features of interest which will be 
compared against other universities from different categorisations within the region in Chapter 7. 
The major differences from the Russell Group UoB that will be worthy of further discussion are the 
much smaller number of USOs generated, the similar observations over twilight USOs and the high 
failure rate compared to previous studies (in line with the predictions of signalling theory) and the 
successful exit from a financial perspective of one of the Aston USOs. Both universities, however, 
show a high rate of obtaining funding compared to the UoB, which is against the predictions of 
signalling theory from consideration of the research strength of the parent university, and suggests 
that other factors are important in the decision-making of the receiver of the signals.  
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6.3 Post-92 Universities - Coventry University and Staffordshire University 
Coventry University (Coventry) received its university status in 1992 along with a number of former 
polytechnics. It was originally formed as the Lanchester College of Technology in 1961 to cater for 
the high level of technical training required in Coventry. The institution merged with Rugby College 
of Engineering Technology to form Lanchester Polytechnic in 1970, which was renamed Coventry 
Polytechnic in 1987. Like Aston, it has a history of offering technology-based study courses, and it 
currently hosts about 27,000 students. It has a wholly-owned subsidiary company that deals with 
commercialisation and technology transfer called Coventry University Enterprises Limited (CUE), 
which holds equity stakes in Coventry USOs for the university. The city of Coventry has historically 
been the site of much automotive manufacture and supporting industries, and the university has a 
strong reputation for its engineering courses, that specialise in this sector. 
Staffordshire University (Staffs) obtained university status in 1992 as one of a cohort of former 
polytechnics along with Coventry, although it was originally founded as far back as 1914 as the 
Central School of Science and Technology to support the two main industries of Stoke-on-Trent, 
namely pottery and mining, which was later transformed into Staffordshire Polytechnic. It currently 
hosts about 19,000 students.  
6.3.1 Constructing and refining the USO database 
Four independent, third party data sources were identified and used to create the USO database, in 
line with the methodology discussed in the previous chapter, during April 2014: 
 
i)  Coventry and CUE’s annual accounts obtained from the University website covering the 
years ended 31 July 2005 to 31 July 2013 inclusive, and Staffs from 31 July 2004 to 31 July 
2014 inclusive.  
ii)   Company searches were performed using the Experian Corpfin UK business database which 
provides data from all UK company accounts filed at Companies’ House, to identify 
companies in which CUE or Staffs were a current shareholder.  
iii)  A search of the Spinouts UK database was performed to find all USOs identified as 
associated with Coventry and Staffs by this specific database.  
iv)  CUE and Staffs’s websites provided some detail of companies which they identified as 
being USOs.  
 
Each of these four sources gave rise to a different population of companies that were potentially 
USOs. These were cross-checked and amalgamated to form a single set, which is shown below in 
Tables 6.15-16. The data was then refined through in-depth analysis of each potential USO’s historic 
financial data, primarily in the form of company accounts and annual returns, in order to reject 
companies that did not meet the chosen definition of a USO.  
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Company University 
accounts 
Experian CUE 
website 
Spinouts UK USO? 
Exilica Limited Y Y Y Y Y 
Advanced Construction 
Technologies (UK) 
Limited 
 Y   N 
Inocardia Limited  Y   Y 
Health Behaviour 
Research Limited 
Y Y Y  Y 
Microcab Industries 
Limited 
Y Y Y  Y 
Tortrix Limited  Y Y  Y 
The Futurelets Limited  Y   N 
Sprue Aegis Limited   Y  N 
Future Armour Limited   Y Y Y 
MCC Engines Limited Y    Y 
Membrasense Limited Y    Y 
Cavisys Limited Y   Y Y 
Trucktrain Knowhow 
Limited 
Y    N 
Natural8 Limited Y    N 
UK Unplugged 
Technology Limited 
Y    N 
WEEE Suitcase Limited Y   Y Y 
Virtualis3D Limited Y   Y Y 
Intelligent Paving 
Systems Limited 
Y    N 
GPS Vision Limited    Y N 
Table 6.15 Potential Coventry USOs identified from the data sources 
 
 
Company Experian University 
accounts 
TTO 
website 
Spinouts UK USO? 
Ava Technologies 
Limited 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Flux Stoke on Trent 
Limited 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Grand Independent 
Limited 
 Y Y Y N 
Intelligent Orthopaedics 
Limited (also a USO of 
Keele – see above) 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Picture Nation Limited Y Y   Y 
Ludorum Studios Limited Y Y   N 
iCentrica Limited Y Y   Y 
Linkway Software 
Limited 
 Y   N 
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Blackstone Resourcing 
Limited 
Y Y   Y 
Table 6.16 Potential Staffs USOs identified from the data sources 
Companies identified as potential USOs by one of the sources, but which were rejected from the 
final data set upon further analysis, are shown in the following table (Tables 6.17-8) together with 
the reasons for rejection. 
 
 
Company name Reason for rejection as USO 
Advanced Construction 
Technologies (UK) Limited 
Appears to be a training consortium; CUE owns 1 out of the 
company’s 715,001 shares 
The Futurelets Limited 100% owned by CUE and appears to be accommodation-
related (formed in 2014) 
Sprue Aegis Limited CUE only ever held a 2% stake, probably as a result of a past 
collaboration (company is now AIM-listed) 
Trucktrain Knowhow Limited Dormant since incorporation 
Natural8 Limited Wholly-owned subsidiary now dissolved 
UK Unplugged Technology 
Limited 
Dormant since incorporation and now dissolved 
Intelligent Paving Systems 
Limited 
CUE owns no shares (university accounts incorrect) 
GPS Vision Limited Consultancy business set up by Coventry academic; CUE owns 
no shares 
Table 6.17 Rationale for rejection of companies as Coventry USOs 
 
 
Company name Reason for rejection as USO 
Grand Independent Limited No shares owned by the University – likely to be a startup 
Ludorum Studios Limited Dormant since incorporation 
Linkway Software Limited No shares owned by the University 
Table 6.18 Rationale for rejection of companies as Staffs USOs 
 
 
Refining the data gave a final total population for Coventry of 11 USOs incorporated between 1989 
and 2013, and 6 for Staffs between 2002 and 2012. 2005 was the most popular year for Coventry 
with 3 USOs being incorporated (Figure 6.5) while Staffs formed no more than one per year. No 
USOs were formed at all before 2002 for either university highlighting the fact that the phenomenon 
of significantly increasing numbers is a relatively new one. Unlike the UoB and Aston, USOs 
continued to be formed after 2010, which could imply that this route remains viable for both as a 
means of commercialising university technology. Unlike UoB, however, there is no discernible 
pattern in terms of increasing or decreasing numbers of USOs, and numbers overall are much lower, 
with few examples of more than one USO being formed in a year. This may suggest that Coventry 
and Staffs may have had less capacity for setting up USOs over the same period of time to 
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commercialise technology, or simply had less technology that was ready to commercialise, which 
would be expected from their much lower research strength. 
 
  
 
Figure 6.5: Coventry USOs, total population, number by year 
 
  
Figure 6.6: SU USOs, total population, number by year 
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In arriving at the final population of USOs, as with the UoB and Aston, it became clear that none of 
the four sources would have been sufficient by themselves to give an adequate reflection of the true 
USO population. In particular, unlike UoB, Spinouts UK proved inaccurate in failing to identify a 
number of older USOs, implying that the database received inaccurate information from its sources 
which may have focused on newer USOs only. This again highlights the need, in order to obtain an 
accurate dataset, not to rely on one source and to check it thoroughly against published financial 
data. 
 
6.3.2 Results 
USO name Company 
registration 
number 
Principal activity Classification 
Exilica Limited 5467661 Develop nanoscale 
polymer particles 
Materials/polymers 
Inocardia Limited 8573417 Develop assays for biotech 
and pharma sectors 
Life science 
Health Behaviour Research 
Limited 
5467654 Consultancy Consultancy 
Microcab Industries Limited 4607731 Automotive manufacture Automotive 
Tortrix Limited 6564337 Software development IT 
Future Armour Limited 8257058 Manufacture workwear Manufacture 
MCC Engines Limited 2387591 Develop auto engine Automotive 
Membrasense Limited 4705038 Develop artificial 
membranes 
Life science 
Cavisys Limited 5359431 Develop water purification 
techniques 
Chemistry 
WEEE Suitcase Limited 6477693 Refuse disposal Chemistry 
Virtualis3D Limited 7523551 Entertainment IT 
Table 6.19 Basic classification of Coventry USOs 
 
USO name Company 
registration 
number 
Principal activity Classification 
Ava Technologies Limited 7451691 Video analytics IT 
Flux Stoke on Trent Limited 7742399 Tableware production Ceramics 
Intelligent Orthopaedics 
Limited 
1709877 Develop orthopaedic 
trauma devices 
Life science 
Picture Nation Limited 5308570 Maintain photo images bank Arts 
iCentrica Limited 8311757 Software development IT 
Blackstone Resourcing Limited 6147341 Recruitment agency Consultancy 
Table 6.20 Basic classification of Staffs USOs 
 
 
126 
 
 
 
Unlike UoB and Aston, Coventry shows a much wider spread of activities for its USOs, and Staffs’s 
are more focused on the arts and digital rather than science and technology, reflecting its recent 
creation as a university. Given the city of Coventry’s automotive heritage, it is maybe not surprising 
to see automotive-based USOs amongst the population. 
 
 
 
0
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Life science IT Automotive Consultancy Chemistry Materials Manufacture
Figure 6.7 Classification of Coventry USOs by principal 
activity
0
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Life science IT Arts Consultancy Ceramics
Figure 6.8 Classification of SU USOs by principal activity
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6.3.3 Survival measurements 
 
USO Date of 
incorporation 
Date of 
dissolution 
Time to failure 
(months) 
Third 
party 
funding? 
Exilica Limited 31/5/05    
Inocardia Limited 18/6/13    
Health Behaviour Research 
Limited 
31/5/05    
Microcab Industries Limited 4/12/02    
Tortrix Limited 14/4/08    
Future Armour Limited 17/10/12    
MCC Engines Limited 22/5/89 17/3/06 201 Y 
Membrasense Limited 20/3/03 13/7/07 51 N 
Cavisys Limited 9/2/05 7/7/09 52 N 
WEEE Suitcase Limited 18/1/08 30/10/12 57 N 
Virtualis3D Limited 9/2/11 29/9/13 31 N 
Table 6.21 Survival data for Coventry USOs 
 
 
 
USO Date of 
incorporation 
Date of 
dissolution 
Time to failure 
(months) 
Third 
party 
funding? 
Ava Technologies Limited 25/11/10    
Flux Stoke on Trent Limited 16/8/11    
Intelligent Orthopaedics 
Limited 
6/8/02    
Picture Nation Limited 9/12/04 20/5/14 114 N 
iCentrica Limited 29/11/12    
Blackstone Resourcing Limited 8/3/07 14/12/10 45 N 
Table 6.22 Survival data for Staffs USOs 
 
 
Of the 11 Coventry USOs identified, 5 had been formally dissolved, as had 2 of the 6 Staffs USOs. This 
represents an aggregate failure rate of 45% for Coventry, although one of the USOs survived for over 
15 years, which is a significant lifespan for a company, and 33% for Staffs. 
 
As with UoB, a number of ‘twilight USOs’ were identified during the data collection. While an 
element of judgment has to be made as to whether a company has ceased to trade, a further 2 
Coventry companies (18% of the sample) and 3 Staffs USOs (50% of the sample) were identified as 
twilight USOs. The populations’ total effective aggregate failure rate is thus 64% (7 out of 11 USOs) 
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and 83% (5 out of 6 USOs) respectively. Tables 6.23-24 below reveals the identity of the twilight 
USOs, as well as the rationale behind their designation as such. 
 
 
USO Rationale for ‘twilight’ designation 
Health Behaviour Research Limited No funding since incorporation – very little activity as a 
consulting company 
Tortrix Limited No funding since incorporation – very little activity as a 
consulting company 
Table 6.23: Rationale for Coventry ‘twilight’ designation 
 
 
USO Rationale for ‘twilight’ designation 
Ava Technologies Limited Company effectively dormant – very little activity 
Intelligent Orthopaedics Limited Last funding in 2010 but credit report shows adverse 
information (company subsequently dissolved) 
iCentrica Limited Company effectively dormant – very little activity 
Table 6.24: Rationale for Staffs ‘twilight’ designation 
 
 
As with UoB and Aston, comparison of Coventry and Staffs’s USO survival rates with existing 
academic studies of USO financial performance reveals a number of interesting findings. In general, 
it is clear that this study shows a lower rate of survival amongst USOs than most other studies when 
considering only formally dissolved USOs (55% for Coventry, 67% for Staffs), and a significantly lower 
rate than all other studies identified in the previous chapter if ‘twilight USOs’ are included (36% for 
Coventry, 16% for Staffs), which again implies that ‘twilight USOs’ are an important class of USO that 
may shed some light upon the apparent longevity of USOs compared to other start-up companies as 
noted in the academic literature to date e.g. de Cleyn (2011). The survival rates are low compared to 
prior studies (Oskarsson and Schläpfer, 2008) which is consistent with signalling as these Post-92 
universities are less research-intensive and hence their USOs are less attractive to funders. 
 
6.3.4 Third party investment results 
Tables 6.25-26 below shows which of the Coventry and Staffs USOs obtained external third party 
funding and the amount of such funding received by each company. The data on funding was 
obtained primarily from analysis of USO accounts, particularly from review of the share premium 
account movements, which represent the excess amount of the total investment by an investor over 
the nominal value of the share capital acquired. 
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USO Investment received Amount (£) 
Exilica Limited Y 549,008 
Inocardia Limited Y 229,948 
Health Behaviour Research Limited N  
Microcab Industries Limited Y 85,000 (CUE invested 150k) 
Tortrix Limited N  
Future Armour Limited N  
MCC Engines Limited Y 267,809 
Membrasense Limited N  
Cavisys Limited N  
WEEE Suitcase Limited N  
Virtualis3D Limited N  
Table 6.25: Third party investment attracted by Coventry USOs 
 
 
USO Investment received Amount (£) 
Intelligent Orthopaedics Limited Y 1,332,232 
Ava Technologies Limited N  
Flux Stoke on Trent Limited N  
Picture Nation Limited N  
iCentrica Limited N  
Blackstone Resourcing Limited N  
Table 6.26: Third party investment attracted by Staffs USOs 
 
4 out of 11 Coventry USOs received external third party investment which represents 36% of the 
total population, and 1 out of 6 for Staffs (16% of the total population). A total of £1,131,765 of 
investment was received from third parties which aimed to commercialise Coventry intellectual 
property and £1,332,232 for Staffs. Table 6.16 provides more detail on the identities of the 
investors. 
 
USO UCF 
(Mercia 
Fund) 
Other 
private 
equity 
Companies Individuals Detail 
MCC 
Engines 
Limited 
   Y  
Exilica 
Limited 
  Y  Watts Blake Bearne Limited 
(part of a large 
multinational group) 
Inocardia 
Limited 
 Y   Mercia Fund (new form) 
Microcab 
Industries 
Limited 
   Y  
Table 6.27 Identities of external investors in Coventry USOs 
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USO University 
Challenge 
Fund 
(Mercia 
Fund) 
Other 
private 
equity 
Detail 
Intelligent 
Orthopaedics 
Limited 
Y Y Other private equity was 
Catapult Venture Managers 
Table 6.28 Identities of external investors in SU USOs 
 
These findings are in line with predictions of signalling theory in that less funding is received than for 
UoB, Aston and Keele, which are more research-intensive and send stronger signals about the 
quality of their technologies. From agency theory’s perspective, the small number of USOs involved 
makes it difficult to compare the range of investors, who would be attracted once a university TTO 
becomes established in creating USOs that attracted funding. Given Coventry’s heritage for research 
and development in the automotive sector, this may suggest that the university and manufacturers 
have used other, more effective means than USO creation to effect technology transfer from 
academia. 
 
6.3.5 USOs achieving an exit 
None of the USOs from Coventry or Staffs achieved an exit that yielded any financial benefit for 
shareholders, which is in line with signalling theory which predicts that USOs from low research-
intensive universities that do not focus on science or technology would be relatively unattractive to 
potential purchasers or investors via an IPO. 
6.3.6 Summary 
The Post-92 universities in the region that have created USOs, namely Coventry and Staffs, have 
shown some properties worthy of further discussion. USO numbers are much lower than the Russell 
Group UoB which could reflect the disparity in quality of scientific research. USO survival rates are 
low although the fact that population sizes are low will hinder drawing definitive conclusions, and 
twilight USOs are again present.  The lower levels of funding obtained and lack of any exit compared 
to the rest of the region are in line with signalling theory given the Post-92 universities’ relative 
research weaknesses and hence lack of attractive technologies for investors to support. 
6.4 University of Warwick 
The University of Warwick (UoW) received its Royal Charter in 1965. Although a relatively modern 
university, it is a member of the Russell Group and consistently ranks very highly alongside the elite 
UK universities in various ranking studies. It currently hosts about 23,000 students and has a 
reputation for its commercial focus, as well as its research strengths in science and technology. It 
conducts research across the whole range of basic and applied sciences, including life sciences and 
biomedical sciences, as well as IT and engineering. 
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6.4.1 Constructing and refining the USO database 
Four independent, third party data sources were identified and used to create the USO database, in 
line with the methodology discussed in the previous chapter. Data was collected during April and 
May 2014: 
 
i)  UoW’s annual accounts obtained from the University website covering the years ended 31 
July 2000 to 31 July 2013 inclusive.  
ii)   Company searches were performed using the Experian Corpfin UK business database which 
provides data from all UK company accounts filed at Companies’ House, to identify 
companies in which UoW was a current shareholder. A range of search terms derived from 
the descriptor “University of Warwick” was used to capture USOs as variations were 
present in recording the identity of the University as a shareholder in the company’s 
Annual Returns. 
iii)  A search of the Spinouts UK database was performed to find all USOs identified as 
associated with UoW by this specific database.  
iv) Details of USOs were provided in the technology transfer section of the UoW website 
 
Each of these four sources gave rise to a different population of companies that were potentially 
USOs. These were cross-checked and amalgamated to form a single set, which is shown below in 
Table 6.33. The data was then refined through in-depth analysis of each potential USO’s historic 
financial data, primarily in the form of company accounts and annual returns, in order to reject 
companies that did not meet the chosen definition of a USO.  
 
 
Company Experian University 
accounts 
TTO 
website 
Spinouts UK USO? 
Allinea Software Limited Y Y Y Y Y 
Anvil Semiconductors 
Limited 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Apnee Sehat CIC Y Y Y  N 
A2SP Limited  Y  Y Y 
Base4 Innovation Limited Y Y Y Y Y 
BioAthene Limited  Y   Y 
Biotek Limited Y Y   Y 
Cambridge CMOS 
Sensors Limited 
Y Y Y  N 
Cellfacts Instruments 
Limited 
   Y N 
Circadian Solar Limited Y Y  Y Y 
Clinvivo Limited Y   Y Y 
Concurrent Thinking 
Limited 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Decision Technology 
Limited 
 Y Y Y N 
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Digeprint Limited  Y  Y Y 
Gadametric Limited  Y  Y Y 
goHDR Limited Y Y Y Y Y 
G-Tronix Limited  Y  Y Y 
Herfurth Laser 
Technology Limited 
 Y   Y 
Incentec Limited  Y  Y Y 
Insight Solutions Limited  Y   N 
Microbial Systems 
Limited 
   Y Y 
Molecular Solar Limited  Y  Y Y 
Multimetaphase Limited  Y   Y 
Neurosolutions Limited 
(parent Sevco 5023) 
 Y Y Y Y 
Novolytics Limited  Y Y Y Y 
Opscape Limited  Y  Y Y 
Optical Antenna 
Solutions Limited 
 Y  Y Y 
Prospero Therapeutics 
Limited 
 Y  Y Y 
Recycling Technologies 
Limited 
Y  Y Y Y 
Sarissa Biomedical 
Limited 
 Y Y Y Y 
Septegen Limited  Y  Y Y 
Shibden Technologies 
Limited 
 Y  Y Y 
Sonemat Limited Y Y Y Y Y 
Sorption Energy Limited Y Y Y Y Y 
Stella Biomedica Limited    Y N 
Streamline Computing 
Limited 
 Y  Y Y 
Tangent Reprofiling 
Limited 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Therapro Systems 
Limited 
 Y   Y 
Virabiotech Limited  Y  Y Y 
Virionhealth Limited Y   Y N 
Vizeye Limited Y Y Y Y Y 
Warwick Analytical 
Software Limited 
Y   Y Y 
Warwick Audio 
Technologies Limited 
 Y Y Y Y 
Warwick Control 
Technologies Limited 
 Y  Y N 
Warwick Dynamics 
Limited 
 Y   N 
Warwick Effect Polymers 
Limited 
 Y Y Y Y 
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Warwick Insect 
Technologies Limited 
Y Y  Y Y 
Warwick Laser Systems 
Limited 
Y Y  Y Y 
Warwick Moulding 
Technology Limited 
 Y  Y Y 
Warwick Plant Genomic 
Libraries Limited 
 Y  Y Y 
Warwick Sensor 
Technologies Limited 
 Y   Y 
Warwick Warp Limited Y Y Y Y Y 
Table 6.29 Potential UoW USOs identified from the data sources 
 
Companies identified as potential USOs by one of the sources, but which were rejected from the 
final data set upon further analysis, are shown in the following table (Table 6.29) together with the 
reasons for rejection. 
 
 
Company name Reason for rejection as USO 
Apnee Sehat CIC Community investment company – social enterprise 
Cambridge CMOS Sensors 
Limited 
USO from Cambridge University that licensed UoW 
technology 
Cellfacts Instrments Limited UoW holds no shares – company bought trade and assets of 
UoW USO Microbial Systems Limited 
Decision Technology Limited Staff startup – UoW held no shares 
Insight Solutions Limited UoW held no shares 
Stella Biomedica Limited Company never filed accounts 
Virionhealth Limited UoW held no shares 
Warwick Control Technologies 
Limited 
UoW held no shares 
Warwick Dynamics Limited Company dormant since incorporation 
Table 6.30 Rationale for rejection of companies as UoW USOs 
 
 
Refining the data gave a final total population for UoW of 43 USOs incorporated between 1988 and 
2012. 2002, 2004 and 2005 were the most popular years with 5 USOs being incorporated (Figure6.9). 
No USOs were formed at all between 1988 and 1999 highlighting the fact that the phenomenon of 
significant increases in the USO population is a relatively new one. In addition, as with the UoB, the 
number of USOs formed after 2010 dropped noticeably, which may imply that this route is losing 
attractiveness as a means of commercialising university technology. Unlike UoB, however, the 
numbers of USOs formed has not stopped, and numbers overall are much higher, suggesting that 
UoW may have had more enthusiasm for setting up USOs over the same period of time as a means 
of attempting to commercialise its technology. 
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Figure 6.9: UoW USOs, total population, number by year 
 
In arriving at the final population of USOs, as with the UoB, it became clear that none of the four 
sources would have been sufficient by themselves to give an adequate reflection of the true USO 
population. This again highlights the need, in order to obtain an accurate dataset, not to rely on one 
source and to check it thoroughly against published financial data. 
 
6.4.2 Results 
The table below (Table 6.31) shows basic classification data for the USOs obtained from the sources 
noted above, and summarized in Figure 6.10. 
 
 
USO name Company 
registration 
number 
Principal activity Classification 
Allinea Software Limited 6871298 Develop software tools IT 
Anvil Semiconductors Limited 7300225 Develop silicon carbide 
technology 
Materials 
A2SP Limited 5803762 Provision of chemical 
genomics services 
Life science 
Base4 Innovation Limited 6389614 Develop single molecule 
analysis technology 
Life science 
BioAthene Limited 4928253 Testing and analysis Life science 
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Biotek Limited 3796916 R&D Life science 
Circadian Solar Limited 4821641 Develop technology for 
solar semiconductors 
Materials 
Clinvivo Limited 8340814 Data processing IT 
Concurrent Thinking Limited 7053109 Support HPC cluster 
installations 
IT 
Digeprint Limited 4182191 Photographic activities Materials 
Gadametric Limited 5184524 Develop antiviral screening 
technology 
Life science 
goHDR Limited 6804791 Development of algorithms IT 
G-Tronix Limited 5166888 Develop imaging techniques Physics 
Herfurth Laser Technology 
Limited 
3817905 Develop laser technology in 
the plastics industry 
Physics 
Incentec Limited 5092146 Develop pre-eclampsia 
diagnostic 
Life science 
Microbial Systems Limited 2283069 Biochemical R&D Life science 
Molecular Solar Limited 6769874 Develop photovoltaic 
technology 
Materials 
Multimetaphase Limited 4460197 Human health R&D Life science 
Neurosolutions Limited (parent 
Sevco 5023) 
4199343 Electrophysiological services Life science 
Novolytics Limited 4355698 Develop solutions for 
bacterial resistance 
Life science 
Opscape Limited 5385726 Develop data visualization 
software 
IT 
Optical Antenna Solutions 
Limited 
5774230 Optical R&D Physics 
Prospero Therapeutics Limited 5677134 Life science R&D Life science 
Recycling Technologies Limited 7528795 Commercialise plastic 
recycling technique 
Chemistry 
Sarissa Biomedical Limited 4581254 Develop novel biosensors Life science 
Septegen Limited 4152221 Life science R&D Life science 
Shibden Technologies Limited 5604033 Life science R&D Life science 
Sonemat Limited 5521464 Develop ultrasonic testing 
equipment 
Physics 
Sorption Energy Limited 6791484 Develop adsorption air 
conditioning 
Physics 
Streamline Computing Limited 3913912 Create computer clustering 
solutions 
IT 
Tangent Reprofiling Limited 6704572 New uses for old drugs Life science 
Therapro Systems Limited 5019013 R&D healthcare monitoring 
devices 
Physics 
Virabiotech Limited 5891056 Develop protecting virus Life science 
Vizeye Limited 6530669 Develop ophthalmoscope Physics 
Warwick Analytical Software 
Limited 
7724630 Develop algorithms IT 
Warwick Audio Technologies 
Limited 
4451674 Develop flat loudspeakers Physics 
Warwick Effect Polymers 
Limited 
4182449 Develop novel polymers Chemistry 
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Warwick Insect Technologies 
Limited 
5356603 Develop insect technologies Chemistry 
Warwick Laser Systems Limited 4966131 Develop industrial laser 
systems 
Physics 
Warwick Moulding Technology 
Limited 
3990241 Develop anti-counterfeiting 
technology 
Physics 
Warwick Plant Genomic 
Libraries Limited 
5044892 Develop plant genomic 
library 
Life science 
Warwick Sensor Technologies 
Limited 
4617515 Ultrasonic sensor R&D Physics 
Warwick Warp Limited 5568627 Develop advanced 
fingerprint solutions 
Physics 
Table 6.31 Basic classification of UoW USOs 
 
 
As for UoB, USOs seeking to commercialise technologies within the fields of life sciences and IT 
(information technology) comprise a significant number of those originating from UoW, a feature 
commonly observed in studies at other universities e.g. Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008). UoW also 
has a large number of physics-based USOs which may reflect the relative strength of its physics 
departments in terms of generating commercialisable technology. 
 
6.4.3 Survival measurements 
Dates of incorporation and dissolution (where relevant) were obtained for each of the USOs from 
Experian Corpfin and are tabulated below. 
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Figure 6.10 Classification of UoW USOs by principal activity
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USO Date of 
incorporation 
Date of 
dissolution 
Time to failure 
(months) 
Third 
party 
funding? 
Allinea Software Limited 6/4/09   Y 
Anvil Semiconductors Limited 30/6/10   Y 
A2SP Limited 3/5/06 8/9/09 40 N 
Base4 Innovation Limited 3/10/07   Y 
BioAthene Limited 10/10/03 12/7/11 93 N 
Biotek Limited 28/6/99   N 
Circadian Solar Limited 4/7/03   Y 
Clinvivo Limited 24/12/12   N 
Concurrent Thinking Limited 22/10/09   Y 
Digeprint Limited 19/3/01 19/5/11 122 Y 
Gadametric Limited 20/7/04 13/8/08 48 N 
goHDR Limited 28/1/09   N 
G-Tronix Limited 30/6/04   N 
Herfurth Laser Technology 
Limited 
2/8/99 5/5/06 81 Y 
Incentec Limited 2/4/04 23/2/10 70 Y 
Microbial Systems Limited 2/8/88 24/1/07 221 Y 
Molecular Solar Limited 10/12/08   Y 
Multimetaphase Limited 13/6/02 23/10/06 52 Y 
Neurosolutions Limited (parent 
Sevco 5023) 
12/4/01   N 
Novolytics Limited 18/1/02   Y 
Opscape Limited 8/3/05 21/9/10 66 Y 
Optical Antenna Solutions 
Limited 
7/4/06   Y 
Prospero Therapeutics Limited 17/1/06 5/5/09 39 N 
Recycling Technologies Limited 14/2/11   Y 
Sarissa Biomedical Limited 4/11/02   Y 
Septegen Limited 1/2/01 13/2/07 72 N 
Shibden Technologies Limited 26/10/05 21/12/10 61 Y 
Sonemat Limited 28/7/05   N 
Sorption Energy Limited 14/1/09   Y 
Streamline Computing Limited 26/1/00 4/2/14 168 Y 
Tangent Reprofiling Limited 23/9/08   Y 
Therapro Systems Limited 19/1/04 9/10/07 44 N 
Virabiotech Limited 31/7/06 5/10/10 50 N 
Vizeye Limited 11/3/08   Y 
Warwick Analytical Software 
Limited 
1/8/11   Y 
Warwick Audio Technologies 
Limited 
20/5/02   Y 
Warwick Effect Polymers 
Limited 
19/3/01   Y 
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Warwick Insect Technologies 
Limited 
8/2/05   N 
Warwick Laser Systems Limited 17/11/03   N 
Warwick Moulding Technology 
Limited 
11/5/00 3/11/09 113 N 
Warwick Plant Genomic 
Libraries Limited 
16/2/04 27/4/10 74 N 
Warwick Sensor Technologies 
Limited 
13/12/02 26/5/09 77 N 
Warwick Warp Limited 20/9/05   Y 
Table 6.32 Survival data for UoW USOs 
 
As noted above, 43 USOs in total were identified with dates of incorporation ranging from 1983 to 
2010. Of the 43 USOs identified, 19 had been formally dissolved. This represents an aggregate failure 
rate of 44%, although three of the USOs survived for 10 years or more, which is a significant lifespan 
for a company. 
 
As with UoB, a number of ‘twilight USOs’ were identified during the data collection. While an 
element of judgment has to be made as to whether a company has ceased to trade, a further 9 
companies (21% of the sample) were identified as twilight USOs. The population’s total effective 
aggregate failure rate is thus 65% (28 out of 43 USOs). Table 6.33 below reveals the identity of the 
twilight USOs, as well as the rationale behind their designation as such. 
 
USO Rationale for ‘twilight’ designation 
Biotek Limited Little activity 
goHDR Limited No external investors and little activity 
Optical Antenna Solutions Limited Little activity 
Sarissa Biomedical Limited Last investment 2010 little activity now 
Sonemat Limited No external investors and little activity 
Sorption Energy Limited Last investment 2010 little activity now 
Vizeye Limited Last investment 2010 little activity now 
Warwick Insect Technologies 
Limited 
No external investors and little activity 
Warwick Laser Systems Limited No external investors and little activity – may be a 
consulting company 
Table 6.33: Rationale for ‘twilight’ designation 
 
As with UoB, comparison of UoW USOs’ survival rates with existing academic studies of USO 
financial performance reveals a number of interesting findings. In general, it is clear that this study 
shows a lower rate of survival amongst USOs than most other studies e.g Oskarsson and Schläpfer 
(2008) when considering only formally dissolved USOs (46%), and a significantly lower rate than all 
other studies identified in the previous chapter if ‘twilight USOs’ are included (35%), which again 
implies that ‘twilight USOs’ are an important class of USO that may shed some light upon the 
apparent longevity of USOs compared to other start-up companies as noted in the academic 
literature to date. This finding is not in line with signalling theory as UoW is a strong, research-
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focussed university with an international reputation, and should be attractive to potential investors 
leading to longer survival times of its USOs. This observation will need to be considered in greater 
depth in Chapter 7. 
6.4.4 Third party investment results 
Table 6.34 below shows which of the UoW USOs obtained external third party funding and the 
amount of such funding received by each company. The data on funding was obtained primarily 
from analysis of USO accounts, particularly from review of the share premium account movements, 
which represent the excess amount of the total investment by an investor over the nominal value of 
the share capital acquired. 
 
 
USO Amount (£) 
Allinea Software Limited 450,021 
Anvil Semiconductors Limited 1,589,746 
Base4 Innovation Limited 5,790,000 
Circadian Solar Limited  14,600,000 
Concurrent Thinking Limited 2,861,000 
Digeprint Limited 4,186,147 
Herfurth Laser Technology Limited 187,500 
Incentec Limited 448,683 
Microbial Systems Limited 4,527,000 
Molecular Solar Limited 154,996 
Multimetaphase Limited 161,250 
Novolytics Limited 2,227,773 
Opscape Limited 79,734 
Optical Antenna Solutions Limited 50,000 
Recycling Technologies Limited 141,825 
Sarissa Biomedical Limited 425,657 
Shibden Technologies Limited 50,000 
Sorption Energy Limited 13,436 
Streamline Computing Limited 3,295,833 
Tangent Reprofiling Limited 700,455 
Vizeye Limited 50,000 
Warwick Analytical Software Limited 162,089 
Warwick Audio Technologies Limited 3,367,296 
Warwick Effect Polymers Limited 4,739,741 
Warwick Warp Limited 1,104,859 
Table 6.34: Third party investment attracted by UoW USOs 
 
 
25 out of 43 USOs received external third party investment which represents 58% of the total 
population. A total of £51,365,041 of investment was received from third parties which aimed to 
commercialise Aston IP. Table 6.35 provides more detail on the identities of the investors.
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Table 6.35 Identities of external investors in UoW USOs 
USO University 
Challenge Fund 
(Mercia Fund) 
Other private 
equity 
Companies Individuals Other Detail 
Allinea Software 
Limited 
Y Y    Oxford Gateway Funds 2-4, Oxford Technology 3 
VCT plc, Forward Innovation Fund, Advantage 
Growth Fund 
Anvil Semiconductors 
Limited 
Y Y  Y  Ntensive angel group, Cambridge Capital Group, 
individual angels, Midven, Minerva Business 
Angels, Early Advantage Limited Partnership 
Base4 Innovation 
Limited 
 Y   Y Meridian Growth Capital LLP, Oxford Technology 
Enterprise Capital Fund, Royal Society, Torteval 
Instruments Limited 
Circadian Solar 
Limited  
Y Y    Seven Spires Investments (UK) Limited 
Concurrent Thinking 
Limited 
Y Y  Y  Rockridge Investments SA, The Era Foundation 
Limited, Advantage Growth Fund, Early Advantage 
LP, Oxford Gateway Fund 4, Oxford Technology 3 
VCT plc, Forward Innovation Fund, Carbon Trust 
Investments Limited 
Digeprint Limited Y Y  Y  EMRVCF No 1 Partnership Limited, IGIE Limited, 
JOBO AG, E-Synergy Early Growth Fund Limited, 
Advantage Enterprise and Innovation Fund 
Herfurth Laser 
Technology Limited 
Y  Y   Herfurth Holdings Limited 
Incentec Limited Y Y Y  Y Oxford Technology 4 VCT plc, Advantage Growth 
Fund, NESTA, Exomedica Limited 
Microbial Systems 
Limited 
 Y  Y  Advantage Early Growth Fund 
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Molecular Solar 
Limited 
Y   Y   
Multimetaphase 
Limited 
Y      
Novolytics Limited    Y   
Opscape Limited Y      
Optical Antenna 
Solutions Limited 
   Y   
Recycling 
Technologies Limited 
 Y Y Y  Advantage Early Growth Fund, Environmental 
Integrated Solutions Limited 
Sarissa Biomedical 
Limited 
Y Y   Y The Wellcome Trust, Advantage Growth Fund 
Shibden Technologies 
Limited 
 Y    Rising Stars Growth Fund 
Sorption Energy 
Limited 
 Y  Y  H2O Venture Partners 
Streamline 
Computing Limited 
Y Y    Oxford Technology 3 VCT plc, Midven, Advantage 
Growth Fund, Forward Innovation Fund 
Tangent Reprofiling 
Limited 
  Y   PepTcell Limited 
Vizeye Limited    Y   
Warwick Analytical 
Software Limited 
   Y   
Warwick Audio 
Technologies Limited 
Y Y  Y Y IBL Associates Limited, Finance Wales, Midven, 
Minerva Capital, Porton Capital, Synergis 
Technologies Limited, Exceed Partnership LP 
Warwick Effect 
Polymers Limited 
Y Y  Y  Catapult Venture Managers, Seven Spires 
Investment, Oxford Technology VCT 3-4, Midven, 
Advantage Growth Fund 
Warwick Warp 
Limited 
 Y    Porton Capital Technology Fund 
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Given the number of investors and funding rounds, it was not always possible to identify the amount 
invested by each investor as such data was not publicly available. 
These findings are exactly in line with both signalling and agency theory. UoW has attracted 
significantly more funding for its USOs in the UK than any other university in the region, which may 
be ascribed to the strength of its technology commercialised by its USOs and the strong signals given 
to investors. The wide range of investors is in line with agency theory which predicts trust will build 
between a TTO and investors once USOs that attract funding have been generated. The data 
therefore confirms the significance of the research strength of the parent university in obtaining 
funding for its USOs. 
 
6.4.5 USOs achieving an exit 
Of the 43 UoW USOs, 2 led to a successful exit for shareholders via a trade sale of the entire share 
capital to a third party. None of the USOs offered any shares to the public via a stock market listing.  
A detailed analysis of the two USOs was undertaken through review of their financial accounts and 
other publicly available information to provide more details about the nature of the trade sale and 
whether the terms of the sale were beneficial to UoW. 
 
6.4.5.1 Neurosolutions Limited 
This USO was founded in 2001 with the aim of commercialising UoW technology as a specialist 
service business exploiting a niche biopharmaceutical market by providing clients with highly 
specialized contract electrophysiological research. Electrophysiology is a specialised technique used 
to record electrical activity in biological systems, and is essential to neurological drug discovery and 
development. UoW held an equity stake of 15,000 shares with a number of university academics 
holding another 72,100 shares between them. No external funding was obtained for the company 
which quickly became cash-generative and self-funding. 
In August 2005 the entire share capital of the company was sold to NeuroDiscovery Limited, an 
Australian company formed in April 2005 for the purpose of the acquisition, and which subsequently 
listed on the ASX (Australian) Stock Exchange. The total consideration was 3,391,667 Australian 
dollars which consisted of the fair value of shares in the acquiring company. UoW received its share 
of the consideration i.e. £248,553 (using the prevailing exchange rate of 2.35 Australian dollars to 
Sterling).  
At the last published accounts prior to the date of sale the USO had net assets of £232,584 and a 
positive profit and loss reserve of £231,284, an indication that the company was profitable and cash-
generative at this stage. 
It is not clear how much value UoW was able to realise from its shareholding. NeuroDiscovery 
Limited is still trading although its name has changed to Oncosil. UoW’s accounts appear to indicate 
that its shareholding of 3,469,187 shares was disposed of during the year ended 31 July 2010. During 
this year, the stock price of NeuroDiscovery was consistently around the 0.05 Australian dollar mark, 
implying a value of about £173,000. 
 
143 
In an unusual turn of events, the management team of Neurosolutions subsequently reacquired the 
entire share capital of the company from NeuroDiscovery in 2010, supported by UoW. The total 
consideration paid was £515,300 (significantly less than the original purchase price). It is likely that 
UoW’s shareholding in NeuroDiscovery was used to fund its acquisition of shares. Overall, therefore, 
it seems unlikely that UoW has made any financial return from this USO. 
 
6.4.5.2 Warwick Effect Polymers Limited 
This USO was founded in 2001 to commercialise technology around the development of novel 
polymers developed at UoW. Funding of £4,739,741 was received from a numbr of investors 
including the Mercia Fund, individuals and private equity investors such as Seven Spires Investments, 
Catapult Venture Managers and Oxford Technology VCT 3. UoW transferred IP to the company in 
exchange for 4,663 £1 shares. Other investors held 212,357 £1 shares. 
In January 2012 the entire share capital of the company was acquired by Polytherics Limited for 
£1,050,000, apparently primarily via a share for share exchange. On a pro-rata basis, UoW would 
have received value of £22,561 in return for its stake. Review of the subsequent annual returns of 
Polytherics do not indicate any shares owned by UoW, so it would seem that UoW received cash for 
its small stake. Polytherics subsequently listed on the UK’s AIM stock exchange via its holding 
company Abzena plc in 2014, so UoW would not appear to have benefited financially from this 
subsequent activity. 
In the last published set of accounts prior to the date of acquisition, the USO had positive net assets 
of £90,711 and a profit and loss deficit of £4,866,050, showing that the company was still in the 
development phase with respect of its technology. At this point, the company had effectively run out 
of money to further develop the technology, so Polytherics was paying what it deemed to be the 
market value of the technology. 
Although the technology developed at UoW was clearly of value, and attracted external investment 
over a number of years, the UoW did not benefit financially to any significant degree as it was 
further developed. 
These findings are not in line with signalling theory, especially as initial funding was so successfully 
obtained by UoW for its USOs. This would have been expected to carry on for further rounds. At this 
stage it is difficult to explain this observation, but it may be that the underlying technology was not 
actually of high enough quality to commercialise, despite the investment success. This observation 
clearly demonstrates that information asymmetry can persist for a TTO and investors to a very late 
stage in the process of a USO’s lifecycle, and that trust as discussed under agency theory can be 
misplaced, with investors unable to provide suitable due diligence on USOs in their early life and 
relying on signals from other investors to aid their decisions to invest. 
 
6.5 Summary 
UoW shows a number of factors amongst its USOs which will bear further discussion in Chapter 7. 
The USOs have been by far the most successful in terms of external investment achieved in the 
region, which is in line with the framework of signaling and agency theories based on the university’s 
strong research capability, as demonstrated by its membership of the Russell Group. However, the 
increased level of funding does not appear to translate into long survival times or financially 
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successful exits, which seems to be inconsistent with the predictions of the frameworks considered 
given the research expertise of the institution. Clearly, financial performance is a complex area to 
assess, but the accurate data obtained from this work across a range of universities will allow the 
predictions of signaling and agency theory frameworks to be evaluated as to their accuracy with 
some confidence. 
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Chapter 7: Analysis of Results within the West Midlands region 
 
Introduction 
The previous two chapters presented and summarised the secondary data collected during this piece 
of research to be used in the analysis of the financial performance of USOs derived from universities 
based in the West Midlands. In this chapter the data is analysed in more depth to provide 
comparisons between USOs from the universities examined in the current study, while Chapter 8 
compares them with other USO financial performance studies in the academic literature. Chapter 6 
identified three different categories of university within the region, namely Russell Group 
universities which are heavily research-focussed, Plate Glass universities which often obtained 
university status during the 1960s, and Post-92 universities which obtained similar status after 1992, 
and which are often less research-intensive. These categories will be of use in the analysis of the 
regional data. 
The three datasets collected for each university cover basic descriptive USO data, survival data and 
third party investment data. In addition, data is collected on the success of USOs as measured by the 
sponsoring university’s financial returns upon exiting its investment. The theoretical frameworks 
identified in Chapter 3 as having some relevance for this work, namely signalling theory and agency 
theory, are used to evaluate consistency of the data with their predictions where possible in order to 
attempt to provide theoretical justification for the results and conclusions drawn from the analyses, 
serving to advance the academic literature in this area.  
On first principles, signalling theory would predict that universities of greater research strength 
would generate more technologies that would have potential to be commercialised. This would then 
lead to more USOs being created, and more external funding being attracted given the strong signal 
of the parent university’s reputation and research strength (Meoli et al., 2013; Munari and Toschi, 
2010; Soetanto and Geenhuizen, 2015). As a result, the USOs from such universities should survive 
for longer (Conceicao and Faria, 2014) and see more successful exits. However, this analysis may be 
simplistic, and as already discussed, the links between research strength of a university and the 
number of USOs generated remains disputed. Further, the link between the attraction of external 
finance and the subsequent financial performance of a USO may also not be straightforward. 
Agency theory might be expected to predict that USOs that obtain external funding perform better 
from a financial perspective as the goals of investors and management become aligned. This would 
complement the predictions of signalling theory, and may mean that it would be difficult to separate 
the two. Again, however, the behaviour of different parties is a complex model and goal 
incongruence may still occur after funding. 
Both theoretical frameworks may also be impacted by the fundamental concepts of information 
asymmetry and uncertainty, which are important in the world of USOs, and which may serve to 
distort the above analysis. 
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7.1 Classification data 
The basic classification data for USOs previously collected includes the number and date of 
formation of USOs generated by each university in the region, and at a company level the principal 
activity of each USO. 
7.1.1 Number of USOs 
The number of USOs generated from each university for all years from 1983 up to and including 
2013 was obtained from up to four key sources: the commercial databases of Experian and Spinouts 
UK, the university’s annual accounts and the university’s TTO website. The results are presented in 
Figure 7.1 below: 
 
 
Analysis 
The disparity in USO generation amongst these universities invites comment. Six universities in the 
region (50% of the population) did not create any USOs at all, which is in line with Pressman’s (2002) 
work that found 36% of US academic institutions did not generate any USOs, and Benneworth and 
Charles (2005) who identified a clearly uneven distribution amongst UK universities. It is noticeable 
that these universities are all Post-92 universities and the majority do not teach or perform 
significant levels of research in the academic areas which have historically given rise to the majority 
of USOs in the UK, namely science, engineering and information technology, so this result may be as 
expected. However, given that the current study does not attempt to limit the definition of a USO in 
any way based on the university department associated with its origins, it is clear that these 
institutions have not chosen USO creation as a means of attempting to commercialise any of their 
research. Of course, it is entirely possible that these universities have developed their 
entrepreneurship profile in different ways, and whether the USO route is necessarily the best from a 
financial perspective for the associated university is an important topic under discussion in this work. 
From a policy perspective, therefore, it is clear that at least in the West Midlands region the subject 
of USOs is not of significant importance to anything like the majority of universities. 
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7.1 Number of USOs generated by each university
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Of those universities in the region that undertook programmes to create USOs, Birmingham and 
Warwick created significantly more companies than the others. At first viewing this result may not 
be surprising, as these two universities are the region’s only members of the Russell Group, a 
grouping of the most research-intensive universities in the UK, and both have a long established 
research tradition in science, technology and engineering. Both universities have clearly embraced 
the proposal that USO generation is a significant part of helping them to achieve their ‘third 
mission’. This finding is consistent with signalling theory (Connelly et al., 2011), which would predict 
that significant amounts of high quality underlying technology will attract TTOs and inspire them to 
set up USOs to undertake commercialisation, and is consistent with the findings of some prior 
studies e.g. DiGregorio and Shane (2003). 
However, the relationship between the nature, quality and heritage of research performed at a 
university and the quantity of USOs that it generates is not necessarily a simple one and a range of 
factors may need to be considered to determine a convincing explanation of trends (Rasmussen and 
Borch, 2010; RSC, 2005). Some of the other Plate Glass and Post-92 USO-generating universities in 
the region have traditions of being founded upon research and training in scientific-related 
disciplines, as noted in the brief histories provided in the previous chapter. Aston in particular is an 
interesting case: it was founded as a College of Advanced Technology and still performs very 
significant amounts of research into science and technology, and as discussed below actually has a 
very early history of commercialising its technology. However, the number of USOs it actually 
generated is quite low, significantly fewer than the Russell Group members, and even than some of 
the much more modern universities with less heritage in these fields. Clearly, the decision to 
undertake a programme of USO creation is not necessarily a straightforward one, and the case of 
Aston may illustrate that certain universities were unconvinced that it was the best way to proceed 
in terms of achieving their commercialisation aims. This finding of a significant degree of complexity 
in the relationship between a university’s research capabilities and the number of USOs that it 
generates is exactly in line with previous work e.g. Tornatzky et al. (1997), as laid out in Chapter 2. 
This topic is discussed in more detail below at 7.1.4. 
 
7.1.2 USO formation by year 
Figure 7.2 below combines data collected in the previous chapters for each individual university 
showing the year of incorporation of their identified USOs, allowing comparisons to be drawn 
between universities across the region, as well as the response of the region as a whole to any 
external influences. 
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Analysis 
Figure 7.2 reveals a number of particularly interesting features that show the potential impact on 
USO formation of a number of external factors, which may also be relevant to other regions of the 
UK. Firstly, it is clear from the above diagram that commercialisation of technology by universities 
was being undertaken well before the significant growth in USO numbers in the region from around 
the year 2000. Although numbers of USOs formed during this early period were very small, this is 
likely to have been a consequence of universities, in the absence of readily available external funding 
during the period up to around the year 2000, carefully selecting those technologies which were 
considered likely to provide a financial return. This is an aspect of the USO debate that is consistently 
overlooked or ignored during the relatively recent popularisation of USOs by national governments 
and other interested parties. Other academic studies have noted similar early developments of USOs 
in the UK e.g. Lawton Smith and Ho (2006), Segal Quince and Partners (1985) when considering the 
Universities of Oxford and Cambridge respectively, and Lawton Smith et al. (2014) who identified a 
USO formed from the University of London in 1965. 
Secondly, it is evident that the rate of formation of USOs dramatically increased from about the year 
2000. This can be reasonably be attributed to the introduction of University Challenge Funds (UCFs) 
by the UK Government, within the wider framework of encouraging USO formation specifically in the 
context of increasing university technology commercialisation. The background to UCFs has been 
covered in an earlier chapter, but these were funds backed by government money specifically set up 
to provide funding, via equity investment or loans, to USOs. This policy was an attempt to overcome 
a perceived problem, common to all start-up companies trying to commercialise new technology, of 
being able to find external funding to provide support during the development of the technology to 
a stage where the USO can start to receive income. This so-called ‘funding gap’ largely arises due to 
the unwillingness of external investors such as venture capital to invest relatively small amounts of 
money into companies where the technology is often speculative and unproven (Manigart and 
Wright, 2013). From a UK government perspective, it can be seen that the narrow objective of UCFs 
to create more USOs was therefore achieved. 
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The peak year of USO formation in the period under review is 2002, which corresponds to a 
relatively short time period after 2000 when universities probably became sure that UCFs were 
ready and able to provide funding, and gained familiarity with the funding process. Oskarsson and 
Schläpfer (2008) note that during the period between 2002 and 2007, 80% of new USOs each year 
received some form of equity participation from the UCFs, which clearly highlights that this was a 
critical factor in increasing the number of USOs generated during this period. 
It is then interesting to note that the rate of USO formation fell relatively sharply in 2003 before 
climbing slowly to another peak in 2005. This trend has already been noted and explained by various 
commentators. The Finance Act of 2003 introduced by the UK Government included a provision 
known as Schedule 22 (Minshall and Wicksteed, 2005). Its purpose was to prevent the increasing 
practice, largely instituted by private equity and other financial institutions, of paying their 
employees in shares and thus reducing their personal tax liability when compared to being paid 
extra salary or a bonus. Schedule 22 required a valuation to be placed upon such shares and income 
tax was then often charged upon this value, negating the above tax planning. However, probably 
unwittingly, this provision would also have applied to academics who received shares in USOs that 
were incorporated to commercialise their technology, providing them with a financial incentive 
should the venture ultimately succeed. In the financial climate at the time, valuations which later 
proved to be excessive were placed upon all kinds of start-up companies, including USOs, which lead 
to the apparent prospect of academics of moderate means being subject to a significant income tax 
charge without having received any cash with which they could pay the tax. As a result, a number of 
potential USOs were apparently delayed in their creation due to anticipated adverse tax 
consequences as a result of a political policy decision. 
It is not clear whether any academic ever actually paid any such income tax, and it can also be seen 
that USO formation continued, although at a reduced rate. The UK Government did eventually 
legislate to provide an exemption to academics from the provisions of Schedule 22, which came into 
effect in 2005. In addition, it should be noted that the valuations of USOs being claimed in this 
period proved, almost without exception, to have been significantly higher than ever actually 
realised, and indeed most USOs provided no financial benefit to any of their shareholders at all, as 
will be seen later in this study. Once the new 2005 legislation was promised and then enacted, the 
number of USOs climbed briefly, presumably as delayed formations were pushed through. 
In the years following 2005, the rate of USO formation fell back, probably as the UCFs’ funding was 
exhausted and not replenished, and universities and external investors started to realise that most 
USOs were not providing any prompt financial return upon their investment. The numbers of USOs 
formed in the West Midlands region from 2006 to 2011 are relatively constant. This would be in line 
with both signalling and agency theory in that the lack of successful USOs to date increased the 
uncertainty for potential funders, who reduced their appetite for funding such companies, with 
universities responding by changing their USO creation policy by focussing on smaller numbers, 
although there is no such official policy change that has been recorded in the literature. After 2012 
the rate of formation again fell sharply, and universities appear to have gone back to pre-2000 
patterns of USO generation i.e. as and when a technology genuinely capable of commercialisation 
was developed. There may also be an underlying impact of the credit crunch of 2009 and the 
associated recession, although the impact is not immediate, and this may well partly be due to the 
time taken to develop a technology ready for a USO and the time period necessary to form a USO. 
Finally, it is also of interest to comment briefly upon the different USO formation policies of the 
universities as evidenced by Figure 7.2. Aston has a long pedigree of creating a small number of 
USOs, presumably as and when a potentially readily commercialisable technology was developed, 
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and this behaviour was not apparently greatly changed by the new availability of UCF money. By 
contrast, Warwick created very few USOs before UCF funding became available, but then created 
large numbers of USOs, which required significant investment in its technology transfer operations. 
Birmingham has an approach between these two extremes, with some pedigree of USO creation 
through its own resources, but additionally taking moderate advantage of UCF money to increase its 
USO formation rates. Coventry, Keele and Staffs had little pedigree of USO formation before 2000, 
but then created a body of USOs on a much smaller scale than Birmingham, rarely exceeding a 
formation rate of over one per year. These differing behaviours of university administrators with 
regard to USO formation rates highlight a significantly overlooked situation that the acceptance of 
USOs as the premier method of technology commercialisation was by no means uniform, even 
within a geographical region, and it would be interesting to examine the decision-making processes 
at each of the universities in question throughout this period should such data exist and be readily 
available. Agency theory would recognise that different TTOs may have very different goals for their 
USO programmes, which can potentially lead to conflict with external parties, so this finding is in line 
with that forecast. 
 
7.1.3 USO Principal Activity 
Figure 7.3 below displays the principal activities of USOs formed in the region, and allows 
comparisons to be made between universities as to the nature of USO they preferred to form. 
 
Analysis 
As expected, principal activities of USOs created are dominated by the areas of science 
(encompassing engineering across various sectors) and information technology, since these are the 
areas of research which lend themselves to producing a range of new technologies, some of which 
may be commercialisable. In addition, these are areas where universities could potentially have a 
competitive advantage over the private sector given their ability to investigate areas that do not 
require an immediate profit motive, as well as their resources of availability of highly skilled 
researchers and the range of existing knowledge that they hold. In particular, life sciences and 
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information technology are the two most significant areas for USO formation. Life science is an area 
in which some universities can excel, particularly given their ability to utilise existing laboratory 
facilities and their links with connected medical facilities. This finding is in line with other studies e.g. 
BVCA (2005) which found in its review of UK USOs that 46% of its sample focussed on life sciences 
and 39% on information technology, and Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008) who found that 54% of 130 
ETH Zurich USOs fell into these two categories, which they consider to be a mainstream area of focus 
for venture capitalist investment, a finding replicated by Visintin and Pisano (2014) who found 53% 
of their sample of Italian USOs were similarly categorised. In their study of USOs from Oxford 
University, Lawton Smith and Ho (2006) found that life sciences accounted for 39% and IT for 29% of 
their sample, while Lawton Smith et al. (2014) found at the University of London 40% in 
pharmaceuticals/biotechnology and 17% in software and computer sciences. 
Minshall and Wicksteed (2005) found in their study of USOs from UK universities that while the 
combination of these two sectors accounted for most of the USOs for each university, the 
proportions varied. Their first group of universities with the largest research budgets comprising 
Oxford, Cambridge, Imperial College and University College London had 47% of its USOs in life 
sciences and 40% in physical sciences (which incorporates IT). Their second group of universities 
designated as large universities in major cities and including Edinburgh, Southampton and Newcastle 
had 31% in life sciences and 58% in physical sciences, while the third group comprising universities 
with smaller research budgets (Cranfield, Loughborough and Strathclyde) had 16% in life sciences 
and 80% in physical sciences. It may be that life sciences are therefore the preserve of institutions 
with large research budgets given the heavy facilities expenditure necessary to develop technology 
in this sector. 
These findings are in line with both signalling theory, in that universities with proven experience in 
research in certain fields is a strong signal that will attract funders for USOs based upon these 
technologies, and agency theory which forecasts that success in such fields builds trust with 
potential and existing funders. The perceived existing expertise will also help potential funders to 
overcome uncertainty and information asymmetry during the due diligence process. 
 
7.1.4 Number of USOs by research strength of university 
Figure 7.4 below shows the number of USOs created by each university in the West Midlands 
compared to its research strength. The research strength of a university is taken from data collected 
under the UK’s 2014 Research Excellence Framework (REF) and analysed by Research Fortnight 
magazine to create a ranking system for UK universities (Research Fortnight, 2014). The REF received 
data from 154 UK universities and assessed their research for its quality. Research Fortnight then 
weighted the data to reflect the number of research staff to produce a ranking table for UK 
universities. 
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Analysis 
The results above show a very broad trend in that universities with a high research strength i.e. 
Warwick and Birmingham, form significantly more USOs than universities with a low research 
strength. This finding is not in line with earlier studies in the US e.g. Tornatzky et al. (1997), Shane 
(2004) which found no correlation between the two. However, the results of this study should be 
treated with care as the sample size is very small. On first principles, the theoretical frameworks 
considered in this work would tend to support a positive correlation; as already noted, signalling 
theory might predict that stronger research universities will produce more technology capable of 
commercialising in the knowledge that funders would find them attractive. However, the university 
may find other ways to exploit their technology such as licensing, so this analysis may be simplistic. A 
difference between the current study and earlier US studies is likely to be that the UCFs in the UK 
were deliberately targeted at USO creation, thus distorting the ratio of USOs to other forms of 
exploitation, in line with the observations of Lambert (2003). The current study shows that USO 
formation rates in the UK fell significantly after UCF money was exhausted, which again supports this 
hypothesis. 
 
7.2 USO Survival 
The following section considers the first of the two USO performance metrics used in this study; that 
of USO survival. 
As already noted, the current study will only consider financial resources of a USO given its narrow 
parameters, so will not provide a full picture which would consider a range of potential resources 
(Coad et al., 2016). The two theoretical frameworks considered in this work have less to add directly 
towards the interpretation of survival data. Agency theory will be more concerned with a USO’s 
ability to attract finance within the framework of potential conflicts between TTO and potential 
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investors, while signalling theory also focusses on a USO’s attraction of finance due to underlying 
resources. Indirectly, both models may support attempts to interpret a situation where a USO was 
able to attract finance and the impact upon its survival. 
In addition, in line with prior studies e.g. Curran et al. (2016), care must be taken in drawing 
conclusions over survival rates, as a number of key factors may be at stake, some of which are 
highlighted in Table 7.1 below. These factors will not be studied in detail in this current work due to 
the limitations of the data collected, but would be interesting to consider in further work on this 
topic. 
Factor Potential impact 
USO industry sector USOs from certain sectors e.g. life science may last longer as the nature 
of the technology they seek to commercialise means a longer lifecycle 
University resource USOs from strong, research resource-rich universities may last longer 
due to higher quality technologies which investors are prepared to 
support for longer 
Ownership structure USOs with external funders may survive less long due to investors’ 
willingness to cease support quickly once a technology appears unlikely 
to reach commercialisation 
Academic commitment USOs from universities that allow founder academics to work a 
significant part of their time in the USO may survive longer as the 
academic can fully focus on developing the technology 
Academic movement USOs where founders move away from the parent university may 
survive less long as technology development will slow 
TTO attitude to survival USOs from universities where the TTO has private equity mindset may 
survive less long for similar reasons as when external investors are 
involved (see above) 
Table 7.1 Factors which may affect survival rates (author-derived) 
 
7.2.1 Aggregate Failure Rate 
Figure 7.5 below shows the aggregate failure rate for each university of its USOs. The aggregate 
failure rate simply divides the total number of USOs that failed for each university (in this case 
defined as companies that had been formally removed from the company register held at 
Companies’ House) by the total number of USOs founded. It therefore does not make any allowance 
for time effects i.e. newer USOs are less likely to be have had time to fail. The USOs in the sample 
may therefore be at very different stages of development and be in possession of very different 
quantities of resources (Vohora et al., 2004) e.g. there is no control for USOs that have only recently 
been founded and may not have had time to attract the notice of potential external investors. 
However, it does have value as a performance metric in that previous studies in the literature have 
highlighted the relatively long survival times of USOs without attempting to control in this manner 
e.g. Shane (2004). 
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Analysis 
The data shows that the aggregate failure rate is relatively consistent over the universities, although 
as noted above, no allowance is made for the age of the USOs in question. This manifests itself in the 
performance of Aston, which appears to show a high failure rate, yet as noted in the previous 
chapter this is not particularly reflective of the true situation as two of the USOs were both over 
twenty years old before being removed, which is a significant lifespan for a company. On the other 
side of the coin, the USOs of Keele and Staffs are relatively young in age and hence have had less 
time to fail, which is reflected in the low failure rates for these two universities. 
However, given that USO formation was extremely low in the region before 2000, meaningful 
comparisons can still be made between universities and the uniformity of the failure rates is notable; 
this may imply that the universities’ technology transfer operations have taken a consistent view in 
allowing USOs to fail and be removed across a wide range of timescales and population sizes. Given 
that the financial resources of all the USOs are likely to vary considerably by university, this would go 
against previous findings that more financial resources increases the likelihood of survival (Shane 
and Stuart, 2002). This will be explored later in the chapter. 
 
7.2.2 Timed failure rate 
In an attempt to augment the data from the aggregate failure analysis to provide a more complete 
picture, other measurements of survival and failure have been undertaken. The main alternative 
method of measuring failure rates is to use the timed failure rate method which takes account of the 
time a USO has been in existence and therefore aids comparability between studies. Figure 7.6 
below compares this metric across the universities. 
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Analysis 
The data obtained from using this performance metric is remarkably interesting in that the 
universities (with the exception of Aston) show a very tight band for the average time it takes a USO 
to fail from 78 months to 87 months (although these quantities mask significant variations on a 
company-level basis at each university). This finding would not necessarily be anticipated given the 
wide range of factors involved such as the attitude of the university TTO towards striking a company 
off, the amount of any external funding for the USO and the associated relationships with the 
funder, the fundamental nature of the technology being developed and the position in the economic 
cycle of the formation date (Simon-Moya et al., 2016), which are very different across each 
company. 
As noted above, Aston’s figures clearly demonstrate the effect of two extremely well-established 
USOs amongst those that have been removed, which confirms the need to look beyond the simple 
aggregate failure rate in drawing any firm conclusions in a study of financial performance across a 
number of companies, as a number of studies in the academic literature have failed to do e.g. Shane 
(2004). 
Although comparisons of failure and survival rates with other studies in the literature will be carried 
out below, a brief comment on the global findings is instructive at this stage. The mean lifetime of a 
USO in the West Midlands as displayed above is significantly longer than would be expected, and 
indeed is observed, than a start-up company in the private sector. Cressy (2006) notes that a number 
of studies of start-ups show that of the order of 50% fail within the first two and a half years of 
trading. This finding is consistent with a number of other academic studies e.g. Zhang (2009). A 
number of reasons have been derived for this observation, some of which have been covered in a 
previous chapter. However, under signalling theory, which would predict stronger research 
universities obtaining more USO funding and hence longer lifetimes, such a consistent survival time 
would not be expected. Further investigation will focus upon the financial resources of USOs and the 
impact upon survival, but this early finding goes against previous conclusions e.g. Mustar et al. 
(2006) mentioned above. It may be that this relatively small sample of USOs has this unusual 
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property that may not be seen elsewhere, or that stakeholders in the USO, both TTO and USO 
management, have a surprisingly consistent approach to deciding when to dissolve their company. 
This may also be an example of a situation observed using agency theory where external financiers 
are present, in that their goals become aligned with the TTO eventually in deciding when to cease 
their interest in the USO. 
 
7.2.3 Range of times to failure 
The above graphs conceal some wide variations in failure time at each university on a company level, 
so Figure 7.7 below adds to the overall analysis by displaying, for each university, the range of 
lifespans of USOs that have been removed. 
 
 
Analysis 
A number of interesting points arise from this figure. Aston’s established USOs again feature 
prominently in the results as expected by providing a maximum lifespan significantly in excess of any 
of the other universities in the region, while Keele shows an extremely narrow range of ages, but this 
may be explained by the small sample (only two companies ceased to trade and were removed from 
the record at Companies’ House in total). More generally, it is interesting that the shortest lifespan is 
just under 50 months for five of the six universities, implying that this is the absolute minimum 
period before those responsible for the USO’s administration decide that the technology being 
developed is not able to be commercialised. As this decision could have been made by a range of 
diverse parties such as founder shareholders, external investors or university TTOs, this consistency 
is of interest and is potentially in line with the framework of agency theory where external investors 
and TTOs see their goals becoming aligned over time (where the USO attracts external investment), 
although still unusual given the range of parties involved. Given that most USOs were not founded 
until after 2000, it is not possible at this stage to comment in detail about the upper limits observed 
for USO lifespans in the region. 
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7.2.4 Failures per year 
Figure 7.8 builds on the range of lifetimes data in Figure 7.6 to show full data for each USO showing 
the year of its life in which it was removed. 
 
 
Analysis 
The data above shows a number of points of note. Firstly, only one USO out of the whole population 
was removed before it had been in existence for 36 months. This is a significantly lower rate than 
the failure rates observed in studies of the wider population of start-up companies (which includes 
USOs and all other start-up companies), and although such studies provide a wide range of results, 
amid some concerns about the methodologies used, this is a significant difference. There is, 
however, a relatively straightforward explanation of this phenomenon in that the underlying nature 
of USOs will tend to mean that they own an early stage technology that still requires development 
time and costs before it reaches a stage at which it may be commercialisable. It would therefore 
appear that the shareholders of USOs are more willing to allow the company time to develop their 
technology than the wider business community. This is in line with the finding from Figure 7.7. In 
addition, the nature of USOs may mean that they are more likely to require funding resources from 
investors to develop their technology, who will be more likely to give the company a chance to 
succeed and see a return on their investment. de Cleyn (2010) notes similar findings, although 
concludes that such data covers up underperforming USOs. 
Secondly, it is apparent that the majority of USOs are removed from the Companies’ House register 
within a relatively narrow band of time (in this sample at least). 64% of failures occur between the 
ages of 36 and 84 months, although this is not a feature that has been noted in the USO academic 
literature to date. The consistency observed for universities across the region is interesting, 
particularly given the different attitudes already observed towards the formation of USOs. Clearly 7 
years appears to be an important cut-off point; if the technology has not proved to be 
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commercialisable by this stage then, unless a significant change such as in senior management 
occurs, it is considered by all significant stakeholders as reasonable to assume that it never will be, 
and further resources are no longer provided to the USO. Again, for USOs that received external 
investment, this may demonstrate consistency in goal congruence between investor and TTO within 
the framework of agency theory. However, studies have shown a range of attitudes amongst 
external investors in keeping their investments alive e.g. Ruhnka et al. (1992), so again this 
consistency is interesting. 
 
7.2.5 Aggregate Rate – Twilight USOs 
As noted in the previous chapter, the discovery of a category of USOs designated ‘twilight USOs’ is 
an important finding of this work and one not discussed at any length to date in the USO academic 
literature, although noted elsewhere e.g. the ‘living dead’ companies of Ruhnka et al. (1992). 
Twilight USOs are designated as USOs that have not been removed but have effectively ceased any 
significant level of activity. Where the USO has received external funding, a significant time must 
have elapsed since the last round of funding for the company to be designated as a twilight USO. 
While there is some form of judgment necessary to designate a USO as a twilight USO, careful 
analysis of its financial records generally gives a reasonable level of assurance that the designation is 
a correct one. A twilight company is clearly using up its residual resources to meet its running 
overhead costs rather than attempting to develop its technology further. 
Figure 7.9 below shows the aggregate twilight USO rate for each university of as a percentage of its 
total population of USOs. As above, the metric does not make any allowance for time effects i.e. 
newer USOs are less likely to be have had time to fall into the twilight category. 
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Analysis 
The data shows a reasonably consistent rate of twilight USO formation for the universities across the 
region of between 20% and 30%. This consistency is of interest because, as noted above, no 
allowance is made for the age of the USOs in question. In addition, the policy of universities towards 
USO formation has already been noted to be different, and this would be, on first principles, likely to 
be the case also for the identification and the management of twilight USOs. 
Staffs is an outlier from this consistency with a rate of twilight formation of 50%, although this is 
manifested on a low number of USOs created (only six in total). A high rate may be indicative of a 
desire by a university or TTO not to strike off companies for fear of ‘losing face’ and preferring to 
keep them running (de Cleyn, 2011). This may be an example of goal incongruence for these USOs 
that attracted external funding between the TTO and the funder, where the funder may be keener 
to cut its losses in its poor investment and cease the USO’s operations more quickly. The existence of 
this reasonably significant level of twilight USOs may lead to the conclusion that survival is actually a 
poor performance metric for USOs. A higher rate of twilight USOs may also possibly be observed 
when a university secures little external funding for its USOs, as such third parties may on first 
principles be less concerned about striking a company off where it is clear that the underlying 
technology is not going to reach any reasonable level of commerciality. 
 
7.2.6 Aggregate Rate – twilight and dissolved USOs 
One of the most important characteristics of twilight USOs is that they contribute towards providing 
a much fuller and more accurate picture of the true failure and survival rates of USOs. Previous 
studies in the academic literature have claimed that USOs have significantly higher survival rates 
than other start-up companies and produce a range of reasons attempting to explain this e.g. Zhang 
(2009).  
By combining the aggregate failure rates of twilight and failed USOs, a clearer picture is obtained as 
to the true failure rate of USOs, and this is displayed in Figure 7.10 below. Comparison with other 
academic studies will be undertaken at a later stage in Chapter 8. 
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Analysis 
The data shows a reasonably consistent range of twilight and dissolved USOs for the universities 
across the region of between 60% and 70%. This consistency is of interest because, as noted above, 
no allowance is made for the age of the USOs in question, or their quality, which signalling theory 
would predict to be linked, in that stronger research universities would produce longer-living USOs 
(Ziedonis, 2007). In addition, the policy of universities towards USO formation has already been 
noted to be different. These numbers are significantly higher than those obtained in previous USO 
academic studies and questions the long-held view that USOs survive longer than other start-up 
companies; this observation is considered in more depth below. 
Aston and Staffs are outliers with total failure rates in excess of 80%. Aston’s result is affected by the 
small number of USOs and the significant age of some of them, being generated well before the 
more recent increase in overall population as previously noted. Staffs’ results are impacted by low 
total numbers of USOs generated. 
 
7.2.7 Externally-funded failures 
USOs that attract external funding might be considered to have a lower rate of failure than the total 
population for a university given that the funders would perform their own due diligence to identify 
promising USOs in which to invest their money. Such findings have been noted in the literature e.g. 
Shane and Stuart (2002), Nerkar and Shane (2003) as discussed in Chapter 3, as well as from the 
wider VC literature e.g. Manigart et al. (2002). Figure 7.11 below compares, for each university in the 
region, the total failure rate (dissolved USOs plus twilight USOs) amongst companies with external 
third party funding against the total failure rate for all USOs from the university. 
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Analysis 
In general, the failure rates amongst USOs that obtained external third party funding are lower than 
those of the total population, as demonstrated by the overall WM universities figures. This gives 
some confidence to be drawn from the due diligence carried out by the funders and gives some 
support to previous studies e.g. Manigart et al. (2002), although the difference is not particularly 
large. A notable exception is Birmingham where the order is reversed i.e. third party investors into 
Birmingham’s USOs performed worse than a random selection in spotting companies likely to 
survive. 
This performance metric acts as an interesting crossover between USO survival and third party 
investment. In some regards it says more about the ability of the investor rather than the USO, but it 
also gives an interesting indication that USOs as a class of investment are not particularly easy to 
predict in terms of which will succeed. The findings are in line with signalling theory which would 
expect USOs sending out strong signals to attract funding and hence survive for longer. 
 
7.2.8. Survival time compared to funding 
Figure 7.12 below shows, for all universities across the West Midlands region, the relationship 
between the lifetime of each USO that failed, and the external funding that it obtained. 
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Analysis 
In general, for the sample of USOs under investigation, companies that obtain more funding survive 
for longer. This finding is in line with expectations, which would propose that USOs with more 
financial resources will survive longer as they will be able to meet their expenses incurred in 
attempting to commercialise their technology for longer, and in line with findings of earlier studies 
e.g. Shane and Stuart (2002), Nerkar and Shane (2003). 
It should be noted, however, that the majority of USOs in the sample obtained very little external 
funding. In addition, a number of USOs survived for a long time without any or very little external 
funding, presumably because their technology could be commercialised at an early stage and 
generate sufficient income to enable the company to survive. The above sample is a small one, so 
any observations must be made with care, and the relationship noted above is unlikely to be 
straightforward, in line with Manigart et al. (2002). 
 
7.3. External Investment into USOs 
The following section considers the second major performance metric of the study, namely the 
ability of the USO to attract external third party funding. Lambert (2003) and other authors have 
highlighted the obtaining of third party financing as a strong signal indicating a successful USO, and 
the fact that UK USOs have a poor record in attracting such finance compared to the US. Both of the 
key theoretical frameworks described in Chapter 3 will all have a part to play in interpreting the 
results of this section. Signalling theory postulates that the possession of resources such as attractive 
technology will send strong positive signals from the USO to the potential investor, and has been 
used before in the literature e.g. Mueller (2010). Agency theory can be used to comment on the 
relationship between potential funder and TTO to the extent that this is in line with the observed 
financial performance data of the USO (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003). 
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7.3.1 Rate of attracting funding 
Figure 7.13 below shows the percentage of USOs at each university that were able to attract 
external third party funding, which has previously been considered as a proxy metric for success for 
a USO.  
 
 
 
Analysis 
The figure above shows a wide degree of variation across universities and TTOs in the attraction of 
external funding by their USOs, in line with prior studies e.g. Wright et al. (2006). From an overall 
perspective, this is a different result from the survival results discussed above, where results were 
often consistent across the universities in the region. This may therefore be a more accurate 
reflection of a proxy for success of the USO or university as a whole. As a result, it is worth 
considering the results for each university. 
Birmingham and Warwick, as Russell Group members, are responsible for generating about 70% of 
the region’s USOs by number and unsurprisingly show levels of attracting finance close to the mean 
for the region of 53%. Given the numbers of USOs generated by these two universities, the work 
required to obtain such a significant number of investments requires the construction of a 
university-led infrastructure of significant scale, in the shape of a TTO and associated functions, to 
accomplish this. Signalling theory would support the observation that such research-focussed 
universities would attract funding for significant numbers of their USOs, which in turn would attract 
other investors, forming a virtuous circle. However, it is noticeable that their rate of attracting 
funding is lower than that of Aston, suggesting that some of the larger number of USOs were not 
attractive to investors, and highlighting that the relationship between university research strength 
and USO funding is not a straightforward one. 
Of the Plate Glass universities, Aston shows a particularly high rate of attracting finance of 86%, well 
in excess of the regional average, which ties in with its observed philosophy of forming relatively few 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Aston Birmingham Coventry Keele Staffs Warwick WM total
7.13 USOs gaining 3rd party financing (%)
164 
USOs that own technology that is potentially commercialisable and hence attractive to potential 
investors. As already noted, Aston has a heritage of teaching and research in science and technology, 
although not a Russell Group member, and signalling theory would agree that such a heritage could 
lead to a competitive advantage in discovering valuable technologies. Keele also has a high rate of 
attracting finance at 67%, so these findings are not in line with signalling theory purely considering 
the research strength of the parent university, but other factors are clearly present, such as sectoral 
differences e.g. some USOs are more capital-intensive. 
Amongst the Post-92 universities, Coventry has a lower rate of attracting finance than the average at 
36% and Staffs significantly lower at 17%. This is in line with signalling theory, although the numbers 
of USOs involved with these institutions is small and may lead to distorted results.  
Within the context of the agency theory framework, this range in success across the region’s TTOs in 
securing funding is of interest. Universities with a high rate of attracting funding would appear to 
have very limited agency problems, with potential investors having confidence in the underlying 
quality of the USO’s technology and its ability to be commercialised. Universities with low rates of 
funding would appear to have greater agency problems with lack of confidence from potential 
investors.  
 
7.3.2 Amounts of Funding raised 
Figure 7.14 below shows the total amount of third party external funding received by each university 
for its USOs. As noted in the previous chapter, USOs attract funding from a number of third parties 
including the regional University Challenge Fund (Mercia Fund), other private equity or venture 
capitalists, limited companies and individual investors. 
 
Analysis 
The graph clearly demonstrates that Warwick has attracted significantly more external third party 
funding in absolute terms than all the other universities combined. The scale of the difference 
cannot be explained simply by the fact that Warwick has generated the most USOs in the region (43 
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out of 102). Possible explanations are that Warwick USOs are extremely successful based on superior 
underlying technology and investors are willing to invest large sums of money to obtain potentially 
significant future financial benefits, or alternatively that Warwick has a vastly superior infrastructure 
including its TTO for attracting investors and providing them with the information they require. This 
will be examined later in the chapter when the success of USOs in terms of successful exits is 
examined. In addition, there is likely to be a cumulative effect whatever the explanation in that 
apparent success attracts success i.e. if one investor puts a significant amount of funding into a 
Warwick USO, other investors will notice and be more attracted to invest in the next available USO 
from the university, which would be in line with the predictions of signalling theory. 
It is clear from the large number of USOs generated that Warwick has significant resource in place to 
attract funding which will include wide networks with potential investors. This is exactly in line with 
agency theory which predicts multiple future interactions once TTO and external financier have 
established a basis of trust and overcome potential problems such as information asymmetry, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. However, the low amounts of funding obtained by other universities, 
particularly Birmingham, casts some doubt on this interpretations, should the number of USOs 
generated by a university be a valid proxy for its enthusiasm and desire to obtain funding for its 
underlying research, such a significant discrepancy between the funding obtained by Warwick and 
the other universities would not be expected. Clearly other factors are at stake such as pre-entry 
experience of the USO (Curran et al., 2016), quality of the underlying technology and the identity 
and risk appetite of investors. 
Signalling theory based on signals sent by the research strength of the university is less helpful here 
in trying to interpret the results. While the amount of funding obtained does follow the university’s 
research strength in terms of ranking i.e. Russell Group obtains more funding than Plate Glass, which 
in turn outperforms Post-92, the magnitude of Warwick’s success compared to the other 
universities, especially its fellow Russell Group member UoB, clearly demonstrates that other factors 
are involved. 
 
7.3.3 Funding obtained per USO funded 
To allow for the range in numbers of USOs formed by each university in the region, Figure 7.15 
below helps to contribute to a more accurate picture as it shows for each university the amount of 
external third party funding obtained per USO generated. 
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Analysis 
Warwick is still significantly ahead of the other universities in terms of funding received per USO 
although the difference is not as pronounced as in the previous figure. An interesting feature of this 
graph is the relatively low amount of funding secured per USO by Birmingham, the second largest 
generator of USOs in the region intimating that they have pursued quantity rather than quality in 
terms of generating USOs, a key accusation levelled by Lambert (2003) and others, on the 
assumption that external third party funding is a good proxy metric for the success of a USO. Again, 
signalling theory would not predict such a low result for UoB. 
Of the Plate Glass universities, Aston and Keele score highly on this metric, again suggesting a policy 
for these two universities of pursuing a small number of potentially high quality USOs with 
underlying technologies that are of interest to potential investors compared to other universities in 
the region. The Post-92 universities show very low levels of funding per USO. Overall, signalling 
theory is of some value when the research strength of the university is considered as the key signal, 
but UoB’s results show other factors must be at play. 
 
7.3.4 Funding obtained per USO 
While Figure 7.15 casts some light on the quality of the USOs generated by a university, a slightly 
different performance metric is the amount of funding received per USO that obtains funding i.e. 
ignoring USOs that obtain no funding. Figure 7.16 below shows this amount for each university 
across the region. 
 -
 200,000
 400,000
 600,000
 800,000
 1,000,000
 1,200,000
 1,400,000
Aston Birmingham Coventry Keele Staffs Warwick
7.15 Total 3rd party funding per USO (£)
167 
 
Analysis 
The major difference between this metric and that shown in Figure 7.15 is the performance of Staffs 
which apparently shows an unexpectedly high value of funding actually achieved by its USOs. 
Further investigation into the detail of the USOs reveals that Staffs only had one out of six USOs that 
achieved any external funding. This company, Intelligent Orthopaedics Limited, was also a USO of 
Keele as both universities appear to have contributed towards its development. The company also 
attracted funding from the Mercia Fund and Catapult Venture Managers, another private equity 
investor. Although it attracted the investment, the USO was not a success and was designated a 
twilight USO in this report (it was subsequently dissolved). 
Staffs’ other USOs attracted no funding at all, so this particular USO which achieved external funding 
distorts the results, and leads to possible questions as to how much involvement Staffs truly had 
with its development. The picture under signalling theory is complex; Staffs has a low rate of 
attracting finance for its USOs, which implies that it lacks suitable networks with potential investors, 
or research strength of the university, which would be strong signals for investors, but one USO in 
the shape of Intelligent Orthopaedics Limited had underlying technology which attracted financial 
resources from third parties, and hence gave a strong signal, distorting the overall picture for the 
university and highlighting the need to consider a range of performance metrics within the overall 
metric of attraction of investment. 
 
7.3.5 Types of investor 
Figure 7.17 below details, for each university, the number of USOs that obtained external funding 
from each particular source to examine the spread of funders. Unfortunately it was not possible to 
obtain further details of the investments such as the amount invested by each party or the number 
of funding rounds because the data was not consistently available. A number of funding rounds 
dated back several years, meaning that records were no longer in the public domain, and amounts 
invested by each investor were often not disclosed, most likely for reasons of confidentiality. 
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Analysis 
Each university obtained external funding for its USOs from a range of sources in line with earlier 
studies (Shane and Stuart, 2002). In terms of UCF funding, which as mentioned above was a key 
driver in accelerating the rate of creation of USOs, it is interesting that Aston and Coventry did not 
receive any funding whereas the Russell Group universities of Birmingham and Warwick, in 
particular, took full advantage of the government-backed scheme to help fund a number of their 
USOs. UCFs provided financial resources to universities specifically for the purpose of forming USOs, 
enabling institutions to access funding for early stage technologies without having to create 
significant infrastructure to attract other sources of funding. These results are in line with signalling 
theory in that strong research universities send strong signals to investors, and have greater 
resource to set up TTO operations. 
However, it is noticeable that all of the universities did not rely solely on UCF money. All universities 
were able to attract some other private equity investment into their USOs, showing that each of 
them must have formed some kind of links with the investment community. Warwick was 
particularly active in securing investments of this nature, some of which were significant in size and 
contributed towards the result observed above of a very significant amount of external funding 
received. Warwick was also notable for obtaining a wide range of different private equity funders, 
suggesting that as a university it created exceptionally strong social networks with the private equity 
community and leading to a clear competitive advantage over the region’s other universities in this 
specific aspect, again highlighting the absence of agency problems with potential funders. In line 
with signalling theory, the existence of other investors (Diamond, 1991) and large numbers of USOs 
sends strong signals to investors. 
Individuals also contributed towards a large number of USOs, making up a significant proportion of 
the total number of investors at a number of the universities. Investments by companies were not so 
prevalent, despite the suggestion previously made in the literature that such investments could be 
beneficial for a successful USO programme for a university. It is likely that the universities found it 
harder to form worthwhile links with companies rather than the investment community on the basis 
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that companies may prefer to pursue research independently, or at least have exclusive access to its 
results. In addition, it may have been more difficult for universities to identify suitable companies to 
invest in their USOs, given that this would require significant resource to achieve, especially starting 
from a low base in respect of infrastructure. 
 
7.3.6 Funding by research strength of university 
In line with the earlier measure of number of USOs by research strength, Figure 7.18 below shows 
the total funding obtained by a university by research strength using the 2014 REF rankings. Only 
universities that generated USOs are considered in this analysis. 
 
 
Analysis 
The results show a trend towards increased funding obtained with research strength of the 
university, although the correlation is distorted by the significant funding obtained by Warwick, 
although this is not in line with previous studies which found no correlation e.g. Tornatzky et al. 
(1997), Rodeiro Pazos et al. (2012). On first principles this is in line with the theoretical frameworks 
of this study; under agency theory external funders will be attracted and potential agency problems 
overcome as the TTO demonstrates the quality of the USOs’ underlying technology and their desire 
to commercialise it, leading to goal alignment with the potential funder and trust being built. 
Signalling theory is also of relevance as high quality technology developed by a strong research 
university will send positive signals to potential investors. However, the previous results and 
analyses have clearly demonstrated that research strength of a university is not by itself the sole 
factor behind a USO’s success, so the above graph must be treated with caution, and more data 
from other universities should be obtained and analysed. 
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7.4 Number of exits 
The final performance metric is that of successful exits from a USO by its parent university. One of 
the most important metrics in determining the success or failure of a programme of USO creation 
for a university is the amount of money for which the university can realise its investment in a 
controlled exit such as a placement of shares, merger or trade sale (Bonardo et al., 2011). Figure 
7.19 below shows the occurrence of such events for the universities across the region. 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
Figure 7.19 demonstrates that across the whole West Midlands region, and despite the significant 
amount of activity in creating USOs, the financial impact for the sponsoring universities has not been 
positive. Despite the large numbers of USOs created, the number of successful exits made from 
USOs is extremely low. It is particularly noticeable that no USO from the West Midlands has ever 
achieved a stock market listing in any form, a particularly unfavourable comparison with the US 
(Zhang, 2009), and even with other UK universities such as Oxford and Cambridge (Holi et al., 2007). 
Amongst the Post-92 and Plate Glass universities, Coventry, Keele and Staffs have not made any 
successful exits at all from their USOs, showing that their programmes have had no financial success 
to date. The more established three universities of Aston, Birmingham and Warwick have had 
slightly more success, but with some wide variations. Aston continues to reinforce the earlier 
themes discussed of a small number of USOs that contain commercialisable technologies, and which 
have ultimately here lead to successful exits. Of the Russell Group members Warwick, despite 
creating large numbers of USOs and achieving a very significant amount of external investment into 
them, has fared no better than Aston in taking them to an exit. Birmingham falls within the two with 
a very similar exit record on a number of USOs that falls between the other two universities. 
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These results are difficult to explain using the theoretical frameworks selected. An exit is essentially 
a special form of external investment, so it would be expected that of the Russell Group members, 
Warwick would show significantly more exits than any of the other universities within the region 
given that it attracted far more external investment, which was at least partly attributable to its 
research strength. Clearly this is not the case, and the results suggest that the quality of Warwick’s 
technology that it attempted to commercialise via its USOs was, in fact, not strong. The only clear 
conclusion is that information asymmetry remains a significant factor for investors, even where a 
university has a strong research pedigree. There is a slight trend in that the three strongest research 
universities were the only ones to obtain any exits, but this does not explain the absolute level of 
exits seen across the region. 
 
7.4.1 Financial benefit to universities  
As noted above, the number of successful exits from a financial perspective for universities from 
USOs throughout the region is extremely low. Figure 7.20 below shows the actual cash received on 
exit by the universities through the disposal of their equity stakes. 
 
Analysis 
In terms of exits, the most successful university in the region is Birmingham, which was largely based 
on the sale of its stake in one USO; Entice Technology Limited. As noted in Chapter 5, this USO did 
not secure any external financing, so it is clear that the underlying technology was the key resource 
behind the ultimate financial success of the company. It is fair to conclude that this company was 
the only financially successful USO in the whole West Midlands region during the observed period of 
30 years. As noted in the previous chapter, Warwick’s actual returns may have been significantly less 
than shown above. 
Again, the figure highlights the lack of a successful financial return to the region’s universities as a 
result of their USO programmes, despite significant numbers of USOs being created and significant 
sums of money being raised to invest in them. While there are other factors than purely financial to 
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assess whether a programme has been a success, the failure to match the apparently significant 
sums raised by US USOs and some USOs from other UK universities must be a major disappointment 
to those responsible at these universities and backs up previous studies sceptical of return from 
USOs e.g. Harrison and Leitch (2010). It is unlikely that the sums shown above even covered the 
running costs of the various TTO operations at each of the university, and certainly did not generate 
any profit over and above its fixed and variable costs, which back up the findings of previous studies 
e.g. Hague and Oakley (2000), Hughes (2007), Siegel and Wright (2015). 
As discussed, this result is difficult to assess within either of the theoretical frameworks chosen as 
the only financially successful USO did not obtain any external funding. Both frameworks would have 
assumed that USOs obtaining the most funding are more likely to be successful and hence these 
results are not in line with theory. 
 
7.4.2. Percentage of successful exits 
Following on from Figure 7.20, the figure below shows the percentage of USOs created at each 
university in the region to provide their parent institution with a successful exit. This important 
metric gives some guidance as to the success of the university in identifying and then creating 
successful USOs. 
 
Analysis 
Under this metric, Aston shows a rate of success significantly higher than any of the other 
universities. This finding again reinforces findings from earlier metrics which have indicated a policy 
for this university of creating only a small number of high quality USOs.  
Of the Russell Group universities, Birmingham and Warwick have a low rate of success in terms of 
their USOs reaching a successful exit. This finding is in interesting contrast to their success in 
attracting third party external funding, as already discussed, especially in the case of Warwick, and 
their activity in generating significant numbers of USOs. It would appear that both universities may 
be exhibiting the behaviour identified by Lambert (2003) of trying to focus on quantity rather than 
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quality of USOs, and simply using the available funding in the form of the UCF to fund their 
programmes. 
 
7.4.3. Cash returns to university compared to funding 
Figure 7.22 below shows the relationship between the cash returned to the university by USO 
compared to the funding it received. Only USOs that exited or failed during the period under review 
were considered. 
 
 
Analysis 
The above results further demonstrate that, to date, universities in the West Midlands have made 
very little financial return on their USOs. In addition, there is little correlation at the USO level 
between the amount of money it receives and the return to the university, as the best returns have 
occurred where there was no or little external funding, where the technology was clearly ready to be 
commercialised at an early date. This is not in line with signalling theory, which would predict that 
USOs with greater external financial resources will show superior performance including returns to 
the parent university, as the company will have been able to give out strong signals, probably 
including the strength of their technology, to allow potential investors to reduce their fear of 
information asymmetry and uncertainty when deciding to invest. It is also not in line with previous 
studies e.g. Shane and Stuart (2002) which would predict better funded companies to be more likely 
to have a successful IPO. It should be noted that the sample is relatively small, and that improved 
results will be obtained as the USOs within this study come to the end of their lifetimes. 
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7.5 Conclusion – West Midlands region 
The above results and discussions provide an interesting insight into the ability of the chosen 
theoretical frameworks of this work to rationalise and explain the financial performance data of the 
region’s USOs. While some results are in line with the expectations of the frameworks, others are 
not and demonstrate the complexity in attempting to explain the data, and the need to consider 
wider data sets and more explanatory factors. The classification of the universities into three 
different groups, based significantly upon their research strengths, also serves to provide a further 
dimension to the analysis. 
In terms of the numbers and activities of the USOs generated, universities with a strong research 
pedigree generated the most USOs in line with the theoretical frameworks, with the Russell Group 
universities dominant in the region, although this finding is not in line with some earlier studies e.g. 
Tornatzky et al. (1997). However, even at this stage it is clear that universities may have different 
policies with regard to USO formation, with the Plate Glass university of Aston, with good research 
credentials, creating a low number of USOs. The formation of USOs in the period under observation 
can be seen to be heavily dependent upon the UCF funding provided by the UK government. The 
principal activity of the USOs is dominated by life sciences and IT, in line with previous studies. 
The data relating to survival of USOs is more difficult to rationalise and leads to a tentative 
conclusion that this is not a useful performance metric, despite earlier opinions noted in Chapter 3 
e.g. Library House (2008). In line with previous studies, USOs survive for longer than other start-up 
companies e.g. Zhang (2009), and twilight USOs are also shown to be significant, backing up the 
findings of de Cleyn (2011), who identified that many European universities adopted policies to keep 
underperforming USOs alive; this therefore indicates that survival times say little about the 
underlying USO quality (Agarwal et al., 2004). However, a number of the survival measures show a 
degree of consistency across the different kinds of university, which would not be expected under 
the theoretical frameworks, as USOs from stronger research universities would be expected to 
survive for longer (Conceicao and Faria, 2016). In line with previous studies e.g. Shane and Stuart 
(2002), and the theoretical frameworks, it is found that USOs with external funding tend to survive 
for longer. 
The data on external funding appears to be in line with prior studies e.g. Shane (2004) and the 
theoretical frameworks in that the total funding obtained by a university is positively correlated to 
its research strength, although the Russell Group member Warwick shows an exceptionally high level 
of funding obtained. However, at a more granular level, by reviewing the amount obtained per USO 
the picture is more mixed, with both the Plate Glass universities of Aston and Keele outperforming 
Russell Group Birmingham, implying a more focussed approach in creating USOs, and showing 
clearly that other factors than the research strength of the parent university are at stake. These 
include the fact that certain sectors such as life sciences are more capital-intensive than others e.g. 
IT and consultancy, some of which can essentially be self-supporting. 
Finally, the data on exits demonstrates the inability of all universities across the region to generate 
financially successful exits. This general lack of success is difficult to explain using the theoretical 
frameworks, particularly given the success in attracting funding, implying attractive technologies 
were created, and is not in line previous studies e.g. Shane and Stuart (2002). In fact, the only 
financially successful exit was by a USO that had no external funding, demonstrating a lack of 
commercialisable technology generated across the region. 
175 
The next chapter will attempt to extend this analysis to compare with results from other studies in 
the literature. This is an important step, as the number of USOs in the current study is relatively 
small, and conclusions must therefore be drawn with care. Overall, however, the West Midlands 
region has shown results that can sometimes, but not always, be explained by the theoretical 
frameworks, and are not always in line with prior studies. 
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8. Comparison of results with existing studies 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Following on from the previous chapter, which sought to compare and contrast the financial 
performance results obtained by USOs throughout the West Midlands region, the current chapter 
will undertake a similar comparison but against results from those studies existing in the academic 
literature in line with the further research question in Chapter 4. These will include results for USO 
survival, attraction of external investment and whether the parent university successfully exited its 
investment. The comparisons will also be evaluated within the chosen theoretical frameworks of 
signalling and agency theories to assess whether the results are consistent with those predicted 
under the frameworks, in particular the research strength of the parent university which is predicted 
under both frameworks to lead to greater external investment and successful exits. However, as 
noted in the introduction to Chapter 7, other explanations will need to be considered, and the 
predictions of the frameworks may be too simplistic. 
As already noted, the relevant USO financial performance literature is small but growing, and 
includes studies of USOs in both the UK and a number of different countries (Fini et al., 2016). 
However, the proportion of the literature that focusses on the performance metrics of this work is 
still a small one, and the number of such studies and comparisons that can be drawn are limited. 
 
8.2 USO survival studies 
A number of early USO financial performance studies in the literature collected data on the 
aggregate survival rates of their USO sample. The tables below combine USO survival data from 
Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008), other studies in the literature on a country or university level and 
the universities of the West Midlands from the current work. The majority of survival studies in the 
literature are not of recent provenance; more recent studies have focussed on external investment 
of the metrics under consideration in this work. 
 
Country Survival rate 
(%) 
Period Years Sample size Source 
USA 68 1980-2000 21 3376 Shane (2004) 
Canada 73 1995-2003 9 301 Clayman and 
Holbrook (2006) 
Hong Kong 
(timed rate 
after 5 years) 
79 1997-2004 8 56 Leung and Mathews 
(2006) 
Netherlands 83 1984-1992 9 92 Shane (2004) 
France 84 1984-1987 4 100 Mustar (1997) 
Sweden 87 1960-1993 34 30 Shane (2004) 
Northern 
Ireland 
94 1984-1995 12 17 Shane (2004) 
Sweden 
(timed rate 
after 2 years) 
73 1994-2002 9 528 Wennberg et al 
(2011) 
177 
Sweden 
(timed rate 
after 5 years) 
53 1994-2002 9 528 Wennberg et al 
(2011) 
USA 94 1991-2001 11 655 Zhang (2009) 
UK 58 1983-2013 31 102 Current work 
UK (including 
twilight USOs) 
31 1983-2013 31 102 Current work 
Table 8.1: USO Survival data by country (author-derived data) 
 
University Survival rate 
(%) 
Period Years Sample size Source 
USA – MIT 80 1980-1996 17 134 Shane (2004) 
Oxford 90 1950-2004 55 64 Lawton Smith and Ho 
(2006) 
London 92 
82 
3 year timed 
5 year timed 
 202 Lawton Smith et al. 
(2014) 
ETH Zurich 88 1998-2007 10 130 Oskarsson and 
Schläpfer (2008) 
Aston 14 1983-2013 31 7 Current work 
Birmingham 31 1983-2013 31 29 Current work 
Coventry 36 1983-2013 31 11 Current work 
Keele 33 1983-2013 31 6 Current work 
Staffs 17 1983-2013 31 6 Current work 
Warwick 35 1983-2013 31 43 Current work 
Table 8.2: USO Survival data by University (author-derived data) 
 
 
Analysis 
A number of interesting discussion points arise from the above tables. It is clearly demonstrated that 
the survival rates of USOs observed in the current study are significantly lower than all of those 
observed in previous academic studies. Table 8.1 shows that the current study’s survival rates for 
the West Midlands region are lower than all country studies even when only companies that have 
been removed from Companies’ House (or the host country’s equivalent) are considered (which is 
the criterion used by all the other studies). In addition, survival rates are significantly lower when 
twilight USOs are also considered. The only exception to this finding relates to the study of 
Wennberg et al. (2011), and here the results are not directly comparable as the failure rate in this 
study refers to the timed failure rate rather than the aggregate. It should also be noted that the 
duration of the study of Wennberg et al. (2011) was much shorter that the current work, which may 
hinder comparisons. 
It should be noted that the difference in the period lengths under study does not invalidate 
comparisons between studies; as discussed above in the current study, 65% of USOs that failed had 
done so by the seventh year of their existence. It is particularly interesting that Oskarsson and 
Schläpfer (2008) completely independently for a dataset from a Swiss university also identified seven 
years as a key milestone after which failure rates start to level off. However, the length of a period of 
study should always be borne in mind, especially when seeking to draw comparisons with other 
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studies. A number of studies in Table 8.1 look at a time period of eight to nine years, which is quite 
short, and given that the failure rates are aggregate the key seven year barrier will not have been 
reached for the majority of USOs, so results may not be fully comparable with those from longer 
studies such as the current work. Similarly, certain studies have a long period length of study, but as 
already discussed, USOs were not created in significant numbers in any country including the US 
until relatively recent times, so the studies are likely to be weighted in terms of population towards 
the end of the period of study. 
Table 8.2, which shows the total survival rate for USOs from the current study by university i.e. 
including twilight USOs, also shows a similar picture i.e. a much lower rate of survival when 
comparing the current work against existing works covering a single university. It should be noted 
that the ETH Zurich figures (Oskarsson and Schläpfer, 2008) also include twilight USOs whereas the 
MIT (Shane, 2004) and Oxford (Lawton Smith and Ho, 2006) figures do not i.e. only companies 
dissolved at Companies’ House and its US equivalent are included. 
The key question here is why the survival figures in the current work are so much lower than those 
shown in the majority of previous academic studies. The inclusion of twilight USOs clearly has an 
impact in significantly reducing measured survival rates, while providing a much clearer picture of 
the state of a university’s USOs, but even if these are ignored the overall survival rate is still 
significantly lower. It is possible that the universities in this study have a very different policy to 
those in previous studies in that they dissolve their USOs more quickly, or even produce fewer USOs 
of sufficient quality to survive. This latter suggestion would be tentatively in line with signalling 
theory, in that ETH Zurich, MIT and Oxford are significantly stronger research universities than even 
the Russell Group members of the West Midlands, which might lead to better quality underlying 
technology for their USOs, more external finance attracted and hence greater survival times. 
Management quality is another potential signal for investors with more prestigious institutions more 
likely to be able to attract such individuals to work for their USOs. However, these explanations must 
be considered with care, as the universities in this study still have plenty of pedigree in teaching and 
research in science and technology, departments from which most USOs originate, and the 
comparative academic studies across a whole country are likely to contain a wide range of 
universities, so it unlikely that the West Midlands region is radically different in these respects. With 
regard to the potential policy of rapid dissolution of USOs, it is unlikely in any case that the university 
will be the primary decision-maker in the matter, especially where it only holds a minority equity 
stake in the USO and external investors are present. 
It should also be noted that previous academic studies have attempted to compare their USO 
survival rates with those of all start-up companies in the same country e.g. Lawton Smith and Ho 
(2006), Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008). Although there is some difficulty in obtaining comparable 
data, the results appear to demonstrate that USOs have a significantly longer life than other start-up 
companies. This may be a deliberate policy on the part of universities in prolonging the lives of ‘living 
dead’ companies, but there may be more fundamental reasons. 
While theoretical frameworks may contribute something towards understanding the results, the 
answer to the query of survival rate differences is perhaps more likely to be connected to the 
difference in the quality of the dataset being constructed and analysed in this work compared to 
previous studies. It is noticeable that previous studies have usually relied on records kept by others 
that may not be complete e.g. many studies will typically approach the university TTO for details of 
USO formation, and USOs themselves or again the TTO for details of external investments. It is highly 
likely that such sources omit, or simply miss off through lack of information, details about older 
USOs in particular. For example, Zhang (2009) only records USOs that actually received venture 
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capital funding and were maintained on a venture capital database, which displays a strong survivor 
bias and significantly limits the completeness of the USO population given that many USOs do not 
receive such funding. Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008) used questionnaires sent to USOs to record a 
range of sophisticated performance measures, and there must be a significant risk of individuals at 
the USO providing incomplete information through a lack of knowledge (if they recently joined the 
company), lack of understanding of the data being requested or simply lack of time to complete the 
request adequately. It is noticeable from Chapters 5 and 6 that had only one source of data on USO 
performance been used in the current work, an incomplete picture would have emerged, and none 
of the data sets relied on the memory of individuals. In addition, it is often the older USOs, about 
which there is now little data or accumulated knowledge (Lawton Smith and Ho, 2006), which 
subsequently failed, and are hence of particular interest in this kind of study. There is therefore a 
significant danger of survival bias in the data collected by certain studies, a danger already 
acknowledged in the literature e.g. Shane and Stuart (2002). The high quality of the data set 
constructed for analysis during this work, involving comparisons and cross-checks between a range 
of independent, objective sources, is one of the key differences in this work compared to existing 
studies and fills a significant gap in the current academic literature. 
 
8.3 External investment and exit 
The tables below compare data collected from the current work and previous studies, some of which 
were previously collated by Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008), concerning the performance metrics of 
attraction of third party external funding by USOs and successful exits from USOs across a range of 
universities from different countries, although mostly from the UK. Table 7.3 simply shows the 
percentage of USOs that attracted external third party funding that were created at each academic 
institution. Table 7.4 shows the percentage of USOs that achieved a successful exit for its parent 
through a trade sale or IPO of its shares. In the same format as above, Table 7.5 shows the total 
amount of external funding secured by a university for all of its USOs, while Table 7.6 shows the 
amount of funding obtained by USOs that obtained any level of funding i.e. removing the distorting 
influence for a university of its USOs that did not achieve any external funding. 
Oskarsson and Schläpfer’s (2008) study on ETH Zurich was only able to obtain data on funding from 
82 of its 130 USOs as a result of non-responses to their questionnaire, hence the smaller sample size 
in Table 7.5, although the authors did not consider that this fact distorted any of their results or 
conclusions. Data in Table 7.6 for the other UK universities is not complete as the Holi et al. (2007) 
report can no longer be accessed, although enough relevant information was obtained from 
citations in Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008) to enable a useful level of comparison with other studies. 
 
University Total 
USOs 
Number with 
external funding 
% with external 
funding 
Source 
ETH Zurich 1998 - 2007 130 34 26 Oskarsson and 
Schläpfer 
(2008) 
     
10 UK universities 1998 - 
2002 
172 111 65 Minshall and 
Wicksteed 
(2005) 
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Cambridge, Oxford, 
Imperial College, 
University College 
London  
99 71 72  
Edinburgh, Newcastle, 
Southampton 
36 25 69  
Cranfield, Loughborough, 
Strathclyde 
37 15 40  
     
20 UK universities 2001 - 
2006 
233 137 59 Holi et al 
(2007) 
Cambridge 30 20 67  
Oxford 24 18 75  
Imperial College 29 19 66  
University College 
London 
9 6 67  
Edinburgh 26 15 58  
     
UK universities 1985 - 
2007 
123 42 34 Munari and 
Toschi (2010) 
     
UK universities 1990 - 
2007 
125 78 62 Mueller (2010) 
     
West Midlands 1983 - 
2013 
102 54 53 Current work 
     
Aston 7 6 86  
Birmingham 29 14 48  
Coventry 11 4 36  
Keele 6 4 67  
Staffs 6 1 17  
Warwick 43 25 58  
Table 8.3 Percentage of USOs attracting third party financing (author-derived data) 
 
Analysis 
Table 8.3 shows a number of features worthy of further discussion. Firstly, ETH Zurich has a 
materially lower percentage of its USOs obtaining external funding than the equivalent UK 
universities despite its focus on science and technology teaching and research. This finding was 
previously noted by Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008), who reasonably attributed the difference to the 
existence of UCF funding in the UK, where there was no such equivalent funding available in 
Switzerland from government specifically designed to create USOs. It is interesting to note that the 
universities of West Midlands region overall obtained a similar level of USOs obtaining external 
funding to the UK universities studied by Holi et al (2007), Mueller (2010) and Minshall and 
Wicksteed (2005), in the region of 50-60% of all USOs created, which provides some comfort as to 
the reasonableness of the findings. The much lower figure obtained by Munari and Toschi (2010) is 
therefore slightly puzzling although their study only includes funding by venture capitalists, both 
private and public (including UCFs), so does not appear to include funding by individuals. It may be 
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that their study suffers from an incomplete data set, as it relies primarily on a single commercial 
database to identify venture capital funders, and as already noted such databases are often 
incomplete due to a desire to keep commercially sensitive transactions secret. 
It has previously been suggested by a number of studies e.g. Munari and Toschi (2010) that the 
amount of external third party funding obtained by USOs will be dependent upon the research 
excellence of the parent university. This is in line with signalling theory, which would predict that 
strength in research would attract investors, and agency theory, in that trust between investors and 
strong research universities would be quickly established. It is interesting to note that the 
universities disclosed separately in the study of Holi et al. (2007) constitute some of the elite UK 
research universities (Cambridge, Oxford and certain of the London universities, sometimes 
collectively referred to, especially by policy makers, as the ‘Golden Triangle’), and those from the 
West Midlands region in the current study generally show a lower rate of funding achieved for their 
USOs, as might be expected from universities with a lower standard of excellence, even though two 
of them are Russell Group members. These results are again strongly comparable with those of 
Minshall and Wicksteed (2005) showing the Golden Triangle outperforming in terms of funding, 
which provides comfort over the levels of attraction of funding observed. Of course, measuring 
research excellence of a university is not a simple task, and previous studies will often use rankings 
in various surveys carried out by education institutions. While simple to use, this measure is a fairly 
crude one. Amongst the West Midlands universities, Aston shows an exceptionally high rate of 
attracting finance as previously discussed, and Warwick is comparable with Edinburgh (another 
Russell Group member), although lower than the top rank universities of Oxbridge and London. This 
relatively limited study therefore tentatively shows that there is a connection between research 
excellence and attraction of funding to a university’s USOs. 
 
 
University Total 
USOs 
Trade 
sales 
% trade 
sales 
IPOs % IPOs Source 
ETH Zurich 1998 - 
2007 
130 8 6.2 1 0.8 Oskarsson and Schläpfer 
(2008) 
       
US universities 655    7.6 Zhang (2009) 
       
20 UK universities 
2001 - 2006 
233 8 3.4 5 2.1 Holi et al (2007) 
Cambridge 30 1 3.3 0 0  
Oxford 24 0 0 1 4.2  
Imperial College 29 1 3.4 1 3.4  
University College 
London 
9 2 22.2 0 0  
Edinburgh 26 0 0 0 0  
       
West Midlands 1983 - 
2013 
102 6 5.9 0 0 Current work 
       
Aston 7 2 28.6 0 0  
Birmingham 29 2 0.1 0 0  
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Coventry 11 0 0 0 0  
Keele 6 0 0 0 0  
Staffs 6 0 0 0 0  
Warwick 43 2 0.1 0 0  
Table 8.4 Percentage of USOs obtaining a trade sale or IPO (author-derived data) 
 
Analysis 
Table 8.4 shows a consistent theme across the universities from different countries of extremely low 
levels of successful exits for universities from their USOs via trade sales or IPOs. While certain 
universities such as Aston or University College London show high rates of trade sales, albeit on very 
low volumes of USOs created (which interestingly implies that these two universities may 
independently have followed a similar strategy of only creating USOs with a high quality underlying 
technology to develop), the long term average of successful USO trade sales is only around 5% for 
UK universities. It should be noted that the number of studies available for consideration is small, 
and care must be taken over some elements of comparability such as the fact that the period under 
study by Holi et al (2007) is extremely short, so this may underrepresent the true number of trade 
sales, and indeed given the elite nature of some of the universities included in that particular study 
one might expect the rate of sales to be higher than those seen in the West Midlands region.  
The overall rates of USO IPOs observed in the study are lower still, although the universities 
reviewed in Holi et al (2007) do at least show that some USOs reached this stage, unlike USOs from 
the West Midlands and ETH Zurich, none of which proceeded to an IPO. Oskarsson and Schläpfer 
(2008) attributed the low rate of IPOs seen in Zurich to the lack of a junior capital market in 
Switzerland compared to the UK, which has London’s Alternative Investment Market, and the lack of 
attractiveness of the Swiss venture capital market to international investors, partly for regulatory 
reasons, although it does appear from other data that founders, family and friends of the ETH Zurich 
USOs invested personally much larger sums than their equivalents into UK and US USOs (Shane, 
2004 and Mason and Harrison, 2001). It is noticeable that significantly more US USOs achieved an 
IPO as shown by Zhang (2009), which is in line with significant empirical and anecdotal evidence that 
US USOs are the most successful worldwide. This has been attributed to various factors, including an 
entrepreneurial culture unafraid of risk-taking and failure, and the observation that the US has the 
most attractive capital markets for investors.  
While the overall trend may be in line with the predictions of signalling and agency theories, the lack 
of significant differentiation between very strong research universities such as the Golden Triangle 
and Post-92 universities is probably not the expected result. These results probably demonstrate 
that information asymmetry and uncertainty remain very significant factors in determining the 
ultimate success of a USO, and on this data far more so than the research strength of the parent 
university. These two factors may serve to discourage potential investors to support a USO to IPO, 
although other factors may be at stake such as the wider stock market climate in the period under 
review and the wider appetite for IPO among all firms in general. 
Overall, it seems likely that no significant financial amounts have been received by UK and European 
universities as a result of their USO programmes. Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008) note that the exit 
rates observed for the ETH Zurich USOs is very low compared to other academic studies on venture 
capital-backed companies e.g. Metrick (2007) who observed a 5 year exit rate of 33% in a study of 
almost 12,000 venture capital investments. This observation has significant implications for policy 
makers who have sought to emphasise USO creation within the field of academic entrepreneurship. 
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University Total 
USOs 
Total funding 
(£’000) 
Funding per USO 
(£’000) 
Source 
ETH Zurich 1998 
- 2007 
82 153,855k CHF = 
65,470 
798 Oskarsson and 
Schläpfer (2008) 
     
10 UK 
universities 1998 
- 2002 
172 494,446 2,874 Minshall and Wicksteed 
(2005) 
Cambridge, 
Oxford, Imperial 
College, 
University 
College London  
99 344,572 3,481  
Edinburgh, 
Newcastle, 
Southampton 
36 121,806 3,384  
Cranfield, 
Loughborough, 
Strathclyde 
37 28,068 759  
     
West Midlands 
1983 - 2013 
102 67,683 664 Current work 
     
Aston 7 4,481 640  
Birmingham 29 5,875 203  
Coventry 11 1,132 103  
Keele 6 3,498 583  
Staffs 6 1,332 222  
Warwick 43 51,365 1,195  
Table 8.5 Total third party external funding obtained by a university (author-derived data) 
 
University Total 
USOs 
Total funding 
(£’000) 
Funding per USO 
(£’000) 
Source 
ETH Zurich 1998 
- 2007 
24 153,855k CHF = 
65,470 
6,411k CHF = 2,728 Oskarsson and 
Schläpfer (2008) 
     
US universities 606  $23.55m = 13,853 Zhang (2009) 
     
10 UK 
universities 1998 
- 2002 
111 494,446 4,454 Minshall and Wicksteed 
(2005) 
Cambridge, 
Oxford, Imperial 
College, 
University 
College London  
71 344,572 4,853  
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Edinburgh, 
Newcastle, 
Southampton 
25 121,806 4,872  
Cranfield, 
Loughborough, 
Strathclyde 
15 28,068 1,871  
     
20 UK 
universities 2001 
- 2006 
  2,300 Holi et al (2007) 
     
Cambridge   5,500  
University 
College London 
  4,300  
     
UK universities 
1990 - 2007 
78  19,754 Mueller (2010) 
     
West Midlands 
1983 - 2013 
54 67,683 1,253 Current work 
     
Aston 6 4,481 747  
Birmingham 14 5,875 420  
Coventry 4 1,132 283  
Keele 4 3,498 875  
Staffs 1 1,332 1,332  
Warwick 25 51,365 2,055  
Table 8.6 Funding obtained per USO that attracted funding (author-derived data) 
 
Analysis 
Table 8.5 illustrates the significant success of Warwick as a university in attracting funding for its 
USOs compared to ETH Zurich, with the rest of the West Midlands region at a much lower level than 
these. Both ETH Zurich and all of the West Midlands universities attracted significantly less funding 
per USO than the majority of the strong research UK universities considered by Minshall and 
Wicksteed (2005). As already noted, this study considered USOs from ten universities split into three 
slightly arbitrary categories. Universities with large research budgets, containing the elite research 
universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Imperial and University College London secured significantly more 
funding than all universities in the other two studies, as did other large universities in large cities 
(Edinburgh, Newcastle and Southampton). This finding would appear to show that the research 
excellence of a university bears a link to the amount of money raised from external third parties by 
its USOs. On first principles, this observation is in line with signalling and agency theories as large 
research-led universities are more likely to develop high quality technologies which are attractive to 
external investors should the university seek to develop the technology through the vehicle of a 
USO. This is then likely to lead to a virtuous circle in which external funders actively seek out 
investment opportunities at the university, which in turn set up the support structures in the shape 
of a well-equipped TTO or other incubatory facilities to further support USOs. Agency theory 
supports such an interpretation as TTOs and investors build trust and have their goals aligned. Some 
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care should be exercised in assuming a simple relationship, however, as ETH Zurich ranks highly in 
worldwide university rankings, and factors such as the availability of external funding in a different 
country will also need to be considered. The third category of university in Minshall and Wicksteed’s 
(2005) study, namely that of universities with smaller research budgets but with a higher percentage 
of research funds coming from UK industry, shows a much lower level of funding than the other two 
categories and one that is highly comparable to ETH Zurich and the overall average for the West 
Midlands universities. Birmingham is noticeably weak in attracting funding despite being a Russell 
Group member, while the Plate Glass and Post-92 universities are also low, in line with the 
predictions outlined above. 
Table 8.6 provides a fuller picture of USO funding than Table 8.5 as it includes a number of other 
studies, but also considers a slightly different funding metric, namely only considering USOs that 
actually attracted funding. The findings above still hold in that a link between research excellence of 
the sponsoring university and attraction of external funding for its USOs can be made in line with 
signalling and agency theories. In terms of individual universities, ETH Zurich shows a significantly 
higher level of funding than West Midlands universities compared to the previous table which 
implies that the latter created a relatively large number of USOs that did not attract any funding at 
all. This is consistent with the observation of low survival rates observed for USOs from West 
Midlands universities in the current study, implying that that they are relatively unattractive to 
funders. The research premium can still be seen for the elite UK universities compared to the West 
Midlands universities and ETH Zurich, and this is consistent with the study of Holi et al (2007) which 
also considered a number of elite universities. In addition, given that ETH Zurich is a strong research 
university, it is a finding in line with signalling theory, and only the Russell Group member Warwick 
comes close to matching it within the West Midlands region. 
Table 8.6 again shows a pattern in terms of funding for USOs appearing to be correlated with 
research excellence with the majority of West Midlands universities at a low level other than 
Warwick, ETH at a higher level and certain elite universities such as Cambridge at a significantly 
higher level still. However, all European universities in the study achieve significantly less funding 
that the US as shown in the figures of Zhang (2009). While Zhang’s (2009) study only included USOs 
that had already achieved third party venture capital funding i.e. not including soft funding such as 
UCFs, and hence only including the most successful USOs, this is likely to be representative of 
observed trends of the US having a much bigger venture capital industry that is prepared to stake 
significant sums of money into promising start-up companies, and where culturally there is much 
less stigma attached to failed companies than is seen in Europe and the UK. It should also be noted 
that one Warwick USO in the current study achieved over £14 million of external funding, such that 
Zhang’s (2009) figures are not unobtainable for the right UK USO. 
The study of Mueller (2010) is puzzling in that it shows an extremely high level of funding achieved 
by UK USOs which is not consistent with that seen in the current work or with the other studies of 
other UK universities in the tables above. Indeed, it claims that UK universities are significantly more 
successful that US universities in attracting external funding for USOs, which is not a conclusion 
supported anywhere else in the literature. It may be that the database used in this work omitted 
many less successful USOs, although even this is unlikely to account for such a difference compared 
to other works. 
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8.4 Conclusion 
Comparison of the financial performance of West Midlands USOs with those generated by other 
universities from the UK and abroad reveal some interesting issues which will be of relevance to 
policy makers, investors and academics alike. While directly comparable academic studies are small 
in number, universities in the UK, Europe and US have been included, providing good geographical 
coverage. The chosen theoretical frameworks of agency and signalling theories would predict higher 
rates of survival and funding obtained by USOs from stronger research universities, and the data 
from this range of universities can be analysed to see if it is line with these predictions. 
In terms of survival, the current study shows significantly lower survival rates for USOs in the West 
Midlands than other universities of a higher research strength, which is tentatively in line with the 
above theories. However, the differences are so significant that it is unlikely that research strength is 
the sole factor, especially as the West Midlands has some strong research universities in the form of 
Russell Group members Birmingham and Warwick. It is suggested that these results may be as a 
consequence of the more accurate USO datasets constructed in the current work, and the ignoring 
of twilight USOs in previous studies, as their survival rates seem unrealistically high, especially when 
compared to other start-up companies that are not USOs. 
The ability to attract third party external investment shows greater variation between countries. 
There appears to be some sort of link between research excellence of a university and the ability of 
its USOs to attract investment, in line with the predictions of the above theories, although more 
work will need to be performed to establish this link, which is not likely to be simple in nature, and 
can be influenced by a number of other factors not considered in detail here such as industry sector 
of the USO, institutional policies, the USO management team (Huynh et al., 2017) and the identity of 
the academic founders. Other UK universities of higher research excellence such as the Golden 
Triangle show higher investment than the West Midlands region, and European regions likewise. 
However, as expected, such results are overshadowed by the ability of US USOs to attract finance, 
which is likely to be a direct consequence of the attractive investment culture in the US towards 
young companies with technology to commercialise. 
Finally, the ability of USOs to generated financial returns for their parent universities by a successful 
exit via a trade sale or IPO demonstrates a similar pattern to the attraction of funding. In terms of 
countries, the US shows significantly higher rates of IPOs than other countries in line with the 
explanations above. However, for all countries the rate of exit is very low, suggesting that 
universities worldwide have not benefited significantly from a financial perspective from 
undertaking their USO creation programmes. These findings are partially in line with the predictions 
of the theories used, but the lack of differentiation and the overall low levels of exits, even amongst 
elite research universities, is not necessarily fully in line with expectations. 
In general, information asymmetry and uncertainty can be seen to remain significant handicaps for 
all universities, regardless of research strength, and for external investors in identifying USOs that 
will succeed financially. Levels of exits remain extremely low, despite in some cases significant 
funding being obtained, and well below the levels seen for other financially-backed start-up 
companies, leading to hard questions for policy makers who have encouraged USO formation on a 
global basis over a number of years. 
 
187 
 
9. Conclusions and final discussions 
 
9.1 Summary of key findings 
This thesis uncovers a number of important findings in the area of the financial performance of 
USOs, both within a regional context for the West Midlands area, and from comparisons with the 
results of other academic studies in this field, both in the UK and overseas. The overarching research 
question from Chapter 1, namely ‘Have USOs generated by West Midlands universities been 
successful in terms of financial performance?’, which is a broad and open-ended question, has been 
explored by identifying the most appropriate metrics with which to analyse financial performance of 
USOs, and while the answer to such a broad question needs to be discussed at length, it is clear from 
the analysis performed that, to date, the USOs investigated have not been financially successful. To 
provide a theoretical justification for the analysis, two frameworks of signalling and agency theories 
were chosen and data interpreted, as far as possible, in the light of their predictions. The 
supplementary research questions identified in Chapter 4 are addressed below in the light of 
previous discussions. 
 
9.2 Research question a) – how do USOs originating in the West Midlands perform in terms of 
survival? 
The West Midlands USOs in the current study display a number of interesting features in terms of 
their survival data, although analysis is challenging given the lack of relevance of the two theoretical 
frameworks selected for this work. There are a surprising number of survival performance metrics 
across the universities that show remarkably consistent results, a feature which would be unlikely to 
be expected given the wide range of types of universities in the region. The mean time to failure for 
a USO is one such metric, as is the shortest observed lifetime of a USO from each university. In 
addition, the mean time to failure for USOs is much longer than that observed for non-USO start-up 
companies in the literature, an observation which reinforces the findings of other studies. Another 
interesting observation is that, in line with other studies e.g. Oskarsson and Schläpfer (2008) looking 
at USOs from a different country, 7 years appears to be a key cut-off date in the life of a USO after 
which time investors will no longer support the company if it has not sufficiently developed its 
technology to reach or be close to a commercialisable format. However, great care must be taken in 
drawing any conclusions about USO survival due to the wide range of factors that can influence 
company survival, and which have not been analysed in detail in this work due to the restricted 
nature of the data collected. 
One of the key findings of this thesis, and an area that has not been discussed in detail in the existing 
USO literature, is the identification of the group of USOs that have been designated ‘twilight USOs’. 
These are USOs that have not formally been removed from the register at Companies’ House, but 
have effectively ceased to develop their underlying technology any further due to a lack of financial 
resources, and a significant period of time has elapsed since their last receipt of funding. They have 
thus effectively ceased to trade, although it is possible that they may recommence trading due to a 
change in circumstances. Twilight USOs are an important category of company as they provide a 
possible explanation for the discrepancies seen and noted in the literature to date, but not 
adequately explained, of why the survival rate of USOs seems to be so high when compared with 
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other start-up companies, including ones that are developing new technology. When twilight and 
formally dissolved companies are grouped together, the overall failure rate is much closer to those 
seen for other start-up companies, and is again remarkably consistent across the universities within 
the region. 
In general, the level of consistency found in the survival data would not be expected from signalling 
theory, and leads to the tentative conclusion that survival is not an effective metric in analysing 
financial performance of USOs, which is in contradiction to the literature reviewed to reach a 
decision on effective metrics for this work e.g. Library House (2008). Again, however, the relatively 
small size of the sample would imply caution should be taken in reaching any firm conclusion. 
 
9.3 Research question b) – how do USOs in the West Midlands perform in terms of attracting 
external third party investment? 
The range of performance metrics associated with the attraction of external finance by the West 
Midlands USOs show much greater variation across the universities than the equivalent survival 
data. This metric may therefore be a more accurate proxy for the successful financial performance of 
a USO and give more information about the approach adopted to the creation and maintaining of 
USOs by the parent university. 
In terms of the numbers of USOs attracting funding, a wide variation is observed across the region 
with some universities such as Aston displaying a very high percentage with a small number of USOs 
created, again implying that the university has focussed on only creating USOs with high quality 
underlying technology which is attractive to external investors. The absolute amount of funding 
received by a university’s USOs varies widely, with Warwick showing significant success in this field 
by attracting more funding than all the other universities combined, and also more funding obtained 
per USO, although the outperformance of this metric is less marked given that Warwick also created 
the most USOs in the region. Birmingham falls somewhere between Aston and Warwick in its 
behaviour in that it created a large number of USOs, but attracted only a relatively low amount of 
funding per USO, a situation that has been unfavourably identified as occurring in the UK in the past 
(Lambert, 2003). In general, the predictions of the theoretical frameworks are seen , in that stronger 
research universities attract more money from external investors for their USOs, but the relationship 
is not a straightforward one given the size of Warwick’s outperformance compared to the region’s 
other universities. 
The types of external investment attracted by USOs also shows some interesting results. All 
universities were able to attract some external private investment, but not all accessed the UCF 
money made available by government. Those universities that did take particular advantage of UCF 
money, Birmingham and Warwick, created the largest number of USOs, in line with signalling 
theory’s predictions above on USO numbers, whereas Aston did not obtain any UCF funding but 
relied on other sources to develop its small number of USOs. 
In addition, figures can easily be distorted by the presence of a very successful USO, as seen here 
with Staffs, making the approach favoured by this work of a detailed analysis of performance by 
individual USO of great importance in obtaining accurate information for interpretation. 
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9.4 Research question c) – how do USOs originating in the West Midlands perform in terms of 
reaching a financially successful IPO or exit for the university? 
The performance metrics that provide information about exits for investors from USOs reveal little 
success for the West Midlands region as a whole from a financial performance perspective. None of 
the USOs considered throughout the whole of the period under review proceeded to an IPO. Six 
USOs were subject to a trade sale and one to a merger. However, in financial terms, only one of 
these exits is likely to have given rise to a profitable exit for the parent university, a Birmingham USO 
called Entice Technology Limited. 
The results from the region demonstrated no connection between the number of USOs generated by 
a university, or the amount of external funding attracted, and an exit from its USOs for the 
university. Again, Aston was the most successful in terms of moving its USOs to exits, while Warwick 
was relatively unsuccessful despite attracting a significant amount of external funding. Such a finding 
has implications for a number of stakeholders in USOs, as discussed in more depth below. 
This finding is very difficult to explain using the chosen theoretical frameworks as an exit is simply a 
special form of external investment, so one would expect strong research universities with 
significant funding such as Warwick to see a number of successful exits. The research strength of a 
university therefore appears of limited relevance. It is possible that the timescale of the study was 
too short to observe some exits, and again the sample sizes are relatively small. It is clear that 
information asymmetry remains a key factor, with even experienced external investors, in the shape 
of UCFs and VCs, unable to pick ‘winners’ in this study. The only successful USO exit came from a 
company with no external funding, highlighting the crucial role of the technology, but also the 
inability of external funders to predict its success. 
 
9.5 Research question d) – how does the attraction of external funding affect a USO’s survival? 
The findings of this work are tentatively in line with that predicted under signalling theory, namely 
that USOs that obtain external financing survive for longer as they send out favourable signals to 
stakeholders. However, the literature is split on this point, and the findings of this work are by no 
means conclusive, particularly as the sample analysed is small and the majority of the USOs obtained 
very little funding. Again, the lack of distinction between USOs seen leads to the conclusion that 
survival is not a particularly effective metric with which to analyse USO financial performance. 
 
9.6 Research question e) – how does the attraction of external finance affect a company’s ability 
to reach an IPO or successful exit? 
In line with the above analysis, there is no discernible link between the attraction of external finance 
and the reaching of an IPO or successful exit.  
 
9.7 Research question f) – how does the West Midlands USOs’ financial performance compare to 
USOs from other universities in the UK and abroad? 
While comparing and contrasting results obtained from universities within the West Midlands region 
leads to some interesting observations, comparisons with the small number of existing academic 
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studies in the field of financial performance of USOs are of even more potential value as a 
contribution to the literature. 
The current study generally shows much lower rates of survival amongst its USOs than all others in 
the literature, particularly when twilight USOs are included. It is likely that this observation is a 
consequence of less complete and accurate populations of USOs being used in previous studies 
rather than simply the inclusion of twilight USOs in the current work, or the possibility that USOs 
from the West Midlands are generally of inferior quality than all other studies performed to date. As 
discussed further below, this finding is a key contribution of the current work to the existing 
literature. The number of single university studies in the literature is very small, and are mainly of 
prestigious institutions making comparison with West Midlands universities difficult. Again, this 
finding suggests that survival is not a particularly strong financial performance metric for USOs. 
In terms of external investment, the results in terms of funding attracted by the West Midlands 
USOs are much more comparable with those of previous studies of UK USOs from other universities, 
which provide confidence about the results from all of these studies. It is noticeable that there 
appears to be a trend between the research excellence of the parent university and the amount of 
funding achieved for each of its USOs, and universities such as Oxford and Cambridge are amongst 
the highest in terms of attracting funding in the UK. This observation confirms empirical findings in 
the literature to date. There is a significant lack of studies from other countries that look at 
comparable metrics, although one existing study from the US (Zhang, 2009) shows a much higher 
level of funding obtained for USOs than the UK, which again confirms a number of empirical 
observations within the literature. A study of USOs from ETH Zurich (Oskarsson and Schläpfer, 2008) 
shows lower amounts of funding obtained than many UK universities, although this was attributed 
by the authors to a lack of a junior capital market in Switzerland comparable to the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) in London. These are in line with the findings of this work regarding the 
line between research strength and external funding, and with the predictions of signalling and 
agency theories as already noted, which provides some comfort over the doubts indicated earlier 
over the distortion of Warwick’s results in the region. 
Exits from USOs via trade sales or IPOs are low across all studies in the literature, so the West 
Midlands as a region is not particularly poor in this regard. As above, the US has a superior record to 
other countries in terms of this performance metric, although the very small number of comparable 
studies means any conclusions must be drawn with great care. The predictions of signalling and 
agency theories are not strongly supported in this area as greater differentiation between 
universities would be expected, and highlights the fact that the information asymmetry identified 
earlier may be a wider UK and international phenomenon. 
 
9.8 Research question g) – is the attraction of external financing by USOs influenced by the 
research strength of the parent university? 
On first principles, the findings of this work support the views that increased research strength of 
the parent university impacts positively on the amount of external funding obtained by its USOs. This 
is in line with the predictions of both agency and signalling theory. However, a number of studies in 
the literature have found no such relationship. It is likely that many other factors are at stake, 
including the attitude of the TTO to obtaining funding and the strength of its networks, as even in 
the current study the success of Warwick in attracting funding distorts the overall picture for the 
region. Again, the finding is a useful contribution to the literature in this field, although greater 
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samples of universities and USOs should be considered if greater certainty over the conclusion is 
required. 
 
9.9 Research question h) – is the number of USOs created influenced by the research strength of 
the parent university? 
The current study shows a positive correlation between research strength and number of USOs 
created by a university, a finding which is not in line with some previous studies. The two Russell 
Group universities in the region, Warwick and Birmingham, create significantly more USOs than the 
other universities, which are of lower research intensity. However, such results should be treated 
with caution, as the sample of universities and USOs investigated is small, and the distorting 
presence of UCF money from the UK government specifically to create USOs may explain the 
difference from prior studies, where TTO policy was shown to vary significantly by university in 
respect of USO creation. The finding of this work does, however, correspond with the prediction of 
signalling theory, so should be of value in ongoing discussion on this point in the literature. 
The identification and classification of USOs in the West Midlands reveals some interesting trends. 
The number of USOs created by any university is not always simple to predict or link to any variable, 
although it appears from the current work, in contrast to some earlier studies cited, that the more 
research-intensive universities in the fields of science and technology often tend to create more 
USOs, in line with what would be predicted under signalling and agency theories, given their 
additional technological resources and reputation. However, some strong research universities 
create few USOs, apparently focussing on creating and maintaining a small number of high quality 
technologies, while a number of universities (usually more modern, less research-intensive 
institutions) do not create any USOs at all.  
In terms of USO formation dates, within the West Midlands region, USOs had been formed from at 
least 1983. Creation rates increased dramatically from about the year 2000, which can probably be 
attributed to the introduction of UCFs, a government-backed funding source specifically aimed at 
encouraging USO creation by UK universities. As the initial amount of funding provided was 
consumed, the rate of creation of USOs dropped, and this was also affected by a range of additional 
external factors. In line with agency theory, which predicts different TTO policies in respect of USO 
formation, individual university behaviours can be seen to be a factor. 
The presence of UCFs may also distort the above finding of a correlation between university 
research strength and number of USOs created, given that the significant sums of money were 
specifically designated to USO creation. In line with other studies from the literature, life sciences 
and IT were the two most popular sectors in which USOs were created in the West Midlands region. 
This finding is also in line with the predictions of signalling theory as universities are particularly well 
placed to develop disruptive technologies in these fast changing sectors, with the highly specialised 
knowledge of their academic and research staff and their ownership of high quality research 
facilities, giving their USOs a potential competitive advantage through their technological resources. 
 
9.10 Contribution to theory 
On a theoretical level, the study confirms that signalling and agency theories are of value as 
theoretical frameworks within which to conduct research on the financial performance of USOs. It is 
clear from the above analysis that not all of their predictions are reflected in the data obtained in 
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this work, and this is maybe to be expected, given the complexity and range of potential factors that 
influence a newly-formed company’s subsequent financial performance. However, they at least offer 
a reasonable framework within which to discuss and analyse the wide range of results obtained. 
Of the two frameworks considered, agency theory is the less useful in analysing the results obtained, 
which is possibly as expected given the limitations in its usefulness identified in Chapter 3. In this 
work, the principal is a potential investor in the USO and the agent the TTO. Not all USOs will actively 
seek external investment, so the model is of little value in these cases. More fundamentally, as 
identified earlier, agency theory is only really of value to explain behaviours before investment is 
obtained (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003) as once this occurs, the investor and TTO are likely to have 
goal congruence, making comparison between universities difficult. In addition, prior studies may 
predict little reason for a TTO to act as an agent under agency theory, given that most TTOs will be 
keen to attract investment for their USOs. 
Signalling theory has been shown to be of value by the current work, which backs up its use in prior 
studies of USOs e.g. Mueller (2010), where new companies and their signals are analysed by external 
parties to overcome information asymmetry and uncertainty. In this study, the USO acts as the 
signaller and the prospective investor as the receiver, and the theory can be expanded to comment 
upon a range of possible signals given out by the USO, such as the strength of underlying technology 
and quality of management. These discussions can be extrapolated to comment upon the findings of 
the other performance metrics including the number of USOs generated by a university and their 
survival. However, as predicted from Chapter 3, given the narrow range of financial data collected 
and the underlying complexity and range of factors that influence the financial performance of a 
company, the theoretical explanation for data is often tentative at best. 
On first principles, both theories would predict that strong research universities would produce 
more USOs of a scientific or technological nature, would attract more funding, would survive for 
longer and see more successful exits. However, the exact picture throughout the West Midlands 
region is considerably more complex, and while some of the predictions from theory are observed, 
others are not, which leads to the particular strength and value of this work. Analysis of the 
predictions of theory against the observed data in depth was made on a regional basis in Chapter 7 
and against existing studies from the UK and abroad in Chapter 8. 
On a regional basis, the frameworks correctly predict that strong research universities generate 
more USOs due to the strength of the signal of the research strength of the university, which is again 
seen in the total investment obtained by a university’s USOs, where agency theory would predict a 
lack of goal incongruence for a university keen to commercialise its technology. However, even here 
there are slight caveats with Aston creating a low number of funded USOs, showing that individual 
TTO policy can be important. The survival of USOs is surprisingly consistent across the region, which 
would not be expected from the theoretical models, and the lack of successful exits is again not in 
line with predictions. This last point shows that uncertainty and information asymmetry are two 
crucial factors which for this particular region appear to overcome the possible range of signals that 
even USOs from strong research universities can send out to potential investors. This is exactly what 
would be expected from USOs, which are new companies often attempting to commercialise 
unproven technology. 
On a national and international comparison, the predictions of the theories are seen to be more 
closely followed for data on investment and exit, albeit on low volumes of comparative data. Again, 
information asymmetry and uncertainty remain key factors which appear to prevent any simple 
correlation being seen. 
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Finally, in contrast to other works in the literature, which rely heavily on the RBV framework to 
analyse their results, this work has demonstrated that it is possible to look to other frameworks, 
which when combined with confidence in the accuracy of the underlying data allows conclusions of 
value to be drawn. 
 
9.11 Additional contributions to the literature 
The current study contributes to the literature on the financial performance of USOs in a number of 
further ways. 
From a data perspective, many of the key findings discussed above make a significant contribution to 
the literature. Possibly the most significant finding is that of the phenomenon of twilight USOs, 
which provides an explanation to a long-debated observation within the literature over the 
apparently relatively long lifetime of USOs. This has not been fully explained to date, especially 
within the context of the observed apparent poor financial performance of USOs. 
Secondly, the different behaviours of universities with regard to their USO programmes has not been 
given great prominence before in the literature. Through consideration of a range of performance 
metrics, this study builds up a detailed picture of how different universities within the same 
geographical region have approached their third mission of development of academic 
entrepreneurship in respect of USOs in different ways. The West Midlands region contains a number 
of very different kinds of university ranging from research-intensive Russell Group members to very 
recently founded universities whose focus is more upon teaching than research. As a result, a wide 
range of behaviours of universities has been observed. Aston appears to have focussed on creating a 
small number of high quality USOs while Warwick has instead maximised its use of government UCF 
funding to create a large number of USOs and attract a great deal of external third party funding, yet 
in terms of exits and financial benefits to the universities the results are very similar (and very low). 
Most of the other universities fit somewhere in the middle of this range of behaviours, while a 
number of universities have not created any USOs at all, in line with prior observations. 
Thirdly, this study fills a surprising gap in the literature with regard to comparing and contrasting 
financial performance results from existing studies, especially with USOs from different countries. All 
performance metrics are compared with other studies, the majority of which are studies of other UK 
universities although not specifically on a regional basis. Overseas studies include USOs from ETH 
Zurich (Oskarsson and Schläpfer, 2008) and the US (Zhang, 2009). 
Fourthly, this study adds to the literature in regard to the methodology of the creation of the 
accuracy and completeness of its USO population. As already noted, a large part of the time spent on 
this work was connected with the creation of the USO database, and it appears likely that the impact 
of this can be seen in the difference in some of the performance results obtained compared with 
those from previous studies, particularly with the metric of survival of USOs which appears to have 
been consistently overstated until the current work as USOs that failed some years before any study 
is conducted are often missed out completely from the population tested. 
Finally, this study provides a useful assessment over the value of a number of performance metrics 
to assess USO financial performance. Of the metrics selected, the number of USOs generated is a 
poor proxy for their financial success. Survival also proves to be a poor metric, despite its use in 
earlier works, given the surprising consistency across companies. External investment is of some 
value, but even so there is little correlation in the West Midlands region with successful exits, which 
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may be said on the current work to be the best metric in assessing the true success of a USO from a 
financial perspective. 
 
9.12 Implications for USO stakeholders 
As a result of the findings above, this thesis identifies a range of issues arising for different 
stakeholders in USOs. The main stakeholders considered are USO management, governments 
(including other policy makers), external investors into USOs and the parent universities themselves 
(along with their TTOs and other incubatory infrastructure created to manage USOs). 
 
9.12.1 USO management 
Given the wide range of types of USO identified in the work, it is difficult to generalise in terms of 
implications for USO management. While all USO managers will wish to see their company’s 
technology developed to a point of commercialisation, the journey they are prepared to take to 
reach that point will vary significantly between, say, a VC-funded USO and a lifestyle USO. 
The main implication from the work is that the majority of USOs will not succeed from a financial 
perspective i.e. they will not commercialise their technology successfully. There is little chance of a 
USO surviving to become a successful and profitable company and the prospects of an IPO or 
successful exit are very low. However, the ability of USO management to obtain funding from 
external parties is more likely. 
The nature of many successful entrepreneurs means that such pessimistic forecasts are unlikely to 
dissuade managers from joining USOs if they genuinely believe that the technology involved 
represents a significant scientific breakthrough and hence a strong candidate for commercialisation. 
Even within the West Midlands, there are a small number of successful USOs. However, the profile 
of USOs in the West Midlands suggests that managers should be realistic about the prospects of 
financial success, and maybe look to join up with well-funded entities, either in industry or other 
USOs, as the likelihood of a single USO becoming successful alone is remote. 
Where the USO management is simply creating a company to formalise profitable consulting work, 
or as an entity with which to attract research grants, the emphasis on activities such as IPOs or 
attracting VC funding is much less significant. As a result, such lifestyle companies are likely to 
continue with little to learn from the fate of other USOs with a much smaller timescale for financial 
success. 
 
9.12.2 Governments and other policy makers 
As already discussed in Chapter 2, governments in the UK, and indeed worldwide, have at various 
times introduced policies designed to encourage the formation of USOs. USOs were seen as having 
great potential for creating highly skilled jobs and developing new disruptive technologies to the 
benefit of the national economy. Government support was often in the form of providing funding in 
the early stages of the life cycle of a USO to provide the necessary financial resources to the 
company to allow it to meet the costs of development of their underlying technology before any 
revenue had been generated. In the UK, the main government policy in this field was the creation of 
UCFs for this purpose. 
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As noted above, it is clear that while UCFs were indeed used to create significant numbers of USOs, 
and certainly far more than in the years before 2000 when such funding became available, the 
financial returns to universities in the West Midlands have been almost negligible. It is noticeable 
that Aston, which did not access any UCF money, was just as successful in terms of financial returns 
as Warwick, which used UCFs to create large numbers of USOs. From the viewpoint of enriching 
universities and creating significant long term wealth for the national economy, the UCF strategy 
conceived by the UK government appears to have been a failure. 
However, other indicators appear to show that the strategy may have had some success in that 
Warwick in particular, and Birmingham to a much lesser extent, were able to attract significant sums 
of money from external third party investors. It is likely that such investors were encouraged to 
participate with the background guarantee of some government money to the USO to meet some of 
its start-up funding costs. Such money may not have been invested had the UCFs not been set up, 
although this study does not investigate this area in great detail. Some university technologies have 
therefore clearly been further developed without having to use public money, and skilled jobs have 
been preserved and even created within USOs, thus adding to the knowledge base of the UK, even 
though the long term financial results appear to be limited. 
There may also have been indirect benefits to the economy such as creation and maintaining of 
supply chains which interact with USOs and the parent universities, including companies in other 
sectors, especially small and medium-sized entities in the local area. In addition, knowledge transfer 
may have occurred even after USOs failed, as staff left and joined other companies, taking with them 
knowledge and skills developed during their time at the USO. 
Overall, the picture is therefore mixed from a policy perspective for government. In the context of 
total government expenditure the amount spent on USOs via UCFs was immaterial, but it is not clear 
if the money could have been spent in a more effective way or on different projects and achieved 
better results. It is also emphatically clear that no significant company was created from USO origins 
within the West Midlands region. The debate will doubtless continue, but at least with studies such 
as the current one the hard facts in terms of financial impacts will now be available should a similar 
programme be considered in the future. It may also be the case that USOs have given better results 
when they are generated from elite UK universities, but that regional universities such as those from 
the West Midlands outside this elite cannot match them and that the USO programme has not 
succeeded for them. 
 
9.12.3 External investors 
Unlike government and other policy makers who may have wider viewpoints, external investors are 
usually almost solely concerned with the financial performance of any company in which they 
propose to invest. As a result, the lack of any significant exits from USOs in the West Midlands 
region, despite the significant sums invested by third party investors, means that the overall 
programme of USO creation has not been a success from an investor’s perspective. 
It should be noted that USOs, like many other small start-up companies whose reason for existence 
is to develop a technology to the point where it can generate revenue, are high risk investments for 
any investor given the significant information asymmetry and uncertainty in this sector. As a 
consequence, it is often the case that a high proportion of investments in this sector of companies 
will fail and the investors will lose all their money, having accepted the risk that this is likely to 
happen. However, given the long timescale of this study, the lack of any successful exits means that 
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USOs in the West Midlands have proved poor investments. This is in contrast to some empirical 
studies of USOs in the US, some of which have grown to significant size, as well as some USOs from 
more elite academic establishments in the UK. As a result, external investors may be more reluctant 
in future to invest in USOs, particularly those generated by universities outside the elite UK research-
driven institutions, given results such as those from the current study. 
 
9.12.4 Universities 
The response of West Midlands universities to the results of this work is not necessarily likely to be 
straightforward. On the one hand, there is likely to be some disappointment among finance 
departments that no USO has been created that led to a significant financial return to the university. 
It is clear that financial returns cannot in any case have covered the running costs of TTOs, their staff 
costs and the costs of other incubatory facilities for USOs. 
However, given that universities are publicly funded, this lack of financial return may not be a 
significant concern. USOs have achieved external funding by third party investors to develop 
university technology which would be unlikely to have happened in the absence of USOs. In addition, 
university staff will have gained valuable experience of the USO creation process and running these 
companies, gaining some commercial skills. Valuable networks with potential investors will also have 
been developed, and this may bear fruition under different programmes between university and 
industry or even in the future should a high quality USO be developed at a West Midlands university. 
Throughout the wider UK university scene, it is likely that the results of this work will be of value to 
universities in their assessment of whether they should try to create as many USOs as possible, or try 
to focus on a few, potentially high quality USOs. The experience of Aston, which did not access any 
UCF funding yet still saw some exits from its USOs, is of particular relevance in the current climate 
with the lack of any significant public financing to succeed UCFs. 
 
9.13 Limitations and suggested further work 
While this study contributes significantly to the existing literature on the financial performance of 
USOs, like all pieces of academic research it has a number of significant limitations in its scope. This 
situation then leads to proposals for further work in the field to help develop the findings and 
conclusions noted above. 
The chief limitation in this work, in common with most others in the field, is the size of the sample of 
USOs collected and analysed. While the sample size of 102 USOs from the West Midlands is of a 
respectable magnitude when compared to many other studies in the field, as noted in Chapter 8, it is 
dominated by the two universities of Birmingham and Warwick which together contribute over 70% 
of the USOs. While interesting trends are still observed for the other universities in the region, the 
small number of USOs generated by each means that results must be treated with care, especially 
when trying to make comparisons with other universities or with other performance studies. 
One of the key features of this study which sets it apart from others is the amount of time spent in 
collating a very accurate database of USOs using a wide range of independent sources. As a result, 
great confidence can be placed in the completeness of the database compared to other studies, and 
this is borne out in a number of ways including very different findings on USO survival compared to 
prevailing views in the field. However, the process of creating the database is time-consuming and 
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was a limiting factor in this study within the available timescale which prevented expanding the work 
to other regions of the UK. The techniques used to create the database in this work can be fully 
replicated for other studies, leading to ease of comparison of results with other regions and 
countries, which is a great strength of this work within its positivist research paradigm. 
There is also some limitation with the amount and range of data that can be collected. The lack of 
publicly available data on financial performance of USOs is a common theme within the literature 
e.g. Zhang (2009) so this situation came as no surprise. In addition, as already noted, the UK is 
particularly limited in the amount of publicly available data relating to companies as generated by 
Companies House with the ability of small companies to file abbreviated accounts with very limited 
financial disclosure required. As a result, the data collected in this work is fairly limited in scope, 
although because of the accuracy of the USO database interesting conclusions can still be drawn. For 
example, while it was possible to obtain data on the total amount of funding by a USO, it was not 
possible on a consistent basis to split this down into different funding rounds with amounts and 
dates, which would have allowed some more interesting results to be obtained. Other studies in the 
past have had to resort to approaching the USO direct to obtain this information, which is likely to 
reduce the accuracy of the data collected. As a result, it is often difficult to draw conclusions about 
apparent trends as a wide range of factors that cannot be considered here may also have an impact 
on the results observed. The theoretical frameworks used can only provide a fairly simplistic level of 
analysis of results, meaning any conclusions are often tentative in nature. 
Suggestions for further work on one level are straightforward, namely to perform a number of 
similar studies for different regions of the UK and different countries to provide more opportunities 
for comparisons against the results of this work. More studies will reveal whether the West 
Midlands region has unusual properties or whether the findings of this work are comparable with 
other regions. It should be noted that the findings on total external investment obtained by West 
Midlands USOs appeared reasonable when compared with other studies of UK USOs, so it is not 
expected that significant differences would be found. However, it should be noted that there is a 
significant lack of studies of overseas USOs, so this may be an area of priority in the field. 
Further investigation should also be made into the elite UK universities using the methodology of 
this work to see if the results are consistent with those already in the literature. As already noted, 
studies of financial performance have been made of some of these universities e.g. Oxford (Lawton 
Smith and Ho, 2006), and such universities have been prominent in promoting their apparent 
financial successes. However, it is noticeable even from the relatively small number of studies 
considered in this work that their financial success is relatively modest, even with questions about 
the accuracy and completeness of the USOs databases used in these works. It is not inconceivable 
that reworking some of these studies using the rigorous methodology of the current work, which 
removes the opportunity to remove historic, failed USOs from the database, could yield very 
different results to those seen previously. This is an area of priority for further work within the field 
of UK USOs. Following on from this, a more detailed investigation could be made examining the link 
between research excellence of a university and the financial performance of its USOs, which has 
not been considered in great depth to date. 
This study differs from other PhD theses in this field e.g. Mueller (2010), de Cleyn (2011) in that it 
does not attempt to obtain financial data through the means of sending questionnaires to USOs and 
then using regression analysis techniques to attempt to derive relationships between USO 
performance and a number of variables. It could be expanded with some more qualitative data, 
probably to include discussions with university TTOs to see if their policies for creating and managing 
USOs match up with observations made from the data obtained in this work. This would add a new 
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dimension to the current work, but its absence does not detract from its existing findings, which find 
sufficient differences from existing views in the field to make this a worthwhile standalone piece of 
work within its academic field. 
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